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ABSTRACT 
Since 1950s the United States had invariably declaring 
that it was an Asian/Pacific power, whose destiny was 
intertwind with that of various countries stretching from 
Japan to Australia. Indeed, at various periods, the United 
States had embroiled itself in a most profound way with 
developments of the entire region, particularly in the sphere 
of security. 
After the end of the Second World War, Southeast Asia 
had been strategically and economically important region for 
the United States and the United States policy was marked 
by its determination to safeguard and promote political, 
economic and strategic interests in the region. The 
containment of communism had been emerged as a major 
policy of the every American administrations and also to 
contain the widespread influence of former Soviet Union and 
the People's Republic of China, which later on contributed 
to the instability and conflicts in the region, particularly in 
Vietnam. 
The United States containment policy to preserve the 
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non-communist states from being controlled by the 
communists collapsed in 1975. It caused a major shift in 
foreign policy of Southeast Asian nations in general and 
Thailand in particular. The United States, therefore, reduced 
the assistance and military presence and urged each nation to 
rely largely on its own resources to preserve its national 
independence and security. 
The United States decided to support the South 
Vietnamese government and also helped to block the 
elections, which were to be held in 1956, believing that such 
elections would be rigged in the North to achieve the 
communist success under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. 
Again the United States decision was based on the nature 
of World Communism and on a desire to contain the 
expansionist tendencies of China in Southeast Asia. In 1957, 
North Vietnamese were furious over their failure to unite 
North and South Vietnam. 
President John F. Kennedy in his short term of pre-
evidency greatly broadened the commitment of President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in South Vietnam. His policy towards 
the crisis in Laos affected his attitude towards commitments 
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in both Thailand and South Vietnam as well as his 
relationship with Cambodia. It became much more clear 
under John F. Kennedy than Eisenhower that American 
involvement in mainland Southeast Asia - the two Vietnams, 
Laos, Cambodia and Thailand - was pronounced and 
heading towards a major crisis. 
President John F. Kennedy's policy in Laos led to 
deeper United States involvement in Thailand. Actually, 
Thailand had long been greatly concerned over developments 
in its Mekhong neighbours. The steps towards a neutralization 
of Laos against a background of the weakness of South 
East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) caused Thailand to 
seek stronger assurance from the United States. 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson believed that 
the world would be less dangerous if communism did not 
succeed in Indo-China. The basic American objective under 
President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, 
therefore, remained constant in South Vietnam denying 
communism to control the area. Although South Vietnam 
remained in existence due to American policy after the 
Geneva settlement of 1954, the United States often found 
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itself at the mercy of weak and inefficient Saigon regimes. 
Both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson 
Administrations constantly pre-occupied with the Domino 
theory or a variation of it. The theory persisted despite the 
emergence of the rift between Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China and despite the subsequent failure of the 
communist coup in the Southeast Asian country like 
Indonesia. Indeed, when Vietnam was viewed from United 
States in term of global strategic considerations, there was a 
certain aspect in outlook, a carry-over from an earlier period. 
After China fell to Mao Tse Tung and the United States 
policy towards communism became hardened and the 
importance of Indo-China in the United States security 
perception viewed seriously by the United States authorities 
to combat any eventualities of communists, particularly in 
Southeast Asian region. 
During 1964 United States policy towards Southeast Asia 
shifted to new phase. In summer, the North Vietnamese 
attacked American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, then a 
congressional resolution permitted the President to response 
strongly to the incident. Moreover, when the North 
Vietnamese government imposed pressure on South 
Vietnamese government, President Johnson approved American 
bombing in the North in an attempt to force the Vietnamese 
to the bargaining table. After 1965 the war became 
increasingly Americanized, such action certainly prevented 
North Vietnam's unification of the country. And later on, led 
to a crucial bloody, prolonged and indecisive conflict. 
When President Nixon came to power, he continued to 
bring the parties of the Indo-China war to the Paris talks 
and when it did not materialized, he then, offered a new 
plan that was the process of Vietnamization of war. Still 
hoping for a negotiate settlement but without other significant 
bargaining power, the President then suggested he would use 
the Vietnamization process and would simply proceed on his 
own schedule. Otherwise he would speed up the process of 
American withdrawal if North Vietnamese would negotiate. 
To fight a war with no hope of decisive victory 
reinforced the frustration of the American soldiers and citizen 
alike. Then Americans were instructed to fight a holding 
action and to minimize casualties. Beginning in early 1970s 
no major offensive operMiien^wef^^^JOv be initiated. While 
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conserving American lives, the effect of this policy was 
perceived as abondoning any hope of victory. 
The Paris Agreements of 1973 between the United 
States and North Vietnam ended American participation in the 
war. It committed the United States to stop all military 
involvement in South Vietnam, and to withdraw all its 
remaining troops, technicians and advisorsM 
r 
Early 1970s, only Thailand had remained in geopolitical 
terms, potentially to focal point of United States involvement 
on continental Asia. The United States authorities, therefore, 
attempted to redefine the role of America forward line of 
defence in the region. The security planners thought that 
there could be an arbitrary limit to set off the rimland of 
continental Asia which would represent the extent of new 
American defence and security. 
In 1974, Thailand asked the United States to stop flying 
over the Indian Ocean from Thai bases and argued that 
such flights contravened Thailand's support for the United 
Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a Peace Zone 
and ASEAN agreement on the neutrality of the region. The 
Thai authorities also sought co-operation from neighbouring 
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countries as well as China regardless of differences in 
political, ideology, economic and social system. 
The withdrawal of United States from Thailand in 1975 
provided a useful bargaining tool for diplomatic negotiations 
with its neighbours. As Hanoi had long maintained that it 
would not open negotiations with Thailand as long as 
American troops were present. Hence, Thai insistance on 
United States withdrawal would be a useful gesture of good 
will. 
Thai-American relations, however, have their own 
features, sometime if there were conflicts they mostly derived 
from problems of co-operation. During the Second Indo-
China war the United States asserted itself too strongly, 
antagonizing its allies especially Thailand. Indo-China war 
ended with an American withdrawal. Allied which were 
parties to the war readjust themselves accordingly. By 
comparison, the Thai-American adaptation process had been 
remarkably satisfied. 
As the competitive demands of the global economy 
propel the states of mainland Southeast Asia towards greater 
economic interconnection after the end of Cold War, 
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therefore, pressures upon Thailand to form a new and 
constructive relationship with government of neighbouring 
countries have multiplied and intensified. Thailand's border 
area could no longer serve merely as buffer zones, instead, 
in the new politic and economic context of regional relations, 
they serve as gateways for trade and investment. Peaceful 
and open border were one major precondition for sustained 
economic development. 
Economic and commercial relations since then, have 
replaced security ties as the Kingdom's major foreign policy 
concern: Thailand economy is now integrated into the world 
capitalist system. The new tone of Thai-United States, 
therefore, reflected Thailand growing importance in the world 
economy. Major aspects of the relations between the two 
countries continue to include financial aid, co-operation to 
wage war on narcotics and support for Peace Corps. 
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PREFACE 
Since 1950s the United States had invariably declaring 
that it was an Asian /Pacific power, whose destiny was 
intertwind with that of various countries stretching from 
Japan to Australia. Indeed, at various periods, the United 
States had embroiled itself in a most profound way with 
developments of the entire region, particularly in the sphere 
of security. 
After the end of Second World War, Southeast Asia 
had been strategically and economically important region for 
the United States and the United States policy was marked 
by its determination to safeguard and promote political, 
economic and strategic interests in the region. The 
containment of communism had been emerged as a major 
policy of the every American administrations and also to 
contain the widespread influence of former Soviet Union and 
the People's Republic of China, which later on contributed 
to the instability and conflicts in the region, particularly in 
Vietnam. 
The United States containment policy to preserve the 
non-communist states from being controlled by the 
communists collapsed in 1975. It caused a major shift in 
foreign policy of Southeast Asian nations in general and 
Thailand in particular. The United States, therefore, reduced 
the assistance and military presence and urged each nation to 
rely largely on its own resources to preserve its national 
independence and security. 
An attempt is made in this thesis to trace out the role 
of United States diplomacy towards Southeast Asia, 
particularly during Indo-China war and the subsequent 
developments in Thailand - United States relations since 
1975 relating to political, economic, social and cultural 
aspects as the growing ties between the two countries had a 
profound impact on the politics of Southeast Asian region. 
The entire region including Thailand witnessed a new era of 
democracy, freedom and right of self-determination and 
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assertion to maintain the individual identity of a nation 
which was free from, external threat or domination. 
The thesis consists of five chapters, conclusion, two 
appendices and the select bibliography. Chapter I, deals with 
the historical background of the United States interests and 
its involvement in Southeast Asian region. While the 
retrospective of Thailand - United States relations since the 
very beginning has been discussed in Chapter II. Chapter III 
explains the reasons and factors which led to the Indo-China 
war of 1970s. The Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamization of 
war have been highlighted in Chapter IV. Chapter V is 
mainly concerned with Thailand - United States relations 
since 1975 focusing, particularly the economic and 
commercial aspects, which indicate the changing approaches 
in their bilateral dealings. The conclusion draws the 
assessment of growing bounds of friendship between the 
United States and Southeast Asian region in general and in 
particular between the United States and Thailand. 
"With a prosperous and stabilized economy, Thailand 
would be ready to co-operate with U.S. in addressing 
issues of mutual concerns, ranging from the promotion of 
democracy, and human rights to nacrotics suppression. " 
Dr. Surin Pitsuwan 
(Thailand Foreign Minister) 
January 16, 1998 
CHAPTER-I 
Introduction : A Historical Background of United 
States Policy towards Southeast Asia 
United States and Southeast Asia 
The United States entered the Southeast Asia after 
1898, when it defeated Spain and seized the Philippines' 
After some three decades of self doubt, the United States 
enacted legislation in 1934 that set out a ten year timetable 
for the eventual independence of the colony. The United 
States interests in Southeast Asia in the initial stages, 
however, were minimal like trade and commerce.^ 
Since 1940 Southeast Asia has experienced major war, 
the defeat of colonial powers by an Asian powers, a 
1. The term Southeast Asia was first introduced during the 
Second World War when Allies established the Southeast Asia 
command in 1943, under Lord Louis Mountbatten, against the 
aggression of Japanese military in the region which 
headquartered at Ceylon (Srilanka). Before that Southeast Asia 
was included in the term Far East. 
Dhanasarit Sadhawetin, International Politics in Southeast 
Asia. (Bangkok : Chuanpim Press Ltd., 1989), p . l . 
2. Frank N. Trager, Why Vietnam. (New York : Frederick A. 
Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 13. 
disillusioning occupation by Japan, a great upsurge of 
nationalism, and the rapid growth of communism. Since the 
end of the Second World War, a wave of independence had 
swept Southeast Asia leaving their people freed of colonial 
rule, a host of new sovereign states, and a vast ideological 
and power vacuum. Economic and political problems had 
increased in complexity. Every states in Southeast Asia, 
except Thailand, had experienced major communist 
insurrection or invasion. A new Asian power Communist 
China had emerged as an immediate neighbour and, since the 
war, the issue of global conflict between communist and non-
communist state focused sharply in the area.^ 
By this time, the United States was emerged as an 
unchallenged power. The globalization of the United States 
power was justified as a necessary sequel to the alleged 
Soviet aggressiveness.'* Therefore, the United States 
3. John Kenry King, Southeast Asia in Perspective. (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 3. 
4. R.L. Walli, Vietnam Long Road to Freedom. (New Delhi : 
Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1976), p. 1. 
intervention in other countries for preventing people from 
overthrowing a satellite government became a regular feature 
of post Second World War policy.^ 
If the communists had not taken over China by 1949 
and invaded South Korea and Tibet in 1950, United States 
interests in Southeast Asia would have remained at a low 
key, even though the communist insurrections had began in 
Southeast Asia in 1947. In early 1950, shortly after fall of 
China to the communist, there began a re-examination of 
United States Asian policy, which led to more intensive 
involvement in freed Asia.^ 
However, the United States in Southeast Asia at early 
1950 can be summarized in a few sentences. In the 
Philippines, things continued to go in a manner generally 
5. Ibid., p. 3. 
6. The kind of this involvement usually through the form of aid 
agreements, which were negotiated with every nation in 
Southeast Asia, bilateral treaties, including security, political 
arrangement and regional agreements, such as Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO). 
Frank N. Trager, n. 2, p. 13. 
acceptable to the United States. In Burma, as U Nhu's non-
alignment became more perceptible. In Thailand, the United 
States began in this period to extend at first minimal 
assistance to the existing oligarchy, military led regimes. In 
Malaysia, the United States encouraged the British, whom 
she had assisted in Europe, to carry the burdens and costs 
involved in curbing the emergency. In Indonesia, despited 
the United States increasing annoyance at Sukarno's excess 
and growing lack of amenability to United States wishes, the 
United States Authorities basically continued a standoff 
posture and refrained from any direct intervention. In Indo-
China, the United States began after the initial hesitation of 
1945-1948 of the France, who in any case appeared 
absolutely essential to its position in Europe, therefore, in 
the absence of the French, there would be no force save that 
of the United States itself that could have coped with the 
threat.^ 
7. Paul M. Kattenberg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign 
Policy : 1945-1975. (New Jersey : Princton University Press, 
1982), p.23. 
In the broad sense, America's post-war Asia policy had 
been an extension of its European policy evolved during the 
late forties and early fifties. The latter was designed to 
contain Soviet expansion in Europe by showing up the 
defences of non-communists European nations and be 
reconstructing their economies, encouraged by the political 
stability and economic viability.^ 
President Harry S. Truman declared on March 12, 
1947, that: 
"One of the primary objectives of the foreign 
policy of the United States is the creation of 
conditions which we and other nations will be 
able to work out a way of life free from 
coercion. We shall not realize our objectives, 
however, unless we are willing to help free 
peoples against aggressive movements that seek 
to impose on their totalitarian regimes."^ 
8. M.S. Agwami, "American Ferment over Asia.", China Report, 
(New Delhi), Vol. V, No.6, November-December 1969, p 15 
9. Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXI, No. 403, March 23, 
1947, pp. 534-537. 
United States interests in Southeast Asia 
After the Second World War, Southeast Asia looms so 
large in American national interests that it fights for 
position with all other national interests, and secures 
military and economic commitments of a scope never 
previously participated. The main interests of the United 
States in Southeast Asia were (I) containment of 
communism, (ii) its security concerns (iii) trade promotion.^^ 
Of all reasons, for American concerns over the area 
that override consideration remained the threat of 
communist domination. American interests in the region, 
however, were further dominated with political, economic 
10. Perhaps these interests emerged from four principal events (i) 
The Seconds World War revealed the strategic importance of 
Southeast Asia to the United States both in military and 
economic terms, (ii) The independence achieved by some Asian 
countries resulted in the formation of new relationships 
between these states and the United States, (iii) Through the 
communist victory in China the relatively weak states of 
Southeast Asia became exposed to the possibility of communist 
aggression and domination and (iv) The key role assigned to 
Great Britain and Japan in Southeast Asia because of 
economic fact that access to the trade and resources of 
Southeast Asia was vital to the United States. 
John Kenry King, n. 3, p.2. 
commercial and strategic considerations. When consider it 
individually, it was hard to see which was vital to the 
conditions necessary for American security or strategy. But, 
when considered it as a whole area and when American 
interests were taken in combination as a multiplicity of 
extended from the Cold War to an increase global effort by 
the United States to prevent international communism, 
American interests in southeast Asia became extremely 
significant." 
Containment of Communism 
The Cold War strategists contended that Southeast Asia 
was the last barricade against communism in all Asia. If 
communism were to sweep through Southeast Asia, it would 
blanket the entire continent and tip the balance of world 
power to the communist bloc.^^ The factors, which gave rise 
truth perception of comoiuuist threat to Souiheast Asia in 
United States policy makers were : 
11. Ibid., pp.2-3. 
12. Ibid., p.2. 
(I) The highly aggressive and potentially extremely Soviet 
posture toward West Europe and the Balkan after 1946 
led to the elaboration of Truman Doctrine in 1947.^^ 
Containment in turn provided the conceptual 
parameters for the perception of spreading Moscow/ 
Peking-directed communism in Southeast Asia. 
(II) The Korean war further bolstered the American 
perception of a Sino-Soviet threat to the United States 
extended role in East Asia, and of aggressive 
communism on the move in Southeast Asia. 
13. Paul M. Kattenberg, n.6, p.21. 
The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the initiation of the 
Marshall Plan, and the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) were the significant steps taken by the 
United States to respond what was described as the challenge 
of Communist expansionism. The President Truman said : "the 
free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining 
their freedoms." he said confidently that Congress would face 
these great responsibilities squarely. The Truman Doctrine was 
based on a conception which subsequently the name domino 
theory was given. 
Jaya Krishna Baral, The Pentagon and the Making of US 
Foreign Policy : A case study of Vietnam 1960-1968t (New 
Delhi : Radiant Publishers, 1978), p.39. And also see, R.S. 
Chavan, Vietnam Trail and Triumph. (New Delhi : Patriot 
Publishers, 1987), pp. 99-101. 
(Ill) The United States unable to accommodate itself to 
communist-led nationalism in Southeast Asia even 
though the communism involves appears to have been 
largely autonomous in inspiration, needed the 
perception of a Sino-Soviet threat in order to mobilize 
itself for intervention in the region.'"* 
As far as American policy of containment was 
concerned for the newly independent national states which 
sought to adopt their philosophies and institutions to the 
value their need, American applied the basic democratic 
14. Paul M. Kattenberg, n.7, pp. 21-22. 
After 1949 the major forces shaped the direction of the foreign 
policy of the new states of Southeast Asia was the emerge of 
Communist China, the extension of Cold War from Europe to 
Asia and the United States sponsored effort to contain the 
widespread of communism by stepping the vacuum created by 
the withdrawal of Western power from the region. 
D.R. Sardesai, Southeast Asia : Past and Present,(Ghaziabad : 
Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1981), p. 318. 
In American eyes the France withdrawal from Indochina 
created a vacuum. So this vacuum must fill by American 
forces, and American was thinking that the whole of Southeast 
Asia might be over run by the communist. 
B.N. Panay, South and Southeast Asia 1945-1979: Problems 
and Policies.(London : Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980) p. 21. 
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values and representative government to the region. 
Although this interest has not been pursued with utmost 
vigour in Southeast Asia, traditionally it had provided a 
primary point of reference in the determination of American 
interests. The United States considered that a threat to 
democratic values anywhere in the would ultimately became 
a threat to her anywhere.'^ 
In considering the potential of communist aggression 
against Southeast Asia, two important factors that the 
United States kept in mind were : 
(I) Individually, no Southeast Asian country had sufficient 
military power to withstand a determined communist 
attrack launched either by Communist China or by 
Communist Vietnam and 
(II) The non-communist countries of Southeast Asia, only 
two were participanib lu coileciive security 
arrangements for the area - the Philippines and 
15. John Kenry King, n.3, p. 4. 
11 
Thailand which known as Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO).'^ 
The United States had attempted to establish the 
situation of strength throughout of pacts, alliances, and 
doctrine that enabled it to intervene anywhere. And also to 
give aid, militarily and economically, to any government 
which American believed such government would use it 
against the aggressive communists. 
16. Ibid-, p. 175. 
SEATO was an alliance of eight nations that signed the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty in Manila, the 
Philippines, on September 8, 1954. The member were 
Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Thailand and the United States. Pakistan withdrew 
in 1972 and SEATO was dissolved in 1977. The treaty was 
initiated by the United States after communist forces defeated 
France in Indochina. The United States claimed that the 
alliance was needed to prevent the expansion of communist 
influence in Southeast Asia. Under the terms of the treaty, 
member states agreed to help defend one another as well as 
other designated nations against military aggression. This 
aggression included threats both from other nations and from 
forces within member nations. SEATO did not develop into an 
effective alliance, partly because many Asian states, including 
India, Indonesia, and Japan did not join. In addition SEATO 
members disagreed on the extent of the communist threat and 
on how to meet it. 
The World Book Encvclopedia. (USA : World Book Inc, 
1990), Vol. 18, p. 887. 
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However, the United States pursued a more flexible 
policy leaning on its powerful armed forces that had been 
deployed in the region and taking advantage of its partner 
weakness and soon gain a position of domination over the 
region. Due to American economic might and skillful 
propaganda the United States appeared attractive to some 
nationalist leaders in Asia. It was the United States that 
guided and coordinated Western policy in the region along 
neo-colonial lines. The United States used it economic and 
military aid to Asian countries as the main tool for securing 
its own interests. Aid was given to those regimes with the 
United States believed would be used against progressive 
forces.'^ The United States doctrine of deterring communism 
formulated in 1947 for Europe, was applied in Asia and 
supplemented by the concept of rolling back communism; 
this called for using the most extreme means and method in 
17. Paul M. Kattenberg, n. 7, p. 48. 
18. S. Tikhvinsky, World War II and the People of Asia. (New 
Delhi : Allied Publishers Limited, 1990), p. 94. 
13 
ideological and political confrontation.'^ Thus, many 
Southeast Asians asserted that the United States was 
interested not in themselves but in their potential as a 
bulwark against communism. 
Security concerns 
Military analysts contended that Southeast Asia was 
vital to United States security even in term of military 
strategic alone.^° The United States considered Southeast 
Asia as an occupied position of global strategic importance 
roughly comparable to Panama and Suez.^' Only through the 
19. Ibid. 
20. John Kenry King, n. 3, p. 2. 
21. In international relations Southeast Asia was considered to be 
a region of great strategic significance. Geographically, it was 
placed between two great Oceans of the world - the Indian 
Ocean and the Pacific ocean. Its position around South China 
sea and Malacca Straits had given it control over an important 
trade route of the world. Lying across the main sea and air 
routs. Southeast Asia occupied a significant position in the 
system of world communication. Secondly, this area was a 
major source of food stuff needed by other countries and, 
thirdly, it was in between two great competing political and 
ideological movements - communist totalitarianism and 
representative democracy. 
G.P. Bhattarcharjee, Southeast Asian Politics : Malaysia & 
Indonesia, (Calcutta : Minerva Associate Publication Pvt. Ltd., 
1976), p.l . 
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narrow straits of Malacca may the barrier be penetrated 
conveniently. And if this region fall into the hands of hostile 
power, the peninsula and offshore islands of Southeast Asia 
in effect would cut the world in two. The same principle of 
American security applied in the Pacific during Second 
World War, the question of Japanese domination of 
continental East Asia and the island of the Western and 
Southeastern Pacific which was a vital pacific issue. 
Through such experiences as Pearl Harbour there was ample 
indication of the threat to American security of Pacific 
Ocean and domination of continental Asia by a single power 
after Peking - Moscow axis established control over a large 
part of Asia.^^ 
The power vacuum also, which left by the France 
defeat in Dien Bien Phu, plays a role of inducing factor for 
external powers competition for filling up the vacuum since 
22. John Kenry King, n.3, p.8. 
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Southeast Asia strategically very important region 
connecting the Indian~Oc^an with the Pacific Ocean.^^ 
Actually, in early 1954, the Eisenhower Administration 
was seized with the apprehensive that France would 
withdraw from Indo-China war and opened a chance for 
communist to penetrate into Southeast Asia under the 
sponsorship of Peking and Hanoi. Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, sought to persuade the British government to 
join the United States in a military effort to bloster French 
position, but he failed.^'' He then, sought a fall back 
position, one that would prevent Hanoi from quickly 
expanding communist control over Indo-China and 
pressuring Thailand.^^ 
American policy of support to the French military 
action against the Viet Minh was based on the belief 
23. Ibid. 
24. Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Southeast Asia in International 
Politics" Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XV, No. 7, July 1975, 
p.575. 
25. Ibid. 
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Stemming from the domino concept that the fall of Indo-
China to communism would lead to the spread of 
communism to other part of Southeast Asia. The national 
Security Council paper known as NSC 64, dated March 27, 
1950, stated: 
^'it was important to United States security interests that 
all practicable measures be taken to prevent further 
communist expansion in Southeast Asia. hido-China is a 
key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate 
threat. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma 
could be expected to fall under communist domination if 
hidochina were contr-olled by a communist dominated 
government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then 
be in grave hazard."^^ 
In April, 1950 the National Security Council prepared a 
paper known as NSC 68 by which summarized Washington's 
attitude towards threat posed by international communism. 
The paper recommended that the United States must resist, 
with force if necessary. Six days after the signing NSC 68, 
the Korean war broke out, and President Harry S. Truman 
ordered American combat troops into action to resist what 
26. Jaya Krishna Baral, n . l3 , p.41 
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the United States described as North Korean aggression 
against South Korea and in another move, Harry S. 
Truman increased economic and military aid to the French in 
Indo-China.^^ 
It was clear that Southeast Asia was a critical elements 
in the balance of power in Asia because of its location with 
respect to China, India and Japan. For the United States, 
Southeast Asia had a quite special meaning as an area of 
forward defence of the Pacific. In addition, the United 
States shares to a significance degree the specific interests 
in Southeast Asia of its allies and others whose security 
27, With the massive involvement of China in the Korean war 
towards the end of 1950 and with continued fighting by the 
Viet Minh against France in Indochina, the policy makers in 
Washington increasingly tended to believe that the operations 
in both Korea and Indochina were parts of the common effort 
made by the communists for furthering their expansion in the 
Far East and Southeast Asia The danger emanating from China 
to Southeast Asia came to be increasingly stressed. NSC. ^ 
124/2, June 1952 stated that the danger of an overt military 
attack against Southeast Asia was inherent the existence of a 
hostile aggressive Communist China. The document carried the 
implication that the less of any entity in Southeast Asia would 
be adverse to the security interests of both Western Europe 
and the United State. 
Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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would be threatened by the hegemony of single power in 
Asia.^* Thus, the United State took upon itself the role of 
self-styled policeman. Even it had been so before, but it 
assumed global dimension in the post Second World War. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson said in 1965 that : 
"History and our achievements has thrust upon 
us the principal responsibility for the 
protection of freedom on earth."^^ 
There was one more factor which the United States 
worried about, that was the population of Southeast Asia. 
Because most of them were peasants who had very modest 
education and technical capabilities. All people in the 
region, highly educated and lesser educated alike, were 
capable of being trained and employed by insurgents or 
unfriendly foreigners for the purpose of converting their 
political rule and fermenting hostility against adjoining non-
communist nations in the region. The United States 
28. W.W. Rostow, The United States and Regional Organization of 
Asia and the Pacific 1965-1985. (USA : University of Texas 
Press, 1986), p.183. 
29. R.L. Walli, n.4, p.7. 
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accordingly had an interest in preventing sizable portions of 
the populaiton in Southeast Asia from falling under 
unwanted totalitarian control. 
Trade Promotions 
As far as the United States was concerned Southeast 
Asia was important not only because of its strategical 
location but also because of the natural resources.^' Due to 
the world-wide energy crisis and scarcity of other natural 
resources, the position of Southeast Asia as source of raw 
materials had become much enhanced. Consequently, this 
economic factor attracted the foreign countries in the 
region.^^ 
30. Frank C. Darling, "United States Policy in Southeast Asia," 
Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XIV, No.7, July 1974, p.609. 
31. Southeast Asia has rich, fertile, its remain agricultural 
products are rubber, tea, and spices. The region's forests 
produce most of the world's teak. The costal waters yield 
large quantities of fish. Parts of the area have rich petroleum 
deposits and mines that produce large accounts of tin and 
precious stones. Manufacturing largely underdeveloped except 
in large cities. 
The World Book Encyclopedia. (USA: World Book Inc., 
1990), Vol. 18, p.686. 
20 
After the Second World War, the United States was 
faced with the traumatic possibility of denial of its 
economic penetration into the markets, industries and raw 
materials in many parts of the world.^^ Thus, American 
policy makers believed that the valuable raw material 
resources of Southeast Asia should not come under the 
control of elements hostile to United States and the West.^ "* 
Moreover, American policy makers might had been interests 
in the markets of Southeast Asia for American products. 
Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, told a Congressional 
Committee : 
"If you wish to control trade and income of the 
United States, which means the life of the people. 
32. R. Nagi, Big Powers and Southeast Asia Security. (New Delhi: 
Lancer Books, 1989), p.47. 
33. R.L. Walli, n.4, p.4. 
34. A National Security Council (NSC) staff study of February 13, 
1952 stressed the importance of the raise materials of 
Southeast Asia to Western powers. It said that : "Indonesia 
was a secondary source of Petroleum whose importance would 
be enhanced by the denial to Western powers of petroleum 
sources in Middle East." 
Jaya Krishna Baral, n. l2, p.41. 
35. Ibid., p.42. 
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you would probably fix it so that everything 
produced here would be consumed here, but that 
would completely change our constitution, our 
relations to property, human liberty, over very 
conception of law. And nobody contemplates 
that. Therefore, you find you must look to other 
markets and markets are abroad."^^ 
It was rightly said that the United States elites, perhaps 
unconciously but nontheless effectively, sought a world 
climate propitious to access for United States trade. United 
States acquisition of essential raw materials and sought to 
use Robert W. Tucker's term, a word congenial to 
America's capitalist economic values as well as to its own 
democratic political ideals.^^ 
The Nationals Security Council paper (NSC-68) dated 
December 23, 1949 highlighted the strategic value of Asian 
raw materials. Asia was the source of important raw and 
semi processed materials, many of them of strategic value. 
Moreover, in the past, Asia has been a market for the 
processed goods of industrialized states, and had been for 
36. R.L. Walli, n.4, p . l . 
37. Paul M. Kattenberg, n.7, p.36. 
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the Western colonial powers a rich source of revenue from 
investments alnci other"invisible earniiigsT^ 
The United States designed its foreign policy for 
protecting its business interests, seeking commercial and 
investment opportunities and raw materials abroad which 
would be done only by imposing its own concepts of 
economic order beyond its frontiers. President Harry S. 
Truman described the concept succinctly in March 1997 
that: "the whole world should adopt the American system."^^ 
38. Even in the case of Vietnam, the economic element had not 
been missing. The Vice-President of the Chase Manhattan 
declared in 1965 that: 
"In the past foreign investor have been somewhat 
wary of the overall political prospect for the 
Southeast Asia region. I must say, though, that 
the United States action in Vietnam this year 
which have demonstrated that the United States 
will continue to give effective protection to the 
free nations of the region have considerably 
reassured both Asian and Western investors. 
Infact, I see some reason for hope that the same 
sort of economic growth may take place in the 
free economies of Asia that took place in Europe 
after the Truman Doctrine and after NATO 
provided a protective shield. The same thing also 
took place in Japan after United States 
intervention in Korea removed investors doubts." 
R.L. Walli, n.4, pp.9-10. 
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In the broad sense, the raw materials of Southeast Asia 
were very important for American politically and 
economically. The National Security Council (NSC-5405) 
dated January 16, 1954, contained the usual reference to 
the raw material resources of Southeast Asia and reiterated 
that the loss of Southeast Asia to the communist would have 
serious economic consequences for many nations of the free 
would and conversely would add significant resources to the 
Soviet bloc/° 
39. Aid and Military power also were used for facilitating foreign investments 
and trade by the United States and other metropolitan powers. As the then 
World Bank's President, Engene Black, said that: 
"Our foreign aid programmes constitute a distinct benefit to 
American business. The three major benefits are . 
(i) Foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate 
market for United States goods and services. 
(ii) Foreign aid stimulated the development of new 
overseas market for United States companies and 
(iii) Foreign aid orients national economies toward a fi-ee 
enterprise system in which United States firms can 
prosper." 
Jaya Krishna Baral, n. 13, pp. 5-6. 
40 Ibid, p.45. 
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CHAPTER-II 
A Historical Retrospective of Thai - United States 
Relations 
Official and non-official relations between American 
and Thailand rest on a long and cordial basis. The first treaty 
negotiated between the United States and Thailand was made 
in 1833 by Thai King, Phra Nang Klao (Rama III), and 
Edmund Roberts, a diplomatic envoy sent to Southeast Asia 
by President Andrew Jackson. For over a century American 
Protestant missionaries entered Thailand in a small numbers 
and initial reforms in education, medicine and technology. At 
the beginning of the 1920s King Chula Longkorn employed 
advisers from the Harvard Law school to assist Kingdom in 
abolishing extrateritoriality and other unequal treaty 
restrictions. 
Between the two World Wars the United States 
government began to play an increasing role in the contacts 
between the two countries. With the beginning of the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia, the United States replaced Great 
25 
Britain as a major foreign influence in Thailand. The policy 
of containing communist aggression led the American 
government to undertake a rapidly expanding role in the 
relations between the two countries.' 
After the end of the Second World War, Thailand 
became the foremost American ally in the region. It was the 
United States that quickly accepted the Thai nullification of 
The American interests in Thailand after the Second World 
War had been three folds . 
(i) Geography : Thailand comprises a strategic area in the 
center of mainland Southeast Asia. To American policy 
makers, Thailand appeared as an oasis of stability in a 
region of turmoil. The geographic importance had been 
increased in the struggle against external aggression 
which Thailand was a crucial base in the defense of the 
entire region. 
(ii) People : The Thai people comprise the largest population 
of any state on, the mainland Southeast Asia. They can be 
trained for the advancement and defense of their own 
country, and they can be trained by outside hostile power 
for the overthrow their government as well. 
(iii) Resources ; Thailand was the World's leading rice 
exporter. Other important products were rubber, tin, teak, 
meat and Kapok. A modest lightened medium industrials 
base was being developed and almost every year more 
manufactured good were produced locally, over one 
hundred American firms, subsidiaries, or affiliates operate 
in the Kingdom, including several large banks and oil 
companies. 
Frank C. Darling, "American and Thailand", Asian Survey. 
(Berkeley), Vol. VII, No.4, April 1967, pp. 214-216. 
26 
the state of war and prevented punitive action against 
Thailand by Great Britain. Thereafter, the United States 
provided technical and economic as well as military 
assistance to Thailand. A statement by Secretary of State, 
James F. Byrnes, issued on August 20, 1945 stated that: "the 
American government had always believed that the 
declaration of war of Thailand against the United States 
during the Second World War did not represent the will of 
Thai people."^ He recalled that the Thai minister in 
Washington had organized the Free Thai Movement (FTM), 
Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the struggle for 
Southeast Asia. (New York : Cornell University Press, 1965), 
p.91. 
The Second World War threatened the new political 
arrangement. Faced with Japanese invasion, the government of 
army leader Pibun Songkhram precipitously joined the Axis 
power effort. When Japan's ultimate defeat became assured, 
the previously decide parliament in 1944 removed Pibun and 
replaced him by a widely respected civilian, Khuang 
Aphaiwong. As the war suddenly ended, before any fighting 
had taken place within Thailand, the government passed into 
the hands of the Free Thai Movements (FTM) that had opposed 
Japan, the Thai underground led by Pridi, and a group of Thais 
who had been in Western Countries at the time of the Japanese 
invasion. The Pride supporter quickly dominated Thai. 
Donald Hindley, "Thailand . The Politics of Passivaty", Pacific 
Affairs. (Vancouver), Vol. XLI, No.3, Fall 1968, p.356. 
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which contributed substantially to the allies cause.^ This 
statement of policy concluded by asserting that the United 
States regarded Thailand not as an enemy, and that it looked 
to the resumption by Thailand of its former place in the 
community of naitons as a free, sovereign, and independent 
country. This declaration clearly put the British and other 
Allied powers on notice that the United States would 
opposed any effort to deprive Thailand of its independent.'* 
By this period Thailand was facing several problems. 
Its transportation systems were destroyed, economy 
3. Ibid. 
The United States recognized the Free Thai Movement (FTM), 
which emerged as an underground organization, working in 
league with the United States Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS). This organization aimed at ousting the Japanese and 
overthrowing the dictatorial regime in Thailand. Members of 
the FTM were trained mostly in the United States. The FTM 
established contacts with United States forces and assisted 
them in fighting against Japan. Thus the United States and 
FTM co-operated with each other for common objective. This 
co-operation, ultimately, led to the foundations of a durable 
friendship between the two countries. 
Ganganath Jha, Foreign Policy of Thailand. (New Delhi: 
Radiant Publishers, 1979), p.34. 
4. Donald E. Nuechterlein, n.2, p.86. 
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declined. It was only the United States adopted a most 
friendly attitude toward Thailand. In January 1946, it 
reestablished diplomatic relation with Thailand. And above 
all, the United States supported Thai leaders in the difficult 
task of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union and facilitated Thailand's admission into the United 
Nations.^ 
It was American that helped rehabilitate Thailand's 
economy in the hopes of turning the country into Southeast 
Asian ally, that would counter balance Indo-China. 
Beginning in 1946 the United States paid a higher price for 
Thailand rubber. In 1946-1947 United States granted 
Thailand a large loan to enable Thailand to purchase railroad 
and reconstructed transportation system. American 
diplomacy made no secret of its desire to establish a firm 
order in Thailand and the circumstances favoured this line.^ 
5. Ganganath Jha, n.3, p.36. 
6. Gennadi Chufrim and Igor Mozheiko, Southeast Asia : Unity In 
Diversity. (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited, 1989), 
p.127. 
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During that period also, Thailand was facing the 
potential danger from the local communist insurrection and 
from the Vietnamese minority, living in Northeast Thailand.^ 
Coupled with the emergence of Communist China in 1949, 
the United States alarmed and decided to do something that 
halted the advance of communism in the region. As a result, 
the United States Ambassador, Phillip C. Jessup visited 
Bangkok for three days conference. He conferred with 
Marshal Pibun Songkram, Thai Prime Minister, and sought 
his support in the battle against communism. Shortly after his 
returning to the United States, President Harry S. Truman 
7. The Northeast was populated mostly by Moas and North 
Vietnamese. It was the poorest region in the country and had 
always been neglected by the center. There were nearly 40,000 
North Vietnamese living in the Northeast whose loyalty had 
always been suspected. Many of them were alleged to continue 
to own allegiance to Hanoi. Most of the inhabitants were of 
Laotian extraction. Culturally there appears to exist a great 
deal of co-ordination between the Pathet Laos forces and the 
insurgents of North Thailand. The geography of the area 
greatly helps these insurrections. At some places, the Mekhong 
river is so narrow that people could easily skip one side to the 
other. 
Jaya Krishna Baral, "U.S. involvement in Thai Security", China 
Report.(New Delhi), Vol. X, No. 4, July-August 1973, p. 18. 
And also, for further details, see, Peter A. Poole, "Thailand's 
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approved a grant of military aid to Thailand. Two months 
later the economic assistance also was extended to Thailand 
through the economic co-operation administration.^ 
On February 28, 1950, Marshal Pibun Songkram 
decided to recognize the government of Bao Dai in South 
Vietnam as an earnest of Thailand's solidarity with the 
Western powers. He also supported the French-sponsored 
governments in Laos and Cambodia and ordered closure of 
Vietminh headquarters in Bangkok. In June 1950, when there 
was a conflict between North Korea and South Korea, 
Thailand supported the latter along with the Western powers, 
Thailand sent four thousand ground troops to fight as 
integral part of the United Nations forces in Korea when the 
United Nations decided upon a military intervention in order 
to end that conflagration.^ Since then, the former dictator 
Vietnamese Minority", Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. VII, No. 
12, December 1967, pp. 886-895. 
8. Ganganath, Jha, n. 3, p. 37. 
9. Ibid. 
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was treated with great respect by the United States in the 
tension of the Cold War.''^ 
It was the Korean war that turned point for both the 
United States and Thailand, in so far as the military defence 
of Southeast Asia was concerned. Until that time American 
in the area was largely economic and cultural. After June 
1950, the military implications of Communist China's 
ambitions in Asia made the United States military and 
economic assistants to Thailand of vital importance to both 
countries.'^ 
On September 19, 1950, the United States signed an 
Economic and Technical Assistance Agreement with 
Thailand. Under this agreement, the United States 
established a mission in Thailand called the United States 
Operation Mission (USOM). To work in close cooperation 
with the USOM, Thailand created a Department known as 
Department of Technical and Economic Co-operation 
10. Ibid., p. 38 
11. Ibid. 
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Stressed the importance of basic projects. The economic aid 
made available under this agreement-consist of grants for the 
financing of technical assistance, training abroad and rural 
developments projects.^^ 
On October 17, 1950, a Military Assistance Agreement 
was signed. Under this agreement the United States agreed 
to provide weapons and equipments to Thailand and to give 
military training to Thai officers. After signing, Edwin F. 
Stanton, the head of American team said that: 
"This agreement follows the request by the 
Government of Thailand for American arms and 
equipments to strengthen Thailand's forces with a 
view to enabling them to better defend Thailand 
and Thailand's people from any aggression which 
may threaten the peace and tranguility of this 
country. The agreement contains no provisions 
for military, naval or air bases. The Governments 
of Thailand has not offered such bases, nor the 
12. Among the first projects sponsored by the USOM were 
schemed for the eradication of Malaria, for the installation of 
village wells, and for the dredging of the Chao Phraya River to 
provide a deep water channel to the port of Bangkok. 
Technical and economic assistance made available through the 
USOM totaled upto approximately $ 440.1 million for the 
period from September 1950 to June 1965. 
Ibid. 
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Government of the United States ever requested 
such bases or any specific concession".'^ 
Alliance with the United States - Communist China's 
strongest enemy - had been the keystone of Thai foreign 
policy sine 1950 formalised in terms of several military 
economic and cultural agreements and above all by the 
membership of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
in September 1954, which initiated by the United States *'*. 
13. According to Thanat-Khoman, the former Thai Foreign 
Minister (1959-72), the Thai-American military agreement of 
1950 was the landmark in Thai-United States Relations. It was 
through this treaty only, not through the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) that the United States acquired a full 
grip over the military aspects of Thailand In October 1950, 
Thailand was given a loan of $ 25,400,000 from the World 
Bank for the reconstruction of railroads, and development of 
the harbour in Bangkok. It was the first loan to any nation in 
Southeast Asia. At the end of 1951 the Mutual Security 
Agency (MSA) replaced the Economic Co-operation 
Administration (ECA). The MSA launched a vast programme 
of military, economic and technical assistance. On July 4, 
1951, the Independence Day of the United States, the Bank of 
America saluted the Kingdom of Thailand where independence 
had become the watchword of the nation. And both nations 
stood in the forefront of world efforts to promote and defend 
the democratic way of life. 
Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
14. Lalita Prasad Singh, Power Politics and Southeast Asia. (New 
Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979), p. 123. 
After becoming member of SEATO, the United States provided 
more aid to Thailand economically and militarily. In 1959, a 
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The King of Thailand, Bhumibol Aduldej, expressed his 
happiness over United States assistance to Thailand in his 
address to the two Houses of United States Congress in 
Washington, D.C., on July 29 that: 
"The United States was applying the old of 
conception of family obligations upon the largest 
scale in giving assistance to foreign countries. 
The nations of the world were being taught that 
they were but members of one big family that 
they had obligations to one another and that they 
were closely interdependent. It may take a long 
time to learn this lesson but when it will be truly 
learnt, the prospect of world peace will be 
right."^^ 
SEATO Graduate School of Engineering (known as the Asian 
Institute of Technology) was established in Bangkok in 
response to an increasing demand for highly trained engineers 
in the developing countries of Southeast Asia. In the same 
year, the SEATO also sponsored a project known as the 
Skilled Labour Project to help overcome the shortage of 
skilled workers. Another project was a military oriented 
project, known as the Military Technical Training School. The 
School provided training for technical supervisions, skilled 
workmen, and instructions of the Royal Thai Army, Navy and 
Air Force. 
In 1960, a SEATO Medical Research Laboratory was 
established to undertake investigations into the principal 
diseases of Southeast Asia, especially malaria and 
haemorrhagic fever. 
Ganganath Jha, n. 3, pp. 48-49. 
15. Bangkok World. July 1, 1960. 
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Thailand Security and United States Policy 
Between 1946 and 1953, when the French began to 
reassert control over Indo-China, about eighty thousand 
Vietnamese refugees owing allegiance to the Government of 
Ho Chi Minh fled across the Mekhong and reached 
Northeastern Thailand.'^ The Bangkok administration thought 
that they were supporters of communism and that they were, 
therefore, a manace from the point of view of the security 
and integrity of Thailand. As they could not be repatriate, 
the military rulers of Thailand dealt with them in a ruthless 
manner.'^ 
16. Northeast Thailand was properly considered an area of 
strategic importance in the conflict in Southeast Asia. This 
region of 70,000 square miles was a significant base area and 
even a potential front in Indo-China war. The politics of this 
region therefore, was a matter of considerable anxiety to the 
government of Thailand and its allies. Moreover, the unsettled 
character of the political structure of Laos, erected on the thin 
crust of the 1962 Geneva Accords, remained a threat to 
Thailand's security. One result of United States, based on the 
1963 Rusk-Thanat interpretation of Manila Pact, had become 
closer and more solid. For this reason the Thai governments 
concerned about the politics of Northeast was shared by the 
Thai government with the United States government. 
David A. Wilson, "Introductory comment on Politics and 
Northeast", Asian Survev. (Berkeley), Vol. VI, No. 7, p. 349. 
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On January 31, 1953, the People's Republic of China 
established a Thai Autonomous People's Government in 
Yunan districts, which Thai called Sibsong Panna, which 
aimed to smash the American imperialist activities in the 
region, and to unmasking the corrupt military rulers of 
Thailand and started a guerrilla war against the military 
regime in Thailand. In their establishment, the Chinese 
communist stated that: 
"they would learn from the Han Chinese and the 
example of the Han Chinese cadres to guide the 
Thai people to help other national minority to 
implement area autonomy, make concerted efforts 
to smash the sabotage activities of the American 
imperialists and special agent of Chiang-Kai-Shek 
and struggle to strengthen national defence of the 
fatherland and construct a new Hsi-Shuang Panna 
area under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and 
the Central People's Government."^* 
In the spring of 1953, the situation made Thai leaders 
more feared of communist invasion when the Viet Minh 
forces moved into Laos and set up a so-called Free Laotian 
17. Ganganath Jha, n. 3, p. 41. 
18. Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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government and then moved into Cambodia in April 1954. 
At this critical juncture, Thailand appealed for more 
American military aid to counter the subversion and such 
assistance was given.'^ 
By this period, it was coincided with the Thai feared 
of communists aggression, American intended to build the 
Kingdom into a bastion of the free world in Southeast Asia 
and to prepare the country for an assault from Communist 
China. Since then, the United States rapidly expanded 
economic and military aid to Thailand. 
19. Donald E. Neuchterlein, n. 1, p. 113. 
As President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated in February 1953 
that; 
"his Administration would follow a new positive 
foreign policy to block any further advance by the 
communists and bolster the nation's anti-
communist allies. A new look would be given to 
the American military positive, and a new stress 
would be placed on deterrent military power and 
collective regional security, appreciating that 
economic need, military security and political 
wisdom combined to suggest regional groups of 
free peoples, within the frame work of the United 
Nations to help strengthen such special bonds the 
world over." 
Ganganath Jha, n. 3, p.43. 
20. Frank C. Darling, n . l , p.217. 
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On April 14, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
wrote a letter to the British Prime Minister, Winston S. 
Churchill, explaining the seriousness of communist threat in 
Indo-China and persuading British to form a collective 
military organization.^' Meanwhile John Foster Dulles, the 
Secretary of State, persuaded Australia, France, Great 
Britain, and New Zealand to join in a Southeast Asia 
defence pact. And only three Asian countries agreed to 
join it namely Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.^^ 
21. He wrote that if Indo-China pased into the hands of 
communists, the ultimate effect of it on the global strategic 
position of the United Kingdom and the United States would 
be disastrous. He proposed the establishment of a new "ad 
hoc" grouping or coalition composed of nations professing a 
vital concern in the checking of the communist expansion in 
the region. He pointed out that in the past they had failed to 
halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and 
in time and had paid the price for their negligence through 
many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. 
Ganganath Jha, n.3, pp.43-44. 
22 In response to Dulles plan, the Thai Foreign Minister said that 
the proposed Southeast Asia Defence Pact should be on the 
pattern of North Atlantic Organization (NATO). He felt that 
Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam should also be persuaded 
to join it. 
Ibid., p.43. 
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On September 6, 1954, the conference was held in 
Manila participated by the representatives of the countries 
accepted the Dulles plan. On September 8, 1954 the treaty 
was signed, which known as the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) to create regional defence 
organization. The treaty had a preamble, eleven Articles and 
a Protocol. Articles 2 and 4 constituted the operative part of 
it.^ ^ The protocol of the treaty extended its protection upon 
23. Ibid.., p.43. 
Under Article 2, the parties to the treaty agreed, jointly and 
severally and by means of continuous and effective self-help 
and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and 
counter subversive acts both within and without their 
territorial integrity and political stability. In Article 4, the 
main political military obligation was contained according to 
which each member of the bloc undertook, in case of 
aggression in the area covered by SEATO, to act for 
overcoming this common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional procedures. Besides, the participants in the 
treaty pledged to act jointly in case the "inviolability or 
integrity of or sovereignty and political independence" of any 
of them was endangered by the means other than armed attack 
or it is influenced or threatened by any other factor situation. 
Thus, support for the United State in Indo-China was one of 
the major lines of the bloc's activity in 1964-1973. 
Andrei Krutskin, United States Militarism. (New Delhi, Allied 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1987),pp. 106-109. 
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Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam even it was repeatedly 
rejected by Laos and Cambodia.^ "^ 
With the signing of this treaty, the United States 
became very close ally of Thailand and help Thailand to 
develop its infrastructure such as air bases, roads, hospitals 
and other activities with a view to meet the requirements of 
the United States forces going to Indo-Chin to war with the 
communists.^^ American influence, therefore, was wide-
spread, the Thais were highly appreciative generally of the 
lavish assistance given by the United States. A few, 
however, criticised it on the ground that it put too high a 
premium of armament and neglected to build the national 
economy so that the result was an economic and political 
crisis in Thailand. And with the help of the United States, 
Thailand's military grew stronger and stronger and 
threatened the country's social balance.^* 
24. Ibid., p. 107. 
25. Ganganath Jha, n.3, p.47. 
26. Describing the bad effect of United States aid on Thai Society, 
some Thai students remarked that support for the previous 
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When Marshal Sarit came to power on September 17, 
1957. He also brought Thailand closer and more deeply 
concerned with the United States as table 2.1 shows that the 
United States military assistance to Thailand had gone 
upward. 
Table 2.1 : United States Economic and Military assistance 
to Thailand 1958-1967 (millions of Dollars) 
Fiscal Year 
Economic 
Military 
1958 
25.9 
19.1 
1959 
58.9 
18.0 
1960 
25.9 
24.7 
1961 
24.3 
49.0 
1962 
47.6 
88.0 
1963 
21.9 
71.8 
1964 
15.1 
32.2 
1965 
41.4 
30.8 
1966 
60.4 
42.3 
1967 
37.0 
59.0 
Source : David K Wyatt, Thailand a short History. (Michigan) p.284. 
Thai development in the period of Prime Minister Sarit 
and his immediate heirs took place in the context of'an 
increasingly threatening international situation. The turning 
point came during the Laos crisis of 1960-1961, in which the 
military government had led to the decay of democracy in 
Thailand and American air bases here have tarnished the good 
image of Thailand as an independent country. They pointed out 
that Thailand was used as a "laboratory" for testing American 
instrument of torture, prior to their application in Vietnam, 
Africa, or even in the United States itself. 
S.R. Sudhamani, Political Development in Thailand 1958-1963. 
(Tirupati : Sri Venkateswara University, 1980),pp.186-187. 
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Laos right wing forced the Pathet Lao out and installed a 
government and ultimately led to the civil war which 
reported that North-Vietnamese supported Pathet Laos. The 
situation rapidly deteriorated and the Thai became seriously 
alarmed at the growing strength of Pathet Laos that 
communism had come to her borders. In March 1961, 
Thailand requested the SEATO to take action against the 
Communist Laotian forces but SEATO failed to a unanimous 
decision on it.^ ^ So this action did not satisfy Thailand 
leaders and they felt betrayed when the United States 
27. As a result, Sarit demanded the reforms in the structures of 
SEATO, he proposed, when he felt that Lukewarm support 
only had been given not the SEATO ideals, that 
"I am ready to support a move to refashion SEATO 
in such a way as to inject into it a new sense of 
purposefulness composed of members who 
completely share the same thoughts and interests, 
and same hopes and aspirations whose fundamental 
goal was to be safeguarded and maintain peace and 
welfare in Southeast Asia and who are ready to 
make common sacrifices to build up a location 
against impeding danger." 
Ibid., p.194. 
And the Thais, however, realistic enough that they could not 
manage to expel France and Britain from SEATO They 
therefore, pressed the United States to offer a unilateral 
guarantee of Thailand's security and to replace the rule of 
unanimity in SEATO's decision by a majority system. 
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abandoned the Laos right wing and supported the neutralist 
Souvanna Phouma whose position at the head of Laos 
government of national unity was secured by the Geneva 
Conference on Laos in July 1962.^^ 
The refusal of SEATO led the Thai government to 
question the "raison d'etre" of the membership of the 
Western alliance. The Thais wanted the traditional of 
friendship with all countries. As a result, on May 17, 1961 
the United States Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson visited 
Bangkok to restore shaken Thai faith in the United States. 
The Thai-American relations, however, remained strained in 
the mid 1961, as the Thai was worried about the Laos 
situation. They opposed such American not intervention that 
this would be a prelude to the communists take-over of Laos. 
The Thai leaders felt that the United States was not attaching 
Lalita Prasad Singh, n. l4, p. 127. 
28. David K. Nyatt, Thailand a Short History. (Michigan: Yale 
University Press, 1987), pp.283-284. 
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the same importance to the view and interests of Thailand as 
it was to its European allies.^^ 
In March 1962, the Thai's Foreign Minister, Thanat 
Khoman, visited Washington for talk with Secretary of State, 
Dean Rusk,on the question of the security of Thailand and to 
assess the danger passed by the Pathet Laos forces which 
advanced towards Thailand's borders.^^ On March 6, 1962 at 
the end of the talks, a Thai United State joint statement was 
published. It clearly stated that : 
"The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United 
States regards the preservation of the 
independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to 
the national interest of the United States. The 
Foreign Minister and the Secretary of States 
reviewed the close association of Thailand and the 
United States in Southeast Asia Collective Defence 
Treaty. The Secretary of State assured the Foreign 
Minister that in the event of such aggression, the 
United States intends to give full effect to its 
obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional process."^' 
29. Lalita Prasad Singh, n.l4, pp.125-126. 
30. Ganganath Jha, n.3, p.51. 
31. This joint statement was well received in Thailand. The 
significant of this joint statement lies in the modification of 
members' obligations which, contrary to the explicit provision 
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Thai - Cambodia relations had been a problem for Thai-
American as well as Cambodian-American relations. During 
the third quarter of 1962, the Thai - United States relations 
became soured when the United States gave military aid to 
Cambodia for preventing the North Vietnamese Communist 
guerrillas from using Cambodian territory for infiltration and 
subversion in South Vietnam. The Thais, however, felt 
cheated because of the failure of the United States to consult 
them before an armed deal with their traditional rival. Who 
might not use army against Viet Cong, but against 
Thailand.^^ Thus, Thai leaders, the Minister of Interior, 
of unanimous agreement for any SEATO action, were now 
declared to be both individual and collective. The United 
States declared that she would go ahead, if she wanted to do 
so, with her actions in the defence of Thailand and elsewhere 
in the treaty area even if others did not approve. This was 
what Thailand had been hoping for long time. In their view, as 
said the Foreign Minister, it gave a new lease of life to the 
shaky structure of Southeast Asia Collective Defence System. 
Lalita Prasad Singh, n . l 4 , p. 127. 
32. Viet Cong was a term applied to all Vietnamese revolutionaries 
and members of resistance movement against French colonists 
and United States aggressors in South Vietnam. In other 
words, the Viet Mint was called "Viet Cong" by Americans in 
South. 
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General Prapas, used this accident to advocate a return to 
Thailand s traditional neutralism." 
Thailand, however, still an enthusiastic ally of the 
United States. This because of the common United States -
Thai perception of communist threat in the region. '^* 
R.S. Chavan, Vietnam Trail and Triumph. (New Delhi: Patriot 
Publishers, 1987), p.114. 
33. But when India was attacked by People's Republic of China 
forces in October 1962, the Thais, therefore, concluded that 
neutralism was not a realistic proposition for Thailand in the 
existing circumstances, as Thanat put it that: 
"We do not think of neutralism as an answer to our 
position. Some of our neighbors profess non 
alignment and this only in theory. In practice they 
lean to one side. They are fearful and oppose the 
side that threatens them." 
Lalita Prasad Singh, n.l4, p. 129. 
34. The presence of a Chinese minority of over five million in a 
country and the creation of the Thai Autonomous in South 
China were viewed by the Thais a the sources of future 
troubles that People's Republic of China might create for 
Thailand. Thai suspicions had been confirmed ever since the 
publication in Peking's Daily, on December 14, 1964 and 
February 5, 1965 of a Thai Communist Party manifesto of the 
movement for the independence of Thailand and the reported 
formation of a Patriotic Front of Thailnd to expel American 
imperialist and to overthrow the traitorous and despotic 
government of Thailand. 
Gnaganath Jha, n.3, p.53. 
Subversion had been considered to be the main danger. As 
King Bhumipol warned after the fall of South Vietnam that: 
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When the situation in Laos became more serious 
especially, when the Pathet Laos forces occupied the Nam 
Tha, which border on Burma, China and Laos on May 6, 
1962. This made it necessary for Robert Mc Namara, the 
then United States Secretary of Defence to pay a visit to 
Thailand to see the situation himself. Mc Namara, then, 
thought of implementing a single strategic plan to protect 
Southeast Asia as a region. Hence, on May 16, 1962, twelve 
United States Super Subre-jet fighters landed at a Thai 
airfield, it was the first jet fighter landing in Thailand 
followed by 1,000 marines of the United States Seventh 
fleet. On May 1, 1962, Sarit, the Thai Prime Minister stated 
that: 
"the entry of the United States troops had become 
necessary because the circumstances following 
the fall of Nam Tha constituted a threat of the 
Kingdom of Thailand."^^ 
"Thailand is now a direct target of an enemy who wants to 
control our country." 
Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand and the Manila Pact", The World 
Today. (London), Vol.36, No.2, February 1980, p.46. 
35. Ganganath Jha, n.3, pp. 53-54. 
48 
By mid 1964, the situation in Indo-China looked 
increasingly threatening to Thailand and the United States. 
The Thais, therefore, agreed to a substantial upgrading of 
their military - base facilities. From March 1964, United 
States aircraft were based at Takhli airfield and after the 
Gulf of Tonkin incident in August of that year, additional 
aircraft were based at Khorat. The American military build 
up continued up to 1968, and through most of this period and 
beyond, there were nearly 45,000 United States military 
personnel stationed in Thailand, with nearly 600 aircrafts, 
including B-52 bombers based at Utapao.^^ 
Thai American relations had improved rapidly 
following the deaths of President John F. Kennedy and 
Marshal Sarit in late 1963, and their replacement by the 
Lyndon B. Johnson and General Thanom. But Johnson was 
increasingly concerned to bolster American prestige in 
Vietnam, while the new regime in Bangkok was less stable 
than that of Sarit and thus more vulnerable to American 
36. David KI. Wyatt, n.28, pp.287-288. 
49 
pressure. The Thanom so called secret treaty or contingency 
plan, agreed in Bangkok in 1964, provided for co-ordination 
between United States and Thai troops in any number of 
detail patterns in case of over attack by land, sea or air.^ ^ 
The growth in 1960 of anti government and separatist 
activities, presumably communist - inspired, opened the eyes 
of Bangkok. A number of economic and social improvement 
schemes were put into operation and the police and army 
action against insurgents was intensified and the United 
States had shown equal interests in the country's problem. 
Special units of the United States Army had been busy" 
training Thais in counter-insurgency techniques and United 
States helicopters and crews provided training for the Thai 
Air Force and transport to Thai army and police units. 
Several of the largest United States military installations in 
the Southeast Asia were located in the region. Thai 
acceptance of this foreign military build-up obviously was 
37. Nigel J. Brailey, Thailand and the Fall of Singapore : A 
Frustrated Asian Revolution. (Colorado : West View Press Inc, 
1986), p.249 
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based on the premise that United States would gradually 
assume, if necessary, the same kind of counter-insurgency 
commitment as in Vietnam.^* 
The United States aid programme to Thailand had beeSn 
closely linked to American involvement in Vietnam and the 
major part of this programme had been devoted to various 
form of several development and protection under the 
heading of counter-insurgency and two third of it had been 
channelled into the sensitive Northeastern region. The aid 
programme under Military Assistance Program (MAP) had 
generally been much larger than economic aid, and 
disbursements for 1969 were estimated at $ 75 millions.^^ 
By 1968, the United States programme constituted the 
major portion of foreign aid in Thailand, accounting for 
about 75 percent of the total assistance that Thailand was 
receiving from foreign countries, as shown at table 2.2. 
38. Lalita Prasad Singh, n.l4, p. 131. 
39 Astri Sutrki, "Smaller Nation Diplomacy : Thailand's Current 
Dilemma", Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XI, No.5, May 
1971, p.432. 
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Table 2.2 : United States aid by field of activity and 
I project (in thousands US dollars) 
Field Project 1964 1965 1966 1967 
(I) Security 
Civil Police Administration 
Civil Action 
Village Radios 
Village Security 
Units 
Security Roads 
2177 6479 14075 20019 
2162 6461 12455 18067 
15 18 
610 1098 
900 650 
110 204 
(II) Rural Development 7462 
Accelerated Rural Development 2442 
ARD training 
Mobile Development Unit 1922 
Northeast Agricultural Develop-
ment Programme 
Community Development 
Comprehensive Rural Health 
Portable Water Supply 
Malaria 
8877 20999 22745 
4331 10326 10733 
335 986 1680 
350 744 745 
791 
470 
378 
-
1501 
717 
232 
190 
-
1275 
2868 
354 
1040 
1533 
2175 
2306 
741 
971 
1367 
2600 
52 
Local Development 
Rural Education 
50 Kw. Portable Transmitter 
Rural Electrification 
115 166 245 387 
55 545 814 
140 
43 
320 
35 
(111) Technical Support 864 1693 2237 2020 
Programme Technical Support 864 1084 2237 1854 
Special Participant Training - ' 9 - 166 
(IV) Human Resources 
Manpower 
Chiengmai Medical School 
Vocational Education 
Research Activity 
General Education 
1223 464 1672 1296 
300 
435 
328 
156 
183 
125 
655 
820 
194 
277 
834 
55 
170 100 
(V) Government Management 
Management Improvement 
Civil Services 
Statistics 
514 654 781 745 
320 343 320 305 
130 131 175 
182 153 272 215 
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 170 28 58 26 
53 
Labour Department Adminis- - - - 25 
tration 
(VI) Private Enterprise 61 20 409 312 
Industrial Development - 20 79 300 
Board of Investment - - 320 12 
Mining 61 
Housing - - 10 -
(VII) Eco Infrastructure 237 1052 2809 1174 
Feasibility 127 404 676 567 
Mun and Chee Basin - 142 678 335 
Aeronautical Ground Service 84 128 1455 272 
Highway 26 380 -
Total 12488 18639 42982 48309 
Source : Ganganath Jha, Foreign Policy of Thailand. (New Delhi : 
Radiant Publishers, 1979), pp.60-61. 
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Nixon Doctrine and Thailand 
In the beginning of 1969, Richard M. Nixon became the 
President of the United States, His views on world affairs 
were similar to both Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles 
and Dean Acheson/^ 
However, President Richard M. Nixon was not free to 
act as his predecessors like John F. Kennedy, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Harry S. Truman and Franklin D. Roosvelt had 
been. It was because he had no majority support in the 
40 According to Dulles, the two bloc powers in the Cold War not 
represented only in terms of military, economic strength and 
ideological orientation but also in moral terms. He said once 
that the United States should take-up every military conflict as 
a moral crusade requiring the unconditional surrender of the 
enemy. He was convinced that democracy, especially the 
United States pattern of democracy, was the best form of 
government and was ready to any kind of risk to save 
democracy from extinction For Dean Acheson, he stated that 
in spite of the death of Stalin, very little had changed in the 
Soviet Union. The communist purpose of world domination 
through threat of military showdown was, according to him, 
unalterable. He tended to regard hard military measures as 
more significant in the Cold War than soft economic 
programmes. 
Ganganath Jha, n.3, pp.62-63 
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United State congress. Also, the United States Press was 
very critical about the involvement of United States troops in 
Vietnam and in other Indo-China countries. Above all, the 
Republican Party had charged President Nixon in September 
1968 with the task of implementing a programme aimed at 
bringing peace to Vietnam.''^ 
At a Press Conference at Guam, the Nixon Doctrine 
was announced as the guidelines of United States foreign 
policy with regard to Asian countries he stated that : 
"While the United States would of course keep its 
treaty commitments, it must avoid that kind of 
policy which would make Asian Countries so 
dependent upon the United States that it is dragged 
into conflicts such as the one in Vietnam. The time 
has come when the United States, in its relations 
with its Asian friends, should be emphatic on two 
points (I) American would keep its treaty 
commitments for example - with Thailand under 
SEATO, (ii) as far as the problems of 
international security and military defence are 
concerned, except for a threat by a major power 
involving nuclear weapons, the United State of 
America had a right to expect that this problem 
would be increasingly handled, and responsibility 
for it assumed, by the Asian nations themselves. If 
the United States just continued on the road of 
responding requests for assistance, for assuming 
41. Ibid. 
'I ( Ace. N o W53n A 
^^' A ; ^ ^ _ . - - • • ' 1 y7 
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the primary responsibility for defending there 
countries when they had international or external 
problems, they were never going to take care of 
themselves."''^ 
In regarding Thailand, President Nixon stated on July 
1969, that : 
"The People of Thailand value their freedom so 
much for themselves that they are willing to fight 
for it for others too. That is why Thailand keeps a 
special meaning for the United Stated Thailand is 
truly the land of free, and it is this sense of self-
reliance, of freedom, of willingness to fight for 
freedom both at home and abroad, that we wish to 
develop all over the world as something very 
proud to be associated with, with our friends 
from Thailand."^^ 
Although President Richard M. Nixon tried his best to 
remove the possible misunderstanding about his policy, but it 
was almost inevitably became a subject of controversy. 
42. Ibid., p.64. 
Donald E. Nuechterlein suggested that the Nixon Adminis-
tration no longer considers mainland of Southeast Asia as a 
vital interests of the United States see Frank C. Darling, 
"United States Policy in Southeast Asia : permanency and 
change", Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XIV, No.7, July 1974, 
pp. 608-620. And also see, A. Appadorai, "The Nixon 
Doctrine", Eastern Economist. (New Delhi), March 27, 1970, 
pp.604-605. 
43. Ganganath Jha, n. 3, p. 65. 
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subject of doubt among Thai leaders. Obviously, Thailand 
wanted to see the United States continue to maintain it's 
forces and play its part in Southeast Asia. In the opinion of 
Thai leaders the ideas of military alliance among Southeast 
Asia was a pipe dream because the countries of this area had 
no military potential, they need their resources for the 
development.''^ The Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, 
openly criticised the Nixon Doctrine in August 1969, and 
pointed out that: 
"The first fact that need to be repeated was that 
the United States of its own free will involve itself 
in Asia, and particularly in Vietnam. Secondly, the 
United States asked the Thai-Government to accept 
American soldiers in Thailand. Among all the 
Asian people and nations, Thais are the one which 
accepted and still accepts American soldiers who 
are in Thailand don't come here to fight and risk 
their lives in the defense of Thailand against 
enemy encroachment. They come to Thailand to 
prosecute Vietnam war at Thailand's risk and 
peril."'' 
44. "Thai Doubts on Nixon Doctrine," Hindustan Times. (New 
Delhi), April 17, 1971. And see Clark D. Neher, "Thailand: 
toward fundamental change," Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. 
xi. No. 2, February 1971, pp. 136-142. And also see, J.L.S. 
<jirling, "Thailand: New Course", Pacific Affairs. (Vancouver), 
Vol. 42, no. 3, Fall 1969, pp. 346-350. 
45. -Gauganath Jha, n. 3, p. 65. 
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Seni Pramoj, the founder of the Democratic Party of 
Thailand also criticised that: 
"Thailand joined hands with America and 
committed itself to the extend of allowing the 
bases to be set up here. It is adequate reason for 
retaliation if the North Vietnamese get it into their 
heads to take action. This has created a dangerous 
situation for Thailand. Thai commitment to 
Western Camp made her most vulnerable to 
communist attacks. In this situation, Thailand 
should make good relations with the people of East 
and Northeast Thailand, because they constitute 
the buffer with China, with which Thailand already 
wants to have good relations.'"*^ 
Since then Thailand began to think seriously about the 
relationship with China and Soviet Union'*^ which ultimately 
led to the agreement, between the United States and Thailand 
of United States withdrawal on September 30, 1969.''^ In 
46. Ibid., p. 66. 
47. The motivation of the Thai government was probably two fold: 
Firstly, it was a desire to go on the record as showing more 
flexibility and preparing to future contingencies and Secondly, 
it was designed to warn the United States against full 
withdrawal from the region. 
Astri Suhrki, n. 39, p. 432. 
48. The experience of alliance with the United States during the 
Vietnam war and what was seen to be the sudden American 
decision to withdraw from Indo-China had taught the Thais the 
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considering the presence of Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, 
Thanat told American audience in November 1969 that : 
"If you avoid a tiger (China) and come to face a 
crocodile (the Soviet Union), it is not much of 
change, if we do not have any other alternatives, 
may be we will have to live with crocodile. This is 
exactly the international pattern that may emerge if 
and when the United States has to yield to the 
pressure of completely withdrawing from this part 
of the world because we can not claim that our 
regional grouping is powerful enough.. We hope 
that you will be understanding and that you will 
discreetly support the efforts of the nations of the 
area."^^ 
It was the Paris Agreement in January 1973 between 
the United States and Hanoi impressed upon Thailand the 
necessity of reviewing its alignments once again. Thai 
officials visited Hanoi and sought the assistance of some 
countries for an understanding with Hanoi. One was 
dangers of being drawn into a dependent relationship with a 
single great power that could reinterpret priorities with little 
regard for Thai susceptibilities. 
Leszek Buszyynski, "Thailand: The Eroson of A Balanced 
Foreign Policy", Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XXII, No. l , 
November 1982, p. 1309. 
49. Astri Suhrki, n. 39, p. 432. 
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expected that Bangkok was seeking assurances from Hanoi 
that the latter would not actively assist insurgents in Thai 
Northeast. In return, Thailand would gradually disengage 
from its military entanglements.^^ On January 16, 1974 Thai 
Foreign Minister, Charunphan Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya, 
outlined the basis for the new government's foreign policy, 
which aimed at the achievements of a balance of interests in 
the region. And his most interesting remarks were directed 
towards the role of the Soviet Union, which was described as 
being in a strong position to contribute to the stability of the 
entire region of Southeast Asia.^' The pace of events was 
accelerated in early 1975 with the fall of Saigon to the Viet 
Minh. Thailand, therefore, promptly asked the United States 
to transfer its military bases and withdraw its military 
personnel from Thai territory in a year. Within a week 
SEATO folded its tent and Thailand assured its communist 
neighbours of good neighbourly relations.^^ Since then the 
50. Lalita Prasad Singh, n. 14, p. 131. 
51. Leszek Buszynski, n.34, p.l040. 
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features of Thai-United States relations had been reshaped in 
accordance with the changes of circumstances and also 
Thailand became closer associated with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which would since then 
began playing increasingly significant role in the Southeast 
Asian region. 
52. Lalita Prasad Singh, n.l4, p.131. 
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CHAPTER-III 
The United States and Indo-China War in 1970s 
Vietnam before the Geneva Accords of 1954. 
There was hardly any country in the world which claim 
to have suffered as much as Vietnam in the Second World 
War period. Perpetual conflict, with only a brief of peace 
following the Geneva settlement of 1954, had marked its 
recent history. Millions of Vietnamese children had grown up 
to adulthood in this period carrying memories of bloodshed, 
terror, bombing and dislocation. The long undeclared"i'rar in 
which the United States was involved divided public opinion 
all over the global effecting human values, national 
economies, presidential prospects and military strategies. 
The French conquest of Indo-China was completed by 
1884 and divided Vietnam into three parts : (i) Tonkin in the 
North with Hanoi as capital, (ii) Annam in the centre with 
Hua as capital; (iii) Cochin-China in the South including the 
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Mekhong Delta as administrative headquarters.' Since the 
very early years of French rule, the people of Vietnam 
expressed their opposition to foreign rule. During the Second 
World War, Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese which in 
return provided the good opportunity for the nationalist, to 
achieve their goal^. 
1. B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam: The Cycle of Peace. (New Delhi: The 
Indian Society of International Law, 1968), p 1. 
2. Ibid..p.2. 
The nationalist movement was not new in Indochina. The 
natives especially those of Annam, had never been fully 
reconciled to French rule, which had been imposed between 
1860 and 1885. At first protest was unorganized and limited to 
a few disparate, disconnected groups, mainly among the young 
and intelligentsia. 
Nathaniel Peffor, The Far East : A modern History.(U.S.A: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p.472. 
At the outset the Viet Minh was not predominantly 
Communist. In fact, the communist were in a small minority, 
even among the leaders. The majority were of the middle class, 
resolved only to free their country from France. If communist 
had the same end they were willing to work with them but by 
their close origin few would have welcomed and still fewer 
approved communism as such. 
In 1927, the nationalist were organized under the name of 
Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnam Nationalist Party (VQDD). 
It has been called the most significant of all non-communist 
revolutionary nationalist organizations; it was modeled on the 
Kuomintang and frequently received support from it. During 
the Second World War years. Nationalist and communist 
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In the meantime, the big three powers in Europe, the 
United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet 
Union, were deciding the fate of the Asian country.^ On 
August 22, 1945, a week after Japan had accepted the Allies 
terms, the Viet Minh set up a provisional government at 
Hanoi to take in Annam, Tonkin and Cochin-China, where 
more than four fifths of Indo-China live. By Agreement at 
Postdam British and Chinese troops were to occupy Indo-
China until the French returned. The British in the South of 
leaders found refuge in China. And some members of the old 
VQDD continued a party of that name, other formed the Dai 
Viet QDD (Great Vietnam Nationalist Party). With the 
assistance of Kounmintang, these two formed a nationalist 
coalition which included the Vietnam Restoration League. This 
coalition came to be known as the Vietnam Cach Menn Dong 
Mint Hoi (the Vietnam Revolutionary League or League of 
Vietnamese Revolutionary Parties). Because Koumintang 
leaders were suspicious of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party, 
the Communist in May, 1941, organized another United Front 
to include certain independent nationalist elements the Viet 
Nam Doc lap Dong Min Hoi (Revolutionary League for the 
independence of Vietnam), popularly known as the Viet Minh. 
Frank N. trager. Why Vietnam. (New York : Frederick M. 
Praeger, 1966), pp-53-57. And also see Dougtla Rike, History 
of Vietnamese Communism 192S-197S. (California : Hoover 
instituion Press, 1978), pp. 1-14. 
3. Ibid. 
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16*^  parallel and the Chinese in the North, but when the 
British arrived early in September the administration of most 
of the colony was already in the hands of the Viet Minh/ By 
the time French arrived the ground was already laid for 
struggle.^ 
The British refused to deal with the Viet Minh. Instead 
the British ordered the release of the French and thus gave 
them the chance to re-establish their rule. In October 1945 
the French forces were reinforced by troops from home under 
General Leeker. But with nationalist resistance in Saigon and 
guerrilla attacks in the countryside did the French again 
control the Mekhong Delta and by then the British had felt.^ 
4. Under the circumstances, the two occupying armies in the 
North and South of le"" parallel foil owed different policies. 
The British, General Gracy refused to reorganize the Viet 
Minh Administration and rearmed the French and help them to 
re-establish their power south of 16"' parallel, and by March 
1946, the British withdrew. The Chinese who occupied the 
North proclaimed a policy of non-interference in Vietnam's 
internal affairs and left the Viet Minh in charge of the 
administration. 
B.S.N. Murti, n.l, p.3. 
5. Nathaniel Peffer, n.2, p.472. 
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In September Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of 
the country and established the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV).^ 
Moreover, when the French occupied certain areas 
around Saigon. The French installed Bao Dai as a Chief of 
the state of Vietnam. The United States of America and 
Britain also recognized him as the ruler of the whole of 
Vietnam.^ But the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China recognized the government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam.^ 
6. Richard Allen, A Short Introduction to the History and Politics 
of Southeast Asia. (New York : Oxford University Press, 
1968), p.134 
7. I b i d , p.133. 
8. Lalita Prasad Singh, Power Politics and southeast Asia. (New 
Delhi : Radiant Publishers, 1979), p.4. 
9. Gennadi Chufrim and igor Mozhaiko, Southeast Asia Unity in 
Diversity. (New Delhi : Allies Publishers Ltd., 1989), p. 116. 
The formation of the Vietnam government under the Ho Chi 
Minh created a situation that France would have to deal with at 
once French troops arrived in Indo-China early in 1946 and 
after some difficulties with the Chinese, who at first refused to 
evacuate, took over entirely by the end of February. But the 
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There was some moderation in the Ho Chi Minh 
regimes that was the Indo-Chinese Communist Party was 
dissolved and replaced by an Association for Marxist 
Studies. When Ho realized that he would not get political 
backing from the United States he decided on temporary co-
opertion with the French. Then, the negotiations with the 
French were held and the Treaty was signed on March 6, 
1946, after the France made a pact with China in February 
1946.^ *^  
By this treaty, the French recognized the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) as a free state having its own 
government, parliament, army and finances, forming part of 
Vietnam government was in being and there had been some 
minor skirmishes. 
Nathaniel Peffer, n.2, p.474. 
As a result, the legal position in Vietnam became confused with 
the DRV in the North and the State of Vietnam in the South 
both claimed authority over the whole of Vietnam. Thus, the 
conflict in Vietnam had its origins in the French refused to 
accept the Viet Minh's right to rule Cochin-China. 
B.S.N. Murti, n. l , p.4. 
10. Richard Allen, n.6, p. 186. 
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the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union. It was 
also agreed that the referendum would be held in Cochin-
China, where most of France interests and much of colony's 
wealth lay, to determine whether Cochin-China should join 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." 
There had been apparent accord on the way in which 
the future of Cochin-China was to be determined, but the 
French made it clear that there would be no referendum. On 
one pretext or another, principally the necessity of first re-
establishing law and order, they postponed it and then on 
their own decision declared the status of Cochin-China to be 
that of an autonomous republic under French authority. But 
Ho Chi Minh wanted a literal application of the original 
application : unity of whole Vietnam as an independent 
political entity but within the French Union as an equal 
partner, with economic and cultural co-operation between 
11. Nathaniel Peffer, n.2, p.474. 
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Vietnam and France. HO Chi Minh would not accepted a 
restoration of colonial subservience.'^ 
From 1946 until 1950, the struggle between the French 
army and the Ho Chi Minh, guerrillas was a large scale 
colonial comparing of pacification against rebels with hardly 
more than local significance. But, in 1950, the operation 
changed into a confrontation of the free World and Chinese-
Russian Communist powers when Ho Chi Minh received 
military equipments from China and Russia.''' 
12 Ibid, P 475. 
13. Victor Bator, Vietnam A Diplomatic Tragedy: origins of 
United State involvement. (London ; Faber and Faber Ltd., 
1963), p.24. 
When Harry S. Truman became the President on April 12, 
1945. He initiated a change in United States policy on Indo-
China. He wanted to achieve unity among the Western 
European powers including France, in opposition the 
communist power in Europe. The United States therefore, felt 
that it was in its national interest to assist France in regaining 
its lost power and influence in Indo-China. 
R.S. Chavan, Vietnam Trail and Truumps. (New Delhi . Patriot 
Publishing, 1987), p.97. 
As early as 1950, President Truman gave substantial arms and 
aid to the French at the same time as the Americans themselves 
entered the war in Korea. This policy was continued and 
accelerated when Eisenhower gained the Presidency in 1952. 
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As the time went on and the French showed no desire 
for accommodation, the native inhabitants became "coiivinced 
that France was resolved to keep their land a colony as 
before. Therefore, nationalism became more widespread. As 
an usual in such situations, in proportion to the growing 
strength of the independence movement grew the power of 
the communist leadership, since communists were a compact 
group who always knew that they wanted.'"^ The hostilities 
between the French and the Viet Minh, which had been 
continuing throughout this period, were temporarily halted 
by a new agreement, the Modus Vivendi of September 14-15, 
1946. Nevertheless, sporadic clashes continued. On 
Vietnam ; A Reporter's war, (Sydney the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, 1975), p.24. 
This supports was the outcome of the perception of threats 
from the Soviet expansion policy. The American policy-
makers, therefore, identified the Soviet Union as the principal 
adversary and communist parties in various parts of the world 
as accessories of the Soviet Union whose activities endangered 
the United States interests. 
Jaya Krishna Baral, The Pentagon and the Making of United 
States Foreign Policy : A Case Study of Vietnam 1960-1968. 
(New Delhi : Radiant Publishers, 1978), p.38. 
14. Nathaniel peffer, n.2, p.475. 
71 
November 23, the French bombed Haiphong and on 
December 19, the North responded with concerted attacks 
on Fronts forts in Tonkin and Annam. Thus began the full 
scale war which ended for a time - in 1954, with the 
partition of Vietnam at the 17*^  parallel.'^ 
When communist became victory in China in 1949. it 
changed the situation in Vietnam. France was forced to look 
to the United States for help in fighting against the Viet 
Minh.'^ 
The United States assistance to the Forces of the 
French Union and the Communist China help to the Viet 
Minh led to the an escalation of the arm conflict. Various 
attempts to enter into negotiations to end the conflict were 
thwarted by the United States which was keen on achieving a 
military victory against the Viet Minh ' •' 
15 Frank N Trager, n 2, p 59 
16 B S.N. Murti, n 1, p 4 
17 The join Franco-American statement issued on September 30, 
1953, declared that the total defeat of communism in Indo-
China was the aim of France, thus, ruling out negotiations and 
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So the years from 1950 to 1954 passed, the existing 
trends growing ever stronger. Meanwhile, the United States 
had intervened at one removes when it perceived that France 
could no longer carry the financial burden - the money spent 
by France in Indo-China almost equaled what it obtained 
from the United States under the Marshall Plan - the United 
States took over a large part of the burden. In another word, 
Indo-China had become a sector in the Cold War.'^ Then 
came 1954, the door of conference to settle the affairs of 
compromises. On January 12, 1954, John Foster Dulles, the 
then American Secretary of States, said, that the communist 
manace would be opposed by massive retaliation by means of 
our own choosing. On March 29, 1954, he further stated that: 
"the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political 
system of Russia and its Chinese Communist 
allies by whatever means would be a great threat 
to the whole free world. The United States of 
America feels that the possibility should not be 
passively accepted but should be met by united 
action. Dulles proposed a confined front of major 
Western powers to initiate United action in Indo-
China to save that area from Communism." 
Ibid., p.5. 
18. Ibid., p.475. For Further details, see Richard Allen n.6, 
pp.182-187. Frank N. Trager, n . l , pp.89-102. And also see 
Arthur M. Schksinger and JR. Albert Schweitzer (edited). 
World Power. . A Documentary History of United States 
Foreign Policy 1945-1973. (New York : Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1973), Vol. IV, pp.454-472. 
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Indo-China was opened on April 26, 1954, just few days 
before the French defeated at Dien Bien Phu. This 
conference participated by Russian, British, Chinese and 
American Foreign Ministers.'^ 
France could no longer conceal to itself either the fact 
of the reverse it had suffered on the consequences the 
reverse dictated. The cease - fire was to go into effect along 
the 17^ *" parallel, which meant in actually that at that line 
Indo-China was being partitioned. This left France an area of 
50,000 square miles, including Cochin China, with a 
population of 10,000,000. The Viet Minh would have a 
population of 12,000,000 and area of 77,000 square miles, 
including the Red River Delta, the city of Hanoi, and the 
port of Haiphong. Laos and Cambodia were to be evacuated 
by communist troops and maintain such relations with 
France. Elections were to be held after two years in all 
Vietnam to determines its future."^ ^ 
19. Ibid., p.478. 
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And the significance of this was communism had 
advanced another step on the continent of Asia. The new 
Republic of Vietnam was left distressed, chaotic, 
impoverished. There was no organization, no point of 
cohesion, no array of groups that a government could base 
itself on. '^ 
This was led to the formation of the South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), which intended to put the 
communist world on notice that a line was being drawn 
beyond which it could not go with impurity. Whether the 
Communist World would be deterred by the warning 
remained to be seen. Thus, all Southeast Asia was 
incorporated in the Cold War.^ ^ 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., p.479. 
22. Ibid. 
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Post Geneva Accords and United States Policy towards 
Vietnam 
Southeast Asia became a subject of headlines in the 
Spring of 1954 when the French was defeated at Dien Bien 
Phu by the forces of Communist Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam headed by Ho Chi Minh. Three major international 
conferences were convened in Geneva and Paris in less than 
three decades and several agreements were concluded to 
solves the problems on the exit of France from the area.^ ^ 
At the conclusion of the Geneva conference, neither the 
United States nor South Vietnam signed the Geneva 
declaration. General Watter Bedell Smith, the Chief United 
States delegate, however proclaimed an unilateral American 
declaration that the United States would refrain from the 
threat or the use of force to disturb the Geneva accords. The 
Eisenhower Administration viewed the Geneva accords as a 
major diplomatic defeat for the United States. In meetings in 
23. Lalita Prasad Singh, n. 8, p. 3. 
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August 8 and 12, the National Security Council (NSC) 
concluded that the Geneva settlement was a disaster that 
completed a major forward stride of communism which may 
lead to the loss of Southesat Asia. Therefore, most concern 
of the United States was to prevent communism from 
spreading into other parts of Southeast Asia.^ '* 
During the Geneva meeting, the United States 
undertook a few covert activities against the Viet Minh in 
Indo-China. From June 1954 to August 1955, a team led by 
Colonel Edward G landsdale, a Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) operative who had earned a reputation for counter 
guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, was instructed to 
undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to 
wage political psychological warfare.^^ 
24. Jaya Krishna Baral, n. 13, p 51. 
25. Ibid. 
In the evaluation of American policy regarding Indo-China in 
general and Vietnam in particular had to be review in the 
context of the overall objectives of American foreign policy. In 
the Immediate post war period, American policy-makers 
identified the Soviet Union as the principal adversary and 
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The United States views the conflict between North 
and South Vietnam as an extention of the clash between the 
forces of freedom and communist totalitarianism. The United 
States had perceived the problem as being military, not 
political and perceived the conflict in South Vietnam mainly 
in terms of aggression by North Vietnam. Hence, almost 
seventy-five percent of United States economic aid provided 
to South Vietnam was used to bolster the country's military 
budget. A White Paper entitled A threat to the peace stated 
that : 
"The determined __ and ruthless campaign of 
propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the 
Communist regime in North Vietnam to destroy the 
Republic of Vietnam and subjugate its people is a 
threat to the peace. The independence and 
territorial integrity of that free country is of major 
and serious concern not only to the people of 
communist parties in various part of the world as accessories 
of the Soviet Union whose activities were minimal to the 
interests of the United States. The emergence of Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe and the subsequent of communist 
takeover in Czechoslovakia served to deepen the anxiety of 
American policy-makers to formulate measures for the 
"containment" of Soviet expansion. 
Jaya Krishna Baral, n. 13, p. 38. > ^ r a A7.;^i/6-"-^ f 
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Vietnam and their immediate neighbours but also 
to all other free nations."^^ 
Thus, the American policy towards Vietnam was 
principally governed by the doctrine of containment of 
communism. With the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the United 
States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued the 
"united action" within two months of the Geneva 
Agreement. •^^ 
The Geneva Accords were only binding upon the 
United States to the degree admitted in Smith's Declaration. 
When France quit her involvement and ran out on her 
26. DR. Sardesai, Southeast Asia Past and Present. (Ghaziabad : 
Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1981), p.410. 
27, Ibid., p.400. 
As regards Vietnam the conference took note of the clauses in 
the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam 
prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and 
military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and 
ammunition. The two parties in Vietnam further took the 
obligation : 
... To see that the zones allotted to them shall iw^ t 
constitute part of any military alliance and shall 
not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or 
in the service of an aggressive policy... 
Lalita Prasad Singh, n.8, p.6. 
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obligations, the United States had to enter the scene or see 
another slice of territory fall under communist despotism. 
The policy of picking up the pieces abandoned by older 
imperial nations had began with the Truman Doctrine 
applied to Greece and Turkey in 1947, In case of Vietnam, 
however, the United States did not depart from its position, 
only France did. The reason was explained by M. Pinean, 
France of Foreign Affairs, February 23, 1956 that: 
"We are not entirely masters of the situation. The 
Geneva Accords on the one hand and the pressure 
of our allies on the other creates a very complex 
situation... You ask me what will be our position 
after the reckoning of July 1956 provided by the 
Geneva Accords. The position in Principle is clear 
: France is the guarantor of the Geneva Accords. 
But we do not have the means alone of making 
them respected."^^ 
Meanwhile, the United States had assumed that any 
forceful attempt by external invasion on internal subversion 
inspired and aided from the outside to seize South Vietnam 
28. Neldon A Brown, Prelude to Disaster : The American Role in 
Vietnam 1940-1963. (New York National University 
Publications, 1975), pp. 105-106. 
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after a failure to get it was aggression against a sovereign 
state and within the scope of Smith Declaration and the 
SEATO treaty of September 1954, temporarily or 
permanently. The United States, therefore, explained her 
stand on the case of election in Vietnam by Dwight D. 
Eisenhower that : 
"I have never talked on corresponded with a 
person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who 
did not agree that had elections been held as of the 
time of the fighting possibly 80 percent of 
population would have voted for the Communist 
Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of 
State Bao Dai."^^ 
One of the first acts in the post-Geneva American 
policy in Vietnam was the establishment of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It was in a way the brain 
of Secretary of States, John Foster Dulles for common 
defence against Chinese expansion. Soon after the Geneva 
conference was over, there started a big debate in 
Washington on whether the United States should impart 
29. Ibid., pp.106-107. 
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military training to the South Vietnam. It was mainly a tussle 
between the State Department and the Defence Department. 
John Foster Dulles was very forcefully argued that the 
United States take over the responsibility of giving military 
training to the forces of the Saigon regime. He also insisted 
that political stability was not possible without military 
security. ^ '^  
In case of general elections, according to the Geneva 
Accords, it must be held in July 1956 throughout Vietnam. 
For this. North and South Vietnam were required to begin 
consultation in July 1955. But, when the time had come, 
Saigon refused to undertake any consultation with Hanoi. 
She argued that there was no use in holding the proposed 
election because it would not be free and democratic in 
North Vietnam. There might have been some elements of 
truth in this charge but the motivation of the Dien regime for 
bulking at the election seems to have been different. The 
30. Jaya Krishna Baral, n. 13, p. 52. 
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Pentagon Papers revealed that the United States had a hand 
in it.^' 
On June 17, 1954, Ngo Dinh Dien was appointed as the 
Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower promptly promised his country's support to 
assist the government of South Vietnam towards developing 
and maintaining a strong viable state capable of resisting 
attempted subversion or aggression through military means. 
31. Before the Geneva conference was over, the JCS had pointed 
out that communists were likely to win if an election were held 
in Vietnam. In August 1954, the CIA reported that if elections 
were held in 1956, the Viet Minh would win. In 1954 President 
Eisenhower himself was reported to have said that Ho Chi 
Minh would win 80 percent of the votes if the election were 
held that year. Thus Washington was almost convinced that the 
communists were sure to defeat the Dien regime in election. 
Against this background, Dulles' instructions and demand 
guarantees that the Communists were likely to reject seems to 
have been a deliberate ploy to prevent the holding of general 
elections in Vietnam. On July 7, 1954 Dulles wrote to General 
Walter Bedell Smith, the Chief United States delegate at 
Geneva that: 
"Since undoubtedly true that the elections might 
even eventually mean unification (of) Vietnam 
under Ho Chi Minh, this makes it all more 
important they should be only held as long as 
after cease-fire agreement as possible and in 
conditions free from intimidation to give 
democratic elements best chance." 
Ibid., pp.54-55. 
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From that time the American involvement in the State of 
Vietnam became deeply felt and increasingly directed.^^ 
Dien, however, on October 23, 1955 declared the State of 
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and on October 26, 1955, 
proclaimed himself as its first President. It was mainly 
American influence which removed General Nguyen Van 
Hinh, a powerful opponent of Dien from Vietnam, enabled 
Dien to devide and defeat the seats, and displaced the French 
in the South of Vietnam.^^ 
According to Geneva Agreements the Commanders of 
the French Union Forces and the People's Army of Vietnam 
were responsible for the execution of the provisions contain 
therein and affording full protection and all possible 
assistance and cooperation to the International Commission 
in the performance of its functions. But between the end of 
1954 and early 1955, the French gradually withdrew their 
32. B.S.N. Murti, n . l , p . l l . 
33. Ibid., p.12. 
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forces from Vietnam, and the United states gradually 
assumed their functions, supporting the Dien regime in the 
South. The premature withdrawal from the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN) of the French who were considered 
responsible for the election in the South complicated the 
question of implementing the Geneva Agreements, especially 
the provisions concerning elections. The govenment of the 
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) adopted a categorized stand 
that it was not bound by the Geneva Agreements and refused 
to talk with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to 
prepare for general elections which was supported by United 
States and Britain.^'' Besides, there was enough evidence to 
say that the United States was at no stage serious about a 
political settlement of the Vietnam problem on the lines 
visualised by the Geneva Agreements. The real reason was 
that they wanted the RVN as a separate anti communist 
state. They were convinced that if elections were held Ho 
34. Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
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Chi Minh would win them and the whole of Vietnam would 
go under communist rule. Dulles made no secret of this when 
he said that : 
"South Vietnam must be strengthened; and we 
must not be trapped into a fictions legalism that 
could condemn ten million potentially free persons 
into slavery."^^ 
And also, as a legal justification, the United States had 
maintained that : 
"From the very beginning, the North Vietnamese 
violated the 1954 Geneva Accords. Communist 
military forces and supplies were left in the South 
in violation of the Accords. Other communist 
guerrillas were moved north further training and 
then were infiltrated into the South in violation of 
the accords'.'^ ^ 
For the American views the Geneva Accords marked 
the end of the French presence in Asia which, however 
obnoxious at one time to Americans on general anti-
colonialist principles, could have been regarded useful in 
anti communist terms. Having decided in 1954 not to buttress 
35. Ibid-, p.16. 
36. Ibid, p.17. 
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French rule any longer, the United States sought an 
alternative anti communist and anti Chinese forces. They 
disapproved of the General Accords because it not only 
failed to constitute such a force but threatened to accelerate 
Chinese Communist expansion by giving Ho the whole of 
Vietnam in two bites - the North by the armistice agreement 
and the South through elections - they regarded Ho Chi Minh 
as a satellite and discounted his chances of becoming the 
Tito of Asia. They resolved, therefore, to maintaining the 
independence of the anti communist regime established by 
Bao Dai in the South, and also to create a new anti-
communist alliance to check China in Asia as NATO had 
checked the USSR in Europe.^^ 
The Buddhist Crisis 
In the wake of national revival. Buddhism in Vietnam 
had become a strong political force. Naturally, Dien's biased 
37. Peter Calvocores, World Politics since 1945. (New York 
Longman Inc., 1968), p.322. 
87 
religions policy turned a large number of Buddhists who 
were in majority in South Vietnam, to become his staunch 
opponents. 
This enraged the anti-Dien Buddhists who had formed 
in 1963, the body known as the Buddhist United Church of 
Vietnam (BUC) which had played an important role in the 
frequent changes in government in South Vietnam. The BUC 
was, therefore, considered by the Americans as a trouble 
making and anti-American organization. But its demand for a 
sovereign national assemble and opposition to Dien's puppet 
government showed that it was following a nationalist 
policy.^^ 
38. The Buddhist were regarded by Dien as his religions enemies as 
he himself was a stannch Catholic. Besides, his Catholic brother 
Archbishop Ngo Dinh Nue and his another brother Ngo Dinh 
Nhu and his wife prevented him from showing any conciliatory 
attitude towards the Buddhists. To add to this, on the advice of 
his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Dien had given official recognition 
in 1963 to one eldest sect of Buddhists, namely, Co-Son-Mon, 
which was completely a political. It was called the General 
Association of Buddhists in Vietnam. 
R.S. Chavan, n.l3, p . m . 
39. Ibid. 
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Another reasons for the annoyance of the Buddhists 
was the order issued by Dien prohibiting them from 
exhibiting the Buddhist flag and other signs on the Birthday 
of the Buddha (May 8). They protested against such an anti-
Buddhist order and took out demonstrations.''^ 
The Buddhist protests aroused great concern in the 
United States. John F. Kennedy urged Dien to improve his 
dealing with the Buddhists. But Dien ignored the advice, 
John F. Kennedy then supported a group of South 
Vietnamese general who opposed Dien's policies. On 
November 1963, the generals overthrow the Dien 
government. Against Kennedy wishes, Dien and Nhu were 
murdered."*^ 
The fall of the Dien government see off a period of 
political disorder in South Vietnam. New government rapidly 
40. Ibid. 
41. The World Books Encyclopedia. (USA : World Books Inc, 
1990), Vol 20, p.391. 
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succeeded one another. During this period. North Vietnam 
stepped up its supply of war materials and began to send 
units of its own army into the South Vietnam by late 1964, 
the Viet Cong controlled up to 75 percent of South 
Vietnam's population/^ 
The Gulf of Tonkin incident 
During August 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
approved secret South Vietnam naval raids against North 
Vietnam. He announced that the United States destroyers 
Maddox and C. Turnerjoy had been attacked in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam.''^ 
42. Ibid. 
43. Some Americans doubted that an attack had occurred, and the 
attack had never been confirmed. 
The World Book Encyclopedia, no. 41, p.391. 
Later on, when the war was as it height, the captain of Maddox 
admitted that his ship had not been attacked. The aim of the 
noisy campaign raised over the "Tonkin incident" was to 
justify the attack on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and 
to arouse anti Vietnamese sentiments among Americans. 
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However, following this doubtful events President 
Lyndon B. Johnson asked Congress for powers to take all 
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the 
forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression 
and he reacted sharply an issued instructions to the United 
States Pacific Command.'*^ 
Meanwhile, on August 7, Congress approved these 
powers in the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The United States did 
not declare war on North Vietnam. But Lyndon B. Johnson 
used the resolution as the legal basis for increased United 
States involvement. In March 1965, he sent a group of 
United States Marines to South Vietnam.''^ 
Alexander Lavrentyev, USA & ASIA. (New Delhi : Sterling 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1982), p.48. 
44. That was 
(i) to continue patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin 
(ii) to provide a combat air pilot over the destroyers 
(iii)to attack any force which attacked United States Naval 
patrols with the object of destroying it 
R.S. Chavan, n . l3 , p.117. 
45. The World Books Encyclopedia. n.41. p.391. 
91 
Mc Namara, the then American Defence Secretary, told 
the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 
1964 that the United States efforts in the Republic of 
Vietnam (South Vietnam) carried the risk of escalating to 
military actions outside the border of South Vietnam. 
Thereafter, an incident that took place on August 1964, in 
the Gulf of Tonkin changed the complexion of the conflict in 
Vietnam. It provided a turning point in the United States war 
policy in Vietnam to one open and direct participation.''^ 
Following these events, the Communist guerrilla 
attacked Bienhoa airfield in November against the United 
States officers' billet in Saigon in December and against the 
I 
United States advisers' compound at Pliku in February 
1965.^ "^  
Actually, this crisis was not an accident or a sudden event. It 
bad its origin in the covert operations against North Vietnam 
approved by President Kennedy in 1961. 
R.S. Chavan, n.l3, p.117. 
46. e.S.N. Murti, n.l, p.28. 
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Ultimately, this incident offered President Lyndon B. 
Johnson an opportunity to have his policy of escalation 
unconditionally endorsed by Congress in the so called Gulf 
of Tonkin resolution, which authorised the President to take 
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the 
forces of the United States and to prevent further 
aggression/^ 
Escalation of war 
The gathering momentum of National Liberation Front 
(NLF) in 1961 alarmed President John F. Kennedy who, in 
May 1961, gave green signal for covert operations against 
North Vietnam by the Central Intelligence Agencies (CIA) 
and the Pentagon.''^ 
47 Charles E Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival 
The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States, (New 
York St Martin's Press, 1978), pp 68-69 
48 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam A Political History, (London 
Andrew Dentsch, 1968), p 483 
49 R L Walli, Vietnam Long Road to Freedom. (New Delhi 
Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1976) p 145 
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Actually, in the middle of June 1960 the Strategic Hamlets 
Programme was conceived and implemented when Willian 
Colby was promoted as the Chief of the CIA station in Saigon. 
It was based on the assumption that the villages which were 
the targets of attacks of the underground communist guerrillas 
should be enabled to defend themselves by providing them 
weapons so that they would not have to depend on the 
Vietnamese army units which were never there when needed. 
The weapons were to be provided by the CIA the only 
American agency with the flexibility that could respond to such 
a local reguest directly and did not have to set up a complex 
programme through Vietnamese government channels, which 
might or might not pass the material to the place it was need. 
Colby and his associated decided to combine the self defence 
concept with the economic and social improvement for the 
villages, and recommended that the Vietnamese Special forces 
be put in charge of the effort, with American in supporting 
role only. 
Along with the Strategic Hamlets campaign to fight the 
Vietcong at the local level, the CIA developed other 
approaches also like recruiting, training, and running 
Mountains Scouts of Highlanders to patrol deep into the 
unpolluted areas along the Cambodian and Laos borders to 
bring back intelligence of communist infiltration there, and 
assisting a so-called "People's Force" of politically trained 
terms in their programme of moving into rural communities to 
live with, work with and help the peasants in their community 
efforts. 
A part from fighting the Viet Cong in South Vietnam the CIA 
also undertook upon itself the taste of penetrating North 
Vietnam and undertaking para-military action there. According 
to Willian Colby, he once stated that : 
"with our experience in Korea and against China, 
CIA was the natural agency to which the job of 
penetrating North Vietnam should be assigned." 
Satish Kumar, CIA and The Third World. (New Delhi : Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1981), p.97. And also see Russell 
H. Fifield, "The Thirty years war in Indochina" , The World 
Today. (London), Vol XVII, No. 9, September 1977, pp.857-
859. 
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In July 1962, Premier Pham Vandong had told Bernard 
Fall, the United Nations Secretary General that: 
"We fully realize that the American imperialists 
wish to provoke a situation in the course of which 
they would use the heroic struggle of the South 
Vietnamese people as a pretext for the destruction 
of our economic and cultural achievement. And he 
added, we shall after them no pretext that could 
give rise to an American military intervention 
against North Vietnam."^° 
In the very first days of the Kennedy Administration 
the number of American advisors in Saigon totaled first to 
10,000 and then 18,000. The President allowed them to take 
part in military operations.^' At the time of Kennedy's death 
these were between 14 and 16 thousands American troops in 
Vietnam. And that number was to grow substantially after his 
Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson takeover. There was a 
50. Charles E. Morison and Astri Suhrke, n.47, p.68. 
However, North Vietnamese responses to American and South 
Vietnamese operations on the North Vietnamese Coast in 1964 
appeared in retrospect to have provided ^ « h a pretext. 
Ibid., p.69. 
51. Alexander Lavrentyev, n.43, p.47. 
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hint of what was to come in the first major speech on his 
occasion to the Presidency in November 1963, that was : 
"Under John Kennedy's leadership, this nation has 
demonstrated, that it has the courage to seek peace 
and it has the fortitude the risk war. We have 
proved that we are a good and reliable friend to 
those who seek peace and freedom. We have 
shown that we can also be a formidable foe. to 
those who reject the path of peace, and those who 
seek to impose upon us, and our allies. This nation 
will keep its commitments through South Vietnam 
to West Berlin, we will be increasing in the search 
for peace resourceful in our pursuit of areas of 
agreements, even with those with whom we differ, 
and generous and loyal to those who join with us 
in common cause.' 
52. Vietnam : A Reporter's war. n . l3 . p.28. 
By spring 1963, United States forces in South Vietnam 
numbered 45,500 in the next twenty-four months the number 
would rise to a staggering half-a-million. Corresponding 
United States estimates were 160,000 in spring 1964 and 
250,000 two years later. The United States military strategy 
was to search and destroy the enemy in the South through a 
variety of means, including bombing, chemical warfare, 
psychological warfare, and counter-insurgency operations. 
And the criterion of success was not how much territory was 
conquered or brought under control but how many Viet Cong 
were killed. To complement these actions in the South, the 
continued bombing of North Vietnam was aimed at crippling 
its economy, interdicting the infiltration of North Vietnamese 
troops and supplies and forcing Hanoi to agree to a negotiated 
settlement. At the same time, the United States gave massive 
economic and military aid to the Saigon Government, whose 
armed forces numbered nearly one million by the end of sixties. 
D.R. Sardesai, n.25, p.414 
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By 1964, the Johnson Administration adopted the Mc 
Namara plan which provided for increasing South Vietnam's 
armed strength to a half a million officers and men and 
concentrating the forces in the Mekhong Delta.^^ It was 
decided to extend hostilities to the entire peninsula of Indo-
China. The United States Air Force executed raids on the 
North Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), 
Cambodia and Laos. The United States of America tried to 
enforce a blockade on the North Vietnam. When there steps 
prove ineffective, the United States of America decided to 
enter the war. By this time the National Liberation Front 
(NLF) controlled more than three-quarters of the country's 
total area. The United States of America Landed military 
units in the ports of South Vietnam which was a repetition of 
the French invasion, only an incomparably larger scale.^ "^  
53 Ibid., p.417 
54. Gennadi Chufrim and Igor Mozhaiko, n 9., p. 149. 
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Since overt military operations against the North were 
rejected as being overly risky and not feasible at the 
moment. American attention was focused on a programme of 
covert activities designed to harrass and sabotage enemy 
transportation facilities and other installations whereover 
accessible. General Maxwell Tayler, speaking for the join 
Chiefs of staff in January 1964, declared that the states for 
victory over Communist insurgency in South Vietnam were 
compellingly high. Such wars of national liberation must not 
be allowed to succeed. Taylor concluded that : 
"The United State must make the ranking service 
commander at Saigon responsible for the total 
United State program in Vietnam and take over 
from the Saigon authorities the actual direction of 
the war. The United States should organize and 
direct large scale commando raids against North 
Vietnam, using South Vietnamese and some 
Chinese Nationalist volunteers to destroy military 
facilities on the ground and operating under South 
Vietnamese cover would conduct reconaissance 
and paratrooper drops."^^ 
55. John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia. (USA : 
Ohio University Press, 1974), p.515. 
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The unflinching United States commitment to maintain 
a non communist government in Vietnam led to the step by 
step escalation of the United States war from the limited risk 
gamble of Eisenhower through counter-insurgency operations 
of Kennedy to open aggression under Presidents Johnson and 
Nixon.^^ 
The full scale United States war from 1965 onwards 
was aimed at attaining full victory. This strategy was 
tailored to compel and pressurize North Vietnam to persuade 
the National Liberation Front (NLF) to give up in the South. 
Interestingly, it was promised on the awareness of NLF's 
indigenous sources of strength. This policy of escalation of 
war into North Vietnam coupled with the maximization of 
military pressure against NLF in South was hoped to give 
total military victory to the United States in Vietnam. With 
the United States military terror tactics extended from South 
to North, the North Vietnam (DRV) was left no choice 
56. R.L. Walli, n.49, p.l45. 
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except to respond to aggression throughout the state of 
Vietnam. ^ ^ 
The arrival at Danang of 1400 men at 9 A.M. on 
March 8, 1965 also marked the beginning of induction of 
542, 558 (June 1966) United States troops, and thousands of 
troops from Australia and its Asia^ satellites. This was in 
addition to one million puppet troops from combat the 
formidable. United States military build-up since 1965 
included all conventional and non-conventional weaponary.^* 
57 Ibid , p 142 
58 Ibid 
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CHAPTER-IV 
The Vietnamization of War 
In the country where civilian leaders were loudly 
declared that their people had no desire to shed their blood 
to protect the interests of United States and where 
government troops viewed the war as belonging to 
Americans, therefore, how could the United States saved 
such a people. Opposition to the war rose to enormous 
proportions by 1967, especially on college campuses. The 
compulsory draft in the army and the growing casualty rates 
awakened the youth to the cost of war. ^  
Roger Hilsman, a former United States Assistant Secretary for 
Far Eastern Affairs, revealed that the President John F. 
Kennedy's policy was to meet the guerrilla aggression within a 
counter-guerrilla framework, with the implied, corollary that if 
Vietcong could not be defeated within a counter - guerrilla 
framework and the allegiance of the people of Vietnam could 
not be won then the United States should accept the resulting 
situation and would be free to enter negotiations without fatal 
consequences to our position in the rest of Asia. 
Lalita Prasad Singh, Power Politics and Southeast Asia. (New 
Delhi . Radiant Publishers, 1979), p. 15. 
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The Johnson Administration came under considerable 
pressure to end the war which had taken over 16,000 United 
States lives and was costing over 55 million a day without 
achieving political results intended. Influential American and 
many Southeast Asian specialists all over the world urged 
the United States to accept the establishment of a coalition 
government in Saigon, including National Liberation Front 
(NLF) and other political forces, and the subsequent gradual 
withdrawal of United States military power. Such a solution 
could permit a disengagement of major powers from Indo-
China peninsula. The Johnson Administration, however, kept 
on trying to keep South Vietnam safe for the free world.^ 
American's steps in the escalation of the war were 
taken in large part during the Administration of President 
Richard M. Nixon who assumed office in January 1969. He 
reduced the number of American servicemen from 543,000 in 
early 1969 to around 23,700 at the time of the cease-fire. 
The withdrawal was done carefully and related to the overall 
2. Ibid. 
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military, political and diplomatic situation. Indeed, the 
American withdrawal of military forces without loss of 
United States credibility abroad was one of the major 
accomplishment of the Nixon presidency. Vietnamization, a 
policy of preparing the South Vietnamese to fight their own 
war, was the rationale employed by the White House and 
Pentagon.^ 
3. It should be observed that "Vietnamization" was not a new 
concept, for the French under the Navarre Plan in 1953 and 
even President Lyndon B Johnson, especially after March 1968 
had tried to implement it. 
Russell H. Fifield, "the thirty years war in Indochina : A 
Conceptual Framework," The World Today. (London), Vol. 
XVII No. 9, September 1971, p.869. 
It was stated that when Nixon came to power, he interested in 
getting out of Vietnam but without abondoning the objective 
of sustaining an independent South Vietnam. The Nixon 
approach, was to change the tactics, not the goal, so as to 
reduce the domestic dissent on Vietnam. As Henry A. 
Kissinger wrote in the prestigious journal of the United States 
opinion elite that : 
"A new American administration must be given to 
benefit of the doubt and a chance to move towards 
a peace which grant the people of Vietnam what 
they have struggled so bravely to achieve : an 
opportunity to work out their own distiny in their 
own way." 
Nixon and his advisors believed that they could achieve what 
the previous administration could not (an American withdrawal 
with a guarantee that the Saigon regime would not be 
overthrown by communists). This was the promise of ensuing 
negotiations for peace and the policy of "Vietnamization of 
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On November 3, 1970, President Richard M. Nixon 
offered a strategy upon the twin approach of negotiations 
and Vietnamization of the war, accompanied by withdrawal 
of American forces. He was pessimistic about the outlook for 
negotiations and told that Vietnamization would permit the 
United States to disengage from the war even if negotiations 
failed. In the period since, the United States had further 
downgraded negotiations as an essential parts of any 
solution. The only subsequent hint that the government might 
war". The United States ground troops were withdrawn to 
make the United States public happy but the air war was 
continued so as to undermine the NLF and Hanoi's war efforts. 
Lalita Prasad Singh, n. 1, p. 17. 
Realizing the inevitability of United States withdrawal, and 
seeing an opportunity in the communists post Tet fall back, the 
United States had launched a three month - accelerated 
pacification programme in November 1968 and then prolonged 
it as fixed policy. Accelerated pacification, i.e. a rush to "clear 
and hold" territory as communist strength declined, 
coordinated and updated programme that previously had 
functioned separately and been given low priority. One 
programme financed by the CIA and headed by former Viet 
Minh Officer Ngu-Yen Be, trained 59 man teams to spearhead 
rural construction. Rural Development (RD) teams were sent 
out to help reorganize village administration, start 
construction projects, and train villagers to defend themselves. 
Williams S. Turkey, The Second Indochina War. (Colorado : 
Westview Press, 1986), p. 130. 
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not consider the Vietnamization strategy sufficient by itself 
was provided by the President's speech on April 20, 1971 
announcing future troops withdrawal, in which both the 
volume and tone of his discussion of negotiations implied a 
recognition that there was important. He stated explicitly 
that negotiations atleast provide a better, shorter path to 
peace. But there was no evidence following that speech of a 
change in the United States position in the Paris 
negotiations, and the President's action in Cambodia 10 days 
later clearly gave priority to Vietnamization. This priority 
was reflected in the renewed emphasis upon the use of 
military means to end the war and in the justification of the 
Cambodian intervention on the grounds that it was needed to 
protect American lives and to guarantee the continue success 
of American withdrawal and Vietnamization programme.'' 
As the 1970s opened, both Washington and Hanoi were 
prepared to make new efforts to reach an agreement. The 
4. Robert H. Johnson, "Vietnamization can it work", Foreign 
Affairs. (New York), Vol. 48, No. 4, July 1970, P. 629. 
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Nixon Administration had been compelled to reformulate 
American policy towards Vietnam due to the impossibility of 
attaining a victory within the limit set by the domestic 
opposition to the war, the obstacles posed by a tenacious 
enemy, and the fear of courting a major confrontation with 
China and Soviet Union as well as alienating America's 
friends. The new strategy of Vietnamization consisted of 
unilaterally and gradually withdrawing American combat 
troops while simultaneously strengthening the Saigon 
government and its armed force. The Administration was still 
committed to maintaining an anti-communist stand in Saigon. 
But the change of means and the reduced importance of 
Vietnam to the American policy makers implied then to 
suggest an opening of negotiations with the North 
Vietnamese.^ 
5. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival : 
The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 78. 
However, the Vietnamization programme was not welcome by 
everybody such as General Iran Van Don, the former chairman 
of the Senate and House Defence Committees, and finally 
Minister of Defence of South Vietnam had said that . 
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"I was an opponent of Vietnamization. I will tell 
just one story. I visited some unit in the field and 
tried to understand the programme of 
Vietnamization of war.... it was the head quarters 
of the S"" Division. I discussed the question with 
the commander of the division, General Minh Non 
Hieh, a most honest general and capable too. I 
was surprised by his answer; it opened my eyes. I 
ask him, "what do you think of Vietnamization? 
He said to me it is impossible to be implemented, 
why? He said, the S"* Division covers an area 
where there were two other divisions, Americans, 
and now with the departure of the two American 
divisions I have only my division to cover the 
whole area. I have three regiments for this area 
and must use one regiment to replace one 
division. How can I face the enemy like this? I 
have become weaker. He looked very 
disappointed. I was surprised; he was a quite man, 
polite man and he tried to do his best. But he said 
to me that this was impossible. How can I cover a 
bigger area with less units? So the Vietnamization 
of war means that we are becoming weaker." 
Colonel Nguyen Huy Loi, a veteran staff officer with a military 
adviser to the South Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks, 
thought that Vietnamization had not been approached properly; 
he started that : 
"When I was in Paris, people came to ask me. 
How do you feel about the Vietnamization? I 
thought a Vietnamization Programme was 
possible, really, because we did it before in 1954 
with the French. But the important thing is to 
Vietnamize the whole structure, right from the 
top, from those who conduct the whole war not 
just the small units. We had good officers who 
would stand and fight but we needed to put them 
in a right structure of force." 
Stephen T. Hosmer, The Fall of South Vietnam : Statements by 
Vietnamese military and civilian leaders. (New York : Crane 
Russak & Company, Inc, 1980), p. 36. 
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President Nixon's policy to vietnamize the war was 
first avowed during the spring of 1969. It involved the 
continuing but unscheduled withdrawal of American ground 
combat troops and the systematic strengthening of Army of 
Republic of Vietnam forces (ARVN). From the beginning 
the proposal was far from popular at Saigon. The political 
context of the Vietnamization proposal changed during the 
summer following the virtual abandonment of hope for 
progress in the peace negotiations and in broadening the 
political base of the Saigon government.^ 
The Vietnamization programme not only implied 
approval of the military suppression of any peace sentiment, 
but also the abandonment of deep seated demands for 
revolutionary social change, long denied by the French, by 
Diem, and successor governments at Saigon.^ 
6. John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia. 
(U.S.A. : Ohio University Press, 1974), p. 601. 
7. IbM., p. 602. 
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The new United States strategy required, the United 
States allies in Asia to take upon themselves the bulk of the 
defence burden. Washington assigned itself the role of good 
old uncle sam always willing to give its allies every help and 
support.* However, this strategy was accompanied by 
systematic demonstrations of United States military might, 
such as resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam in late 
1971 and the massive incursions by American and Saigon 
troops into the territory of Cambodia and Laos.^ 
8. Alexander Lavrentyev, USA & Asia. (New Delhi : Sterling 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1982), p. 51. 
9. Cambodia won international recognition at the 1954 Geneva 
Conference on Indo-China. The Cambodian delegation told the 
conference that the new independent state would refrain from 
joining any military or political alliance and would pursue a 
peaceable foreign policy. Indeed, the Cambodian government 
did resist Western attempts to draw the country into the 
SEATO military bloc. In reply to blatant pressure Cambodia 
rejected all types of American aid and expelled some United 
States services from the country. Among other things, it 
prohibited the propaganda activity of the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) on its territory. At the same time 
the Cambodian government condemned the United States 
aggression in Vietnam and did all it could to help the 
government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and 
the Provisional. Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
South Vietnam. It did it utmost to prevent the United States 
from involving Cambodia in the hostilities, which were gaining 
in scope and ferocity in neighbouring Vietnam and Laos. The 
Pentagon regarded Cambodia as a breach in the unstable 
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The new strategy of Vietnamization of war, while at 
the same time bringing greater military pressure to bear on 
Hanoi and steadily withdrawing United States forces, turned 
on the ability of the South Vietnamese to carry on the war on 
their own. In this sense this strategy was a gamble, betting 
that the South could hold its own with the North. With the 
adoption of the new Vietnamization strategy, it became 
paramount to make every possible disruptive effort against 
the enemy, particularly his logistic and troop reinforcement 
system, while substantial members of United States combat 
troops were still in the country.'^ 
frontline in Indo-China The American Generals insisted that 
Washington should permit an extension of hostilities to the 
territory of Cambodia so as to gain one more sector from 
which to attack Vietnam 
Ibid , pp 51-52 
10 This basic purpose lay behind the cross-border operations into 
Cambodia and Laos Cambodia was more or less off limits to 
major operations by allies forces, however, until Sihanouk's 
overthrow in March 1970 He had allowed the historically 
hated Vietnamese both North and South to use Cambodia as a 
forward base, yet he continued to proclaim his country's 
neutrality 
General Bruce Palmer, Jr, The 25 Year War America's 
Military Role in Vietnam. (USA University of Kentucky 
Press, 1984), pp 98-99 
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President Richard M. Nixon, however, put 
Vietnamization at centre stage in his plan to end the war, 
stating his strategic concept that : 
"We have adopted a plan which we have worked 
out in co-operation with the South Vietnamese for 
the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat 
ground forces and then replacement by South 
Vietnamese forces on an orderly schedules 
timetable. The withdrawal will be made from 
strength and not weakness. As South Vietnamese 
forces become stronger, the rate of Americn 
withdrawal can become greater."^^ 
In the sense, Vietnamization had begun in 1968 with a 
general mobilization that had raised the total of armed forces 
under Saigon's command to over 800,000 of which 380,000 
were in the regular army. By 1970, the total was near one 
million, over half those troops were irregular territorial 
defence forces (see table 4.1). 
11. Henry J. Kenny, The American Role in Vietnam and East Asia. (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1984), p.33. 
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President Nixon's noteworthy November 3, 1969, 
speech was directed towards two critical situations, one 
growing out of the anti war demonstration in Washington and 
the other concerned with a serious political crisis emerging 
in late October 1969 in Saigon. The President declared that 
his programme of Vietnamization was the only feasible 
alternative to an abrupt American withdrawal from South 
Vietnam, which would betray long standing commitments to 
the people effected and would precipitate a blood both of 
incalculable dimensions. An American retreat from Southeast 
Asia would allegedly cancel existing restraints on the 
reckless endeavours of great powers intent on world 
conquest. President Richard M. Nixon affirmed that the 
successful termination of the Vietnam war was the last hope 
for peace and freedom of millions of people about to be 
suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.^^ 
The speech also discounted the prospects of a 
negotiated settlement. President Richard M. Nixon cited Ho 
12. John F. Cady, n. 6, p. 602. 
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Chi Minh's alleged rejection of a letter sent to Hanoi on July 
15, in his reply dated August 25, just two weeks before Ho's 
death. As subsequently disclosed, Ho's reply had affirmed 
North Vietnam's desire for a real peace with independent 
and freedom. He argued that the United States would have to 
agree to withdraw its troops and to respect the right of the 
population of the South and of the Vietnamese nation to 
dispose of themselves without foreign interference. Ho 
concluded that with good will on both sides, we might arrive 
at common efforts in finding a correct solution.'^ 
President Richard M. Nixon concluded his address with 
an emotion laden denunciation of the vocal minority in the 
United States who were, he said ready to court defeat, 
humiliation, and disaster, and the massacre of Asian friends 
in order to gain their ends. The President's temporary 
success in quieting American protests had no observable 
effect on bringing the war to an end. Neither the Hanoi nor 
the NLF representatives in Paris saw any point in seeking a 
13. Ibid., p. 603. 
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cease-fire in South Vietnam without an unequivocal promise 
of the withdrawal of the half-million allied troops assigned 
to support the unacceptable government in Saigon.''* 
The task of improving the discipline and performance 
of the Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces as part 
of the Vietnamization programme was critically important, 
but the plan also carried ominous political overtones. The 
admittedly superior fighting performance of the North 
Vietnamese troops and their Southern Vietcong allies was 
clearly attributable to better leadership and motivation. The 
anticipated economic impact of Vietnamization was also 
distributing. The continuance of large-scale American 
financial aid was an integral part of the laboured agreement 
reached between Saigon and Washington during 1969.'^ 
The Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) fire power was 
increased as departing United States units left behind their 
arms and equipments. The value of United States arms 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., pp. 604-605. 
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transfers to Saigon rose from $ 775 million in 1969 to $ 925 
million in each year of 1969 and 1970.'^ 
However, Saigon recognised that Vietnamization or 
self-reliance required substantial efforts to build up the 
government forces. The logic of Vietnamization gave Saigon 
a convincing rationale to press for increased military and 
economic assistance in compensation for the gradual 
withdrawal of American combat troops.^^ 
Nixon Doctrine 
In 1969, the Secretary of Defence, Laird, said that the 
United States would ensure permanent control of Saigon 
government over South Vietnam. On November 3, 1969, 
President Richard M. Nixon revived the Domino theory. He 
held that American defeat in Vietnam would result in a world 
wide loss of faith in its leadership and that its withdrawal 
16. William S. Turkey, n. 3, p. 130. 
17. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Sukrke, n. 5, p. 95. 
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from Vietnam would mean a collapse not only of South 
Vietnam but also of Southeast Asia.^^ 
The Nixon Doctrine flowed out of his various 
statements, starting with his informal Press Conference on 
July 1969 at Guam on November 3, 1969 and January 11, 
1970 statements, and state of World Message of February 
10, 1970. It does not involve any shift in the United States 
policy in Asia. The Nixon Doctrine enjoins on client states 
to provide the man power and the rest of the resources.*^ 
18. R.L. Walli, Vietnam Long Road to freedom. (New Delhi : 
Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1976), p. 151. 
19. Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
The Nixon Doctrine was a philosophical statement emphasizing 
reduced engagement for the United States and urging greater 
self-reliance upon others. And it was also abroad strategy 
dealing with the United States responses to various level of 
military threat. As a strategy, it seeks to shift primary 
responsibility for providing military man power to nations 
under threat, while at the same time reaffirming all existing 
treaty commitments. It therefore, leaves a large area of future 
policy in determinate. Finally, the Doctrine rationalize United 
States military withdrawal tactics in a fashion that provides 
wide latitude in responding, on the other hand, to the 
pressures of United States domestic public opinion and, on the 
other, to reactions of United States friends and forces. 
Robert H. Johnson, "The Nixon Doctrine and the New Policy 
Environment" , in Joseph. J. Zasloft, (edited), Indochina in 
conflict. (Canada . D.C. Health and company, 1972), p. 175. 
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If the Kennedy and Johnson Administration's 
proceeded on the assumption that saving South Vietnam was 
a vital national interests of the United States, the statements 
and actions of the Nixon Administration seem to suggest that 
the United States government no longer considers this to be 
so. In his 1971 report to Congress on United States foreign 
policy. President Richard M. Nixon made the following 
statement about the United States response to aggression 
which does not involve one of the nuclear powers that : 
"we will continue to provide elements of military 
strength and economic resources appropriate to 
our size and our interests. But it is no longer 
natural or possible in this age to argue that 
security or development around the globe is 
primarily America's concern. The defence and 
progress of other countries must be first their 
responsibility and second, a regional 
responsibility."^" 
In discussing the reasons why he had decided on a de-
escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the President said: 
20. Donald E. Nuechterlein, "United States National Interests in 
Southeast Asia", Asian Survey.(Berkeley^. Vol. XI, No. 11, 
November 1971, p. 1066. 
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"Some urged that we escalate in an attempt to 
impose a military solution on the battle field. We 
ruled out this approach because of the nature of 
the conflict and of the enemy, the cost of such a 
policy, the risks of a wider war, and the deeply 
held convictions of many of our people". 
In effect, Richard M. Nixon once said that : 
"the struggle in Vietnam was not vital to United 
States in the world and that seeking a military 
solution to the war was not worth the cost 
involved. Therefore, a diplomatic solution which 
did not abandon South Vietnam was seen as the 
objective. We sought above all a rapid negotiated 
solution to the conflict by progressively defining 
the terms of a settlement that would accommodate 
the legitimate interests of both sides. And in the 
absence of a settlement, we sought through 
Vietnamization, to shift American responsibilities 
to the South Vietnam."^^ 
/ 
21. Thus, within the span of only ten years, the United States 
government's perception of its national interests in Asia had 
shifted dramatically. In the summer and fall of 1961, the mood 
in Washington was that China posed a growing threat to 
United States interests in Asia generally, and in Southeast Asia 
specifically, and that those interests were so vital that they had 
to be protected with United States arms if the South 
Vietnamese government was unable to do so itself. In 1971, 
another president representing another political view point, 
decided that China may not be a military threat to United 
States interests in Asia and that the accommodation with China 
which included a political solution in Vietnam was more in 
America's interests than trying to press for a military solution 
to that problem. 
One may conclude from this shift in policy by Nixon 
Administration, and the apparent willingness of the American 
people to support it, that the United States no longer perceives 
any vital interests at stake in South Vietnam. Furthermore, the 
two factors cited above, on which Kennedy advisors justified 
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The principle which President Richard M. Nixon 
enunciated that, certainly was a change from the policy 
followed by his immediate predecessors. Let the principle be 
described in Nixon's own words: 
"It central thesis is that the United States will 
participate in the defence and developments of 
allies and friends, but that American cannot - and 
will not - conceive all the plans, design all the 
programme, executive all the decisions and 
undertake all the defence of the free nations of 
the world. We will help where is considered in 
our interests. America cannot live in isolation if 
it expects to live in peace. We have no intention 
of withdrawing from the world. The only issue 
before us is how we can be most effect in meeting 
our responsibilities, protecting our interests and 
thereby building peace."^^ 
the view that Vietnam was vital - the Asian balance of power 
and United States world wide prestige - Nixon seemed 
prepared to take care of those remaining balance in Asia -
Peking - while reassuring American allies Taiwan-Thailand and 
South Vietnam - that he would not abandon them as part of an 
accommodation with China. In the summer of 1971, it was not 
certain whether Nixon would succeed in extricating the United 
States from what he believed to be an over commitment of 
United States resources and prestige in South Vietnam. 
However, the American people were clearly in the mood for a 
searching re-examination of United States national interests in 
Asia, including the normalization of relations with China. 
Ibid., p. 1067. 
22. D.R. A. Appadorai, "The Nixon Doctrine", Eastern Economist. 
(New Delhi), March 27, 1970, p. 604-605. 
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It was interesting that the genesis of this principle, 
according to Nixon himself was learnt by him from a leader 
of an Asian country. He said in his nation-wide television 
address on November 3, 1969 that : 
"When you are trying to assist another nation 
defend its freedom. United States policy should 
be to help them fight the war but not to fight the 
war for them. In accordance with this wise 
consel, I laid down in Guam three principles as 
guidelines for future American policy towards 
Asia: First, the United States will keep all of its 
treaty commitment. Second, we should provide a 
shield if nuclear power threatens the freedom of a 
nation allied with United States or of a nation 
whose survival we consider vital to our security. 
Third, increase involving other types of 
aggression, we shall furnish military and 
economic assistance when requested in 
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we 
shall took to the nation directly threatened to 
assume the primary responsibility of providing 
the manpower for its defence."^^ 
23. Ibid. 
When President Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to stand for 
re-election. Underlying the decision was the American 
frustration over its role in Southeast Asia. Increasing loses in 
men, money and material in Vietnam so demolized the United 
States that its desperately sought an honourable withdrawal. 
The wide spread intellectual unrest, a situation approximating 
a rebellion on diverse American campuses, and a severe rift in 
democratic ranks had played the Johnson administration. The 
effects on the United States economy were more telling: it 
could not provide for both guns and butter. A later MIT study 
estimated the comprehensive cost of Vietnam war up to 1971 
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Peace initiations 
The realization of futility of the war in Vietnam came 
to a number of high Government officials as early as 1967, 
though such were then in minority. Thus on May 19, 1967 in 
a memo to the President, Defense Secretary McNamara 
stated that:^ "* 
"The picture of the world's greatest superpower 
killing or seriously injuring 1,000 non-combatants 
a week while trying to pound a tiny backward 
nation into submission on an issue whose merits 
are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one." 
at $ 753 billions, or equal to the gross national product of the 
United States for one year. Richard M. Nixon, appeared 
metamorphosed as he got himself elected on a platform of 
disengagement promising massive troops withdrawal and 
rapproachment with China. 
D.R. Sardesai, "Peace in Vietnam and the Security of 
Southeast Asia", China report. (New Delhi ), Vol. IX, No. 4, 
July-August 1973, pp. 7-8. 
24. After McNamara resigning. His successor, Clark Clifford (from 
March 1968) soon came to the similar conclusion. He had 
stated that: 
"I was convinced that the military course we were 
pursuing was not only endless, but hopeless. A 
further substantial increase in Americanization of 
the war, and thus leave us even further from our 
goal of a peace that would permit the people of 
South Vietnam to fashion their own political and 
economic institutions." 
DR. Sardesai, Southeast Asia Past and Present. (Ghaziabad : 
Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1981), p;. 416. 
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The situation in Vietnam during 1970 could be summed 
up in one sentence: it had been a year of progressive military 
de-escalation and growing political confrontation. To every 
combatant - the United States, South Vietnam, North 
Vietnam, the National Liberation Front-it had become 
undeniably obvious that military victory was unattainable. 
But it was equally obvious that no one was prepared to 
accept defeat either. Everyone was tired of an endless war, 
but no one was prepared to call a halt to it. The blood and 
suffering of the hundreds of thousands of lives thrown into 
battle had to be justified by some concrete results, however, 
meager. Thus, the struggle for South Vietnam had shifted to 
another sphere. Fighting had been replaced by negotiations, 
propaganda and the manipulation of popular opinion.^^ 
The choice for the United States in Vietnam, therefore, 
was between unattainable victory and unacceptable defeat. 
Both negotiation and escalation were beset with many 
25. Jerry Mark Silverman, "South Vietnam and the Elusive Peace", 
Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XIII, No. 1, January 1973, p. 
23. 
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imponderables. If the limited escalation of 1963 had any 
lesson it was an exercise in futility. The United States had to 
blame herself for such a state of affairs.^^ 
The misadventure in Vietnam had invited the 
conclusion that United States arms and technical advisors 
cannot in themselves provide national cohesion or build a 
nation, even in opposition to an externally assisted guerrilla 
enemy, and that without such cohesion United States efforts 
may prove futile and debilitating both at home and abroad. 
26. Ibid., p. 19. 
It was a mistake to think that a viable state can be built in 
South Vietnam without a requisite political base and it was a 
blunder on the part of the United States to take over the war. 
How easy it was for the communist-dominated National 
Liberation Front (NLF) to convince the countryside that the 
current war was a continuation of the war of independence. As 
a prominent Buddhist leader one said that : 
"The more American troops sent to Vietnam, the 
more the anti American campaign led by the NLF 
becomes successful. Anger and hatred rise in the 
hearts of peasants as they see their villages 
burned, their compatriots killed, their houses 
destroyed by American soldiers holding guns with 
bayonets, make people think of Indo-China war 
between the French and the Vietnam and cause 
pain even to anti Communist Vietnamese." 
Lalita Prasad Singh, n. 3, p. 14. 
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This conclusion was implicitly expressed in both the Nixon 
Doctrine and President Ford's Pacific Doctrine.^^ 
However, the sequence of events that led to 
negotiations probably started with General Westmoreland's 
visit to Washington in November 1967. On that occasion. 
General Westmoreland told a joint session of Congress that 
the war was being militarily won. He outlined indicators of 
progress and started that a limited withdrawal of United 
27. Joseph J. Zasloft and Lister Brown, Communist Indo-China 
and United States Foreign Policy Post war Relations. 
(Colorado : West View Press, 1978), p. 2. 
During the post-1968 period, the main strategic problem was 
to sustain enough pressure on the battle field to support the 
negotiations in Paris and definitely bring an end to the limited 
war. As the Vietnamization strategy became the main focus of 
United States policy and withdrawal of American troops 
proceeded, the defeat of the Saigon forces became the main 
focus. While the purely military balance of forces had not been 
a major preoccupation of Hanoi during the period of greatest 
United States involvement. During the 1969-70 period the 
issue was what level of military activity was necessary to 
support the Paris negotiations and counter pacification and 
Vietnamization while waiting for the United States to complete 
its troop withdrawal. 
David W.P. Elliott, "Hanoi's strategy in second Indochina War 
in Jaynes. Werner, (edited). The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and 
American Perspective. (New York : M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 89. 
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States combat forces might be undertaken beginning late in 
1968.2^ 
A new phase in the conflict began and Washington 
recognized that it was manifestly impossible to clear South 
Vietnam of communist forces, as the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency(ClA) report had noted the growing 
menace of communist militants on March 1, 1968. The North 
Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front (NLF) 
discerned in this a long awaited opportunity to exploit 
American hesitation. The proposal presented by the NLF 
delegate, Tran Bun Kien to the Paris talks in May 1969 
contained to concessions designed to give the talks 
momentum, instead of unconditional American withdrawal, 
the NLF now called for unilateral withdrawal. The previous 
demand of political settlement must be achieved by the time 
of the military cease-fire was modified. Although, the 
principle was maintained in order to avoid a repeat of events 
28. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign PoJicy. (India : A.H. 
Wheeler & Co. (P) Ltd., 1969), p. lOL 
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following the Geneva Accords, the NLF was willing to 
accept an interim government at the time of cease-fire thus 
leaving elections and the eventual settlement to a future date. 
But the NLF stood firm on its demand that the interim 
government must be a peace cabinet, the existing Saigon 
establishment headed by President Nguyen Van Thien, whom 
the NLF regarded as an American puppet, could not be 
represented.^^ 
The American response to the NLF plan subsequently 
gave rise to a lost opportunity thesis. President Richard M. 
Nixon on May 14, 1968 called for a partial military 
withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces. An 
International Control Commission (ICC) would supervise the 
remaining withdrawals.^° 
Whichever the case, the American position was soon 
classified. A joint Washington - Saigon proposal in June 
1969 called for an election formula whereby the NLF would 
29. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, n. 5, p. 76. 
30. Ibid., p. 77. 
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be integrated into the existing Saigon government. This was 
totally unacceptable to the NLF which saw it as a prelude to 
its own destruction. Moreover, the establishment of a 
Provisional Revolutionary Government for South Vietnam 
(PRG) in June 1969 demonstrated its willingness to accept 
any compromise that would be little its prestige and power in 
an eventual settlement.^' 
However, a partial bombing halt and preliminary 
negotiations with the communists would be continued, the 
pressures on the Saigon government to adjust were rapidly 
mounting. Thus, Thien was in quick order to accept the 
American conditions for a bombing pause, sent a delegation 
31. Stalemate was also evident on another level. When the secret 
talks between Hanoi and Washington commenced in August 
1969, Henry A. Kissinger proposed to Hanoi's chief 
negotiator, Le Due Tho, that both states should withdraw their 
forces from the South as part of an overall settlement. Le Due 
Tho rejected this. Hanoi did not publicly admit that there were 
Army of Republic of Vietnam (RAVN) regulars in the south, 
and continued to maintain that Vietnamese forces in Vietnam 
and the American aggressors could not be equated. Le Due 
Tho also reiterated, the demand for Thien's exclusion from any 
coalition government in Saigon as a pre-condition for cease-
fire. 
Ibid., p. 78. 
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to Paris to negotiate with the Northern Vietnamese and the 
NLF, to formulate a policy on the question of a political 
settlement in the South which atleast had the appearance of 
flexibility, and acquire in gradual American troops 
withdrawal without reciprocal actions by the North 
Vietnamese. The contrast between there demands and 
Thien's desires was demonstrated by Saigon's five-point 
proposal of June 23, 1968.^ ^ 
Thien initially stuck to a maximalist position and 
referred to send a delegation to the first plenary session of 
the Paris talks scheduled for November 6, 1968. He stated 
that: 
"We do not and will not accept the participation 
of the so-called South Vietnam National 
Liberation Front (NLF) as a valid participant at 
any stage of the peace talks, even in the 
32. Those were (1) the communist must stop all military and 
subversive activities in the South (2) North Vietnam must 
disband the NLF "puppet organization" and withdraw their 
troops from the South. (3) the RNV must determine its 
domestic political affairs without outside intervention. (4) The 
United States should remain in the South untill peace is 
restored; and (5) The independence of the RVN must be 
effectively guaranteed. 
Ibid. 
130 
While United States engagement and Vietnamization 
were in train, the Nixon Administration was also attempting 
to get serious negotiations underway with North Vietnam. 
President Richar M. Nixon had written to Ho Chi Minh in 
late December 1968 on the subject as a gesture of good will 
from the newly elected United States government, but 
received a brutal, totally negative response on December 
31.^ "* In February 1969 Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Cyrus 
Vance as the United States representative in the largely open 
talks in Paris, and in Agust 1969 Henry Kissinger tried to 
initiate meaningful secret talks with the North Vietnamese, 
but to no avail. Although serious secret negotiations were 
resumed between Henry Kissinger and Le Due Tho in 
February 1970, it was not until October, 1972, when their 
Eastern 1972 offensive ran out of stream, that the North 
Ibid., pp. 92-99. 
34. Ho Chi Minh died in September of the following year, but the 
Hanoi regime continued its unrelenting and uncompromising 
outlook without a change in beat. 
General Bruce Palmer Jr, n. 10, p. 119. 
131 
Vietnamese finally indicated that they were ready to make a 
political settlement.^^ 
In the meantime. President Richard M. Nixon had 
sought to bring increasing pressure on the North Vietnamese 
to negotiate by seeking separate talks with the Soviet Union 
and China. The strategic arms limitations talks with the 
USSR, which began in mid November 1969 and led 
eventually to SALTI, were initiated partly for this purpose. 
Likewise, the President's trip to China in February 1972, 
which reopened contact between the two countries, was also 
intended to put pressure on Hanoi.^^ 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
But the huge gap in perception and principle still devided the 
two sides. Hanoi's terms had not changed since April 8, 1968, 
when Premier Pham Van Dong had enunciated "four points" 
based on the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The four points called 
for (1) recognition of Vietnam's national right to peace, 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, and 
cessation of all United States military activity in both the 
North and South. (2) strict implementation of the 1954 
prescription against military alliances with foreign countries 
and foreign military bases' while Vietnam was still temporarily 
devided into two zones. (3) Settlement of South Vietnam's 
internal affairs in accordance with the program of the South 
Vietnam National Front for liberation and (4) Peaceful 
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While the United States and the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (DRV) would negotiate a military settlement of 
the war, the Saigon government would seek a political 
solution with the National Liberation Front (NLF) American 
forces would be gradually withdrawn the Vietnamization of 
the balance of the war would leave Saigon as a strong and 
friendly government. The new policy was also based on 
rapprochement with China, which seemed eager to grasp the 
American hand of friendship progressively in the hope of 
using it against the Soviet Union.^^ 
reunification by the Vietnamese people in both zones without 
foreign interference. The third point required establishment of 
a coalition government that would have to include the NLF. 
The Johnson administration had insisted on withdrawal of 
North Vietnamese troops in advance of United States 
withdrawal and had refused to discuss political arrangements 
except in terms of the South's self- determination. Nixon and 
Kissinger persuaded to propose a mutual troops withdrawal 
and restoration of the demilitarized zones as a boundary. But 
this proposal by implying that North Vietnamese as well as 
United States troops were "foreign" to South Vietnam and that 
Vietnam was two countries ran directly counter to Hanoi's 
non-negotiable position that Geneva had affirmed Vietnam's 
juridicial unity. 
William S.Turkey, n.3, p. 119. 
37. D.R. Sardesai, n.24, p.417. 
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The plan for gradual withdrawal of United States 
troops was not achieved without further bloodshed. Efforts 
to make the operation compatible with the achievement of 
peace with honor involve more saturation bombing of 
Vietnam - North and South - than ever before, mining of Hai-
Phong Harbour, escalation of the clandestine war in Laos and 
an overt invasion of Cambodia. From 1970 to 1973, the 
Vietnamese conflict became truly an Indo-China war.^^ 
For the President, the peace package was a means to 
extricate United States ground forces from Vietnam while 
simultaneously buying an understanding from the communists 
not to force the demise of Nguygen Van Thien's regime 
before a decent interval that would undoubtedly be kind to 
American prestige in the world and Richard M. Nixon in the 
history books.^^ 
38. Ibid. 
39. Far Eastern Economic Review. (Hong Kong), Vol. 80, No. 16. 
p.27 
134 
Factors led to the Peace Agreement 
International circumstances at that time were of course 
unfavorable to any wider war, whereas in 1970 there were no 
such obstacles, the Vietnam war was being wound down, the 
American's withdrawing, bombing of North Vietnam had 
ceased, the non-aligned Sihanouk was in exile and the Lon 
Noi government in Cambodia was desperately seeking help. 
The Soviet Union, maintaining its embassy in Phnom-Penh, 
had not recognized Sihanouk's government in Peking. The 
Chinese, for their part, had been confidentially negotiating 
for nearly two months with Lon Noi. They were urging the 
new regime to revive Sihanouk's policy of accommodation of 
North Vietnam and the NLF in return for China's friendship 
and non-recognition of the Sihanouk. But the confusion in 
Cambodia following the overthrow of Sihanouk - North 
Vietnamese pressure on Lon Noi to see reason, the uncertain 
nature of support for Sihanouk among officials, towns people 
and peasantry, the historic Cambodia fear of the Vietnam 
invader - all conspired to drive the Khmer regime, toward 
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neutrality or a new alignment with the communist powers, 
but into the arms of the West.'*^ 
By 1967, more and more Americans were coming also 
to the conclusion that the war was atleast unwinable if not 
totally wrong. The first anti war demonstrations had already 
taken place in Washington, and on many United States 
campuses in April and May 1965, and in October 1967, 
35,000 demonstrators descended on Washington. Increasing 
number of government officials as well were beginning to 
wonder as reportedly had Assistant Secretary of Defence 
John Mc Naunghton as early as December 1964, if they were 
on the wrong side.'*' 
The discordant voices in the American administration 
had been proceeded by a nation wide student concern. By 
1968, an election year, the anti-Vietnam war protest 
40. J.L.S. Girling, "Nixon's Algeria Doctrine and Disengagement 
in Indochina," Pacific Affairs. (Vancouver), Vol XLIX, No. 4, 
winter 1971-72, p.532. 
41. James Pinckney Harrison, The Endless War : Fifty years of 
struggle in Vietnam. (New York : The Free Press, 1982), 
p.264. 
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movement had widened to include most of the intellectuals 
and created a severe rift in the Democratic Party's ranks. 
After the initial benefits to the war, the economy had began 
to deteriorate and thus causing concern to the United States 
authorities. The recession, growing unemployment and the 
declining dollar boasted public clamour to end the war. Both 
the sides in the Vietnamese war had an eye on United States 
political situation. North Vietnam and the NLF's decision to 
launch a major offensive on all the main cities and towns of 
South Vietnam around the time of the Tet offensive in 
January 1968 must had been taken with a view to exploiting 
the American electoral politics. The attack would be 
followed by negotiations in which the Americans would be at 
a distinct advantage.""^ 
42. D.R. Sardesai, n. 24, p.416. 
The Tet offensive, however, produced a military stalemate, 
though it had a tremendous impact on American politics. The 
NLF was not successful in holding any of the cities and towns 
except Hua for a short period. The NLF's expectations of 
major popular risings in its favour in the urban centres were 
not fulfilled its losses were heavy, about 40,000 killed, with 
many more casualty. The impact of the offensive on United 
States and South Vietnamese forces was disastrous. In 
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Moreover, there had been tremendous pressure on the United 
States from all over the world to stop bombing of North Vietnam 
unconditionally. At the 12^^ Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, even thou^ Vietnam was not on the agenda, most of the 
members who participated in the general debate spoke on the Vietnam 
situation. An analysis of the speeches provides an interesting insight 
into world opinion on American bombing of North Vietnam. Out of 109 
members who participated in the debate, only six countries, including 
the United States supported the bombing policy. America had the 
support of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Nationalist China 
and Thailand. Eight countries demanded mutual de-escalation of 
hostilities in Vietnam or as some of them put it, there should be 
reciprocal action or that all the parties should stop fighting. Countries 
Washington, a major debate on the potential costs of 
continuing the war took place based on the assumption that 
only a quarter of North Vietnam's forces were involved in the 
Tet offensive. From that point of view, the United States 
seemed resolved to disengage from Vietnam with honour. 
Bombing and other forms of warfare would be continued to 
secure the best terms in the preferred course of negotiations. 
An immediate result of all this was Johnson's decision not to 
seek office again. By the end of the year, the former Cold War 
hero, Richard Nixon, was elected the Presidency platform of 
disengagement from Vietnam. 
Ibid. 
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like the United Kingdom, Belgium, Austria, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Argentina and Uganda belonged to this group. Fifty-five countries 
including some allies of the United States and the NATO partners, like 
Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, demanded an 
unconditional end the American bombing. A ^otal of thirty seven 
countries eitiier did not mention Vietnam or express no definite opinion 
on the question of bombing, four countries Equador, Mexico, Barbados 
and Jamaica extended fiill support to U. Thant's proposals, and eight 
more hoped for achieving peace in Vietnam on the basis of the Geneva 
Agreements. Pakistan, Iran, Italy, Lebanon, Laos, Singapore and 
Madagascar came under this category."*^  
43. Added to this world opinion, there had been a great deal of 
criticism within the United States itself which almost forced 
President Lyndon B. Johnson to revise his bombing policy. On 
September, 29, 1967, President Johnson, in an address to the 
nation from San Antonio in Texas said that : 
"The United States is willing immediately to stop 
aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam 
when this will lead promptly to productive 
discussion. We would assume that while 
discussions proceed North Vietnam would not 
take advantage of the bombing cessation or 
limitations." 
Undoubtedly, this offer went further than any of his previous 
offers. He was not anymore insisting on prior commitment or 
promise by Hanoi about reciprocity. Instead, he seemed to 
leave it to Hanoi to reciprocate suitably while the talks were in 
progress. However, his offer did not go for enough to promise 
139 
The cost of war also was enormous as well as the 
casaulty. In 1968 it was estimated that United States was 
spending about $ 22 billion a year. The exact figures were 
debatable but no doubt about the huge sum had been spent. 
In early 1971, President Richard M. Nixan had reduced the 
cost but it was still huge. Economic assistance to South 
Veitnam also was costly. The heavy burden of the war 
contributed to a rise in the United States taxes and 
facilitated inflation in the country.''^ 
The casualty figures of the war mounted on both sides. 
With Janurary 1, 1961 American battle deathes came to 
45,665 and American wounded numbered 302,774 through 
March 18, 1972 as shown in table 4.2. 
a unilateral end to the bombing. Nevertheless, a mind toning 
down of the United States demand for reciprocity was 
discernable in President Johnson's speech. 
B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam : The Cvcle of Peace. (New Delhi : 
Indian Society of International Law, 1968), pp.62-64. 
44. William S. Turkey, The Second Indo-China War. (Colorado : 
Westview Press, 1986), p. 175. 
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The Cease-fire 
It looked as if the Paris Agreements of 1973, like the 
Geneva Accords of 1954, had merely transferred the struggle 
from military to the political plan. Several Statements from 
the spokesman of the Nixon Administration indicated that the 
United States would continue to assist Saigon in its struggle 
for survival/^ Concerned about the possibility of re-entry 
into the Vietnam war, and distrustful of Nixon in view of the 
Watergate revelations, the United States Congress adopted, 
overriding the President's authority to use troops only in the 
event of a war declared by Congress or if sanctioned by a 
Congressional statutory authorization.'^ 
45. It was revealed later that Nixon had actually written to Thien 
promising military support if Hanoi attack South Vietnam 
again. 
Lalita Prasad Singh, n.l, p. 18. 
46. Ibid. 
During the past three years British and United States 
governments had consistently stressed the importance of 
getting talks with North Vietnam start. Two statements from 
North Vietnam raised hopes that such talks would at last 
begin. The first North Vietnamese statement to inspire hope of 
talks was the assurance by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh 
in December 1967 that, if the United States stop the bombing 
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In the conference on January 30, 1969 Ambassador 
Xuan Thuy indicated that the problems of South Vietnam 
must be solved by the population of the South on the basis of 
self-determination. Consequently, the Americans had 
of the North, North Vietnam would talk with the United 
States. But when the President Johnson wrote to Ho Chi Minh 
in February 1967, he had shown no signs of being troubled 
about the will issue, and asked for no clarification on it. He 
appeared to accept that if the United States bombing of North 
Vietnam stop, North Vietnam would be ready to talk. Neither 
in February 1967, not ten months later whom Nguyen Duy 
Trinh said : "will" was the United State prepared to end the 
bombing of North Vietnam unconditionally and permanently in 
return for talks. 
Two months later, in response to President's Johnson speech 
of March 31, the second statement came to arouse hopes of 
peace and stated that : 
"The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam declare that it is ready to have its 
representative meet with representatives of the 
United States to decide on the unconditional 
cessation of the bombing and other war acts 
against the DRV so that discussions could start." 
Up to the mid April these were no indications that either side 
seriously envisaged an early settlement. As the debate about 
the site for the Vietnam talks dragged on, the North 
Vietnamese demonstrated their continuing distrust of 
President Johnson by pointing out, with obvious relish that the 
American President's of expressed willingness to meet his 
adversaries any time and anywhere did not mean what it 
appeared to mean. On April 8, United States and South 
Vietnamese forces launched the largest allies offensive of the 
Vietnam war. This operation gave North Vietnam its heavy 
bombardment for more than three months - though all the 
action, was south of the 19'*' parallel. 
Adam Roberts, "Hanoi's offer to talk". The World Today. 
(London), Vol. 24, No. 5, May 1968, pp. 176-176. 
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apparently accepted the principle of self-determination for a 
considerable time. At the time of the Honolulu meeting on 
July 19, 1968, President Johnson spoke to President Thien 
about an honourable peace which would allow the people of 
South Vietnam to decide their own future. Moreover, the 
Americans also declared that they had no desire to retain 
military bases or alliances with South Vietnam, thus 
accepting the principle of neutrality.''^ 
47. By the end of January 1969, therefore, the character of the 
Paris conference had been clearly defined it had in fact 
become the follow-up of the 1954 Geneva Conference. The 
goal was the definite decolonization of South Vietnam on the 
basis of the self-determination of its people and the diplomatic 
and military neutrality of the country. 
The problem was to find out what self-determination meant to 
the participants. From the start, it appeared that their 
interpretations were contradictory. The Americans, convinced 
that only North Vietnamese military help allow the NLF to 
impose its rule on the South Vietnamese, demanded first the 
withdrawal of Northern troops. In return, Washington was 
prepared to withdraw its own forces once the Saigon army was 
in position to take over the struggle. Hence, the Americans 
Paris had demanded the mutual withdrawal of non South 
Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam since the beginning of 
February. 
Philippe Devillers, "The Paris negotiations on Vietnam," The 
World Todav. (London), Vol. 25, No. 8, August 1969, pp.340-
342. 
Preliminary talks between the United States and the DRV 
began on May 13, 1968 in Paris. The Government of the DRV 
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The Paris Accords finally signed by the four parties 
concerned the Democrativ Republic of Vietnam (DRV), 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam 
(PRG), the Thien Government and the United States - on 
January 27, 1973 brought about a cease-fire in Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos. The Accords provided for withdrawal of 
all American troops, the return of prisoners of war, a cease-
fire in place without demarcation lines. A democratic 
solution for the South was envisaged. The PRG and the 
Thien government were to resolve their conflicts through 
mutual consultation. A Council of Reconciliation and 
Concord was to be established for organizing elections in the 
South. Thereafter, a tripartite coalition government of Thien, 
nominated Mr.Xuan Thuy former Foreign Minister of the 
Government of DRV, as its representative at the Paris talks. 
This preliminary talks constitute only a beginning in the 
settlement of the complex problem. The time taken to decide 
Paris as the venue for talks, despite President Johnson's 
repeated statement that he was ready for talks at any place and 
at any time, was a clear indication of the difficulties involved. 
Both sides appeared anxious to keep the dialogue going till 
they were able to settle the preliminaries and pave the way for 
the convening of the Geneva Conference. 
BSN Murti, n.43, p.63. 
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the PRG and neutralist would be established. Reunification 
of Vietnam could be considered though consequent 
consultations between the North and the South. As for Laos 
and Cambodia, the Paris Accords confirmed the provisions of 
the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. An unwritten 
clause of the agreement was the United States promise to 
pay $ 3.2 billion towards the reconstruction of the DRV. 
This was never paid - Hanoi's march against Saigon in 
March 1975 had, in Washington's view, absolved it of that 
promise.'*^ 
It had been evident for several months that the United 
States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam considered 
the 1954 Geneva Agreements to be a basis of a possible 
settlement. However, it had been clear for some time that 
Washington and Hanoi did not interpret these Agreements in 
the same way. From the start it appeared that the object of 
the American tactics was to push first and foremost the 
military clauses of the Agreements and especially those 
48. D.R. Serdesai, no. 24, p.428. 
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which seemed advantageous for Saigon the re-
establishement and control of the demilitrized zone, the 
mutual withdrawal of external forces, and the reactivation of 
the International Control Commission. On the other hand, the 
delegates from Hanoi, insisted that the political aspects of 
the Agreements were the fundamental one and should have 
preference that most of the military clauses were temporary 
and aimed only at permitting the political settlement.'*^ 
The Agreement also provided for a cessation of all acts 
of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), 
the withdrawal of all the arm forces of the United States and 
its allies from South Vietnam within a two-month period, and 
49. Philippe Devillers, n.45, p.340. 
The Accords brought the Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Le Due 
Tho, Chief North Vietnamese negotiator (who did not accept 
it) and Henry Kissinger, but no peace to states of Indochina. 
The three Vietnamese parties to the Accords viewed the 
agreement as a temporary truce, giving time to each to prepare 
for the final phase of the conflict. The Accords had implicitly 
allowed the DRV to station about 140,000 troops in the South 
until a political solution was reached. The cease-fire left south 
Vietnam with pockets of PRG rule. The withdrawal of United 
States forces left the South Vietnam exposed to an eventual 
invasion by the North. 
D.R. Serdesai, n.24, p.428. 
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for the interference of the warring states in the domestic 
affairs of the Vietnamese people. The signatories to the Paris 
Agreements came to an understanding on a political 
settlement of South Vietnam's internal affairs, based on the 
principle of recognition of the actual alignment of forces in 
that country.^^ 
The cease-fire agreement and implementing protocols 
relative to Vietnam ended the words of presidential 
proclamation issued May 7, 1975 active participation 
conflict. President Nixon on January 26, 1973, issued a 
proclamation stating that the United States had achieved its 
goal of peace with honour in Vietnam and calling the next 
day for a "National Moment" and "Thanks giving". The next 
year President Nixon issued a proclamation on February 26, 
in which he designated March 29 as Vietnam Veterans Day, 
observing that the departure of the last United States Combat 
Soldier from Vietnam on that day in 1973 marks the final 
50. Alexander Laurentyev, n. 8, p. 53. 
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conclusion of America's longest, and without question its 
most difficult war.^' 
Moreover, this agreement retained main principles of 
the October draft agreement. It recognized, although not as 
explicitly as the PRG and the DRV had demanded, the 
existence of two administrations and two armies in South 
Vietnam (the PRG and the Thien government) and three 
political tendencies (the PRG, the Thien forces and a neutral 
third force). It ended direct American military pressure on 
the North and finalized the withdrawal of American forces 
from the South. The United States even made a conditional 
promise over five billion dollars in reconstruction aid to the 
DRV, although this was much less important and at any rate 
did not materialize. The agreement did not provide for a 
peace cabinet even on an interim basis in which, and Thien 
had promised of continued American economic and military 
equipments assistance. Hanoi did not exclude the possibility 
of renewed American bombing, or even of the reintroduction 
51. Russell H. Fifield, n. 2, p. 685. 
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of ground troops, if the Saigon government were seriously 
threatened. Still, it was not an unfavourable agreement if 
viewed as a transition to the final phase of the conflict. The 
central committee of the Lao Dong Party hailed it as the 
basis for their people to march forward and win new 
victories and achieve independence and democracy in the 
South and proceed to the peaceful reunification of their 
fatherland. The PRG similarly claimed that a new period was 
opened very advantageous for the completing of the national 
and democratic resolution.^^ Of most impotance for destiny 
of the Vietnamese people was Article 15 of the Paris 
Agreements, in which the signatories recognized the 
principle of unity and terrotorial integrity of the whole of 
Vietnam. 
The world opinion welcomed the Paris Agreements. It 
was regarded as a historic victory of the Vietnamese people. 
It guaranteed the political and legal bases for the Vietnamese 
people's fundamental right and self-determination as well. 
52 Charles E Morrison and Astri Suhrke, n. 5, p. 88. 
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CHAPTER-V 
New Initiatives in Thai - United States Relations 
since 1975 
Since 1973, Thailand was in a state of internal turmoil 
as successive governments were pursuing multiplicity of 
political interests and unable to compromise on vital national 
issues.^ 
The Thai policy and action were predicted on 
conditions within Thailand itself as well as on the thinking 
and perception of individual leaders who were at the helm of 
governmental affairs. The democratization of the Thai policy 
had a direct effect upon the new foreign policy orientation in 
the beginning of 1973 which was designed to reflect both the 
changing realities of international policies as well as the 
growing popular participation in the policy formulation 
process.^ 
1. The Investor.(Bangkok). Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1977, p. 14. 
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When Kukrit Pramoj became Thai Prime Minister in 
1975 he had expressed a policy of stressing the desire for 
friendly relations with all countries regardless of political 
differences. On March 9, 1975, he outlined the foreign 
policy of his newly-formed coalition government to the 
House of Representative that: 
"This government will pursue an independent 
policy taking into account national interests 
which are based upon economic and security 
considerations. 
This government will promote peaceful co-
existence by be friending every country which 
demonstrates goodwill towards Thailand, 
irrespective of differences in ideologies or 
political systems; rather non-interference in 
internal affairs, justice, and equality will be the 
considered principles in ordering bilateral 
relations. 
In order to create a balance in relations with the 
superpowers, this government will endeavour to 
recognize and normalize ties with the People's 
Republic of China, to effect a withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Thailand within a year, 
through friendly negotiations and taking into 
account prevailing conditions in the region. 
This government will strengthen ties with 
neighbouring countries and support co-operation 
with ASEAN in every way, while continuing to 
seek constructive contacts with the Democratic 
Sarasin Viraphol, Directions in Thai Foreign Policy. (New 
Delhi, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, JNU, 1976), p.3. 
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Republic of Vietnam. On foreign assistance, this 
government will consider obligations as being 
vital, and will not put itself in any 
disadvantageous position, as the government 
intends to go as far as possible-and as rapidly as 
possible in creating a basis for economic and 
military self-reliance."^ 
In fact, the prevailing mood in the United States in 
1975 was one of withdrawal. Neither the United States 
government nor the American public was inclined to continue 
heavy involvement abroad politically, militarily, or 
otherwise. Coincided with prevailing sense of resignation in 
the United States, the Government of Kukrit set a one-year 
deadline for the removal of American troops and military 
equipments from Thai territory. In addition, student-led 
demonstrations against continued United States military 
presence in Thailand naturally put an additional strain on the 
bilateral relations."* 
Ibid., p. 1 
The question of United States bases and military presence was 
a big issue in 1973 and the short-lived Seni Government, which 
had proceeded the Kukrit Government, had set a schedule of 
18 months for the withdrawal of United States military forces 
from Thailand. Prime Minister Kukrit later shortened it to one 
year. Consequently, the United States agreed to pull out 7500 
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On May 7, 1975, when Thai Prime Minister Kukrit 
Pramoj sent the United States a Memorandum stating 
Thailand's intentions to review all the existing bilateral 
agreements with the United States, there was a tacit 
understanding between the two governments of the necessity 
to structure a new set of relations requiring a termination of 
the existing military base agreements which the United 
States was unwilling to sustain and Thailand was unable to 
maintain.^ 
troops in 1975 with the remainder of the forces to leave by 
1976. Due to inability of Washington to focus on this critical 
aspect of Thai-United States relations. United States 
procrastination led to appearance that the United States was 
being forced out of Thailand rather than it being a United 
States initiative or a mutually agreed upon policy. Hence, such 
an action tended to poison the climate of Thai-United States 
relations for a period of time. 
Sarasin Viraphol, "Thai-American Relations in the Post-1975 
period", in Wiwat Mungkandi and William Warren, (edited), A 
Century and a Half of Thai - American Relations, (Bangkok : 
Chulalongkorn University Press, 198), p. 122. 
Ibid. 
In the course of United States withdrawal from Indo-China, 
President Richard M. Nixon enunciated a new doctrine of 
United States policy towards Southeast Asia, and after the 
communist victory, President Gerald Ford provided a capstone 
with his Pacific Doctrine. In his foreign policy report to the 
Congress in 1971, Nixon made clear that the United States 
would seek to reduce its military role in Southeast Asia and 
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Thai-United States relations in this period had formed 
an integral part of the American development in Asia and 
Pacific. Following the American decision to withdraw 
military from South Vietnam in the early 1970s Thailand had 
remained, in geopolitical terms, potentially the focal point of 
United States involvement on continental Southeast Asia.^ 
would not bear primary responsibility for its defence. Rather, 
this task should be undertaken by the countries of the region, 
with United States assistance. President Gerald Ford, in 
December 1975, emphasized that the United States was a 
Pacific Power whose position of strength throughout the area 
was basic to any stable balance of power and whose strategy 
rests on a partnership with Japan and normalized relations with 
China. He recognized on American stake in stability and 
security in Southeast Asia, but noted that each of the countries 
there must protect independence by relying on its own national 
resilience and diplomacy with continuing United States aid. 
Both pronouncement imply that the United States had an 
interest in preventing anyone power from robbing Southeast 
Asian states of their independence. President Ford made no 
mention of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which both 
Philippine and Thai leaders were then ready to phase out. 
Rather, he pointed to the economic potential of ASEAN. On 
June 29, 1977, in the first major policy statement on Asia by 
the Carter Administration, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance 
told the Asia Society in New York that the United States 
would remain an Asia and Pacific power and would continue 
its keyrole in contributing to peace and stability in Asia and 
the pacific. 
Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, Communist Indochina 
and United States Foreign Policy. (New York; Westview Press, 
1985), pp. 164-165. 
Sarasin Viraphol, n. 2, p. 118. 
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The post-1975 period of Thai-American relations offers 
a vignette of the evolving process of adjustments to 
prevailing international realities as experienced by both the 
United States and Thailand. It seems that the post 1975 
period had given rise to an unusual circumstances which 
permits both the United states and Thailand to much better 
understand and appreciate their respective positions, 
particularly in the context of their bilateral ties and 
adjustment to prevailing realities.^ 
7. Ibid., p. 119. 
Since Henry Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State, the 
American foreign policy had been geared towards what would 
call the "big power syndrome." 
Frank C. Darling, "United States Policy in Southeast Asia" 
Permanancy and Change", Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XIV, 
No.7, July 1974, p. 623. 
Kissinger had never paid great attention to the Pacific or 
Southeast Asia, concentrating his policy on Moscow and 
Peking. The manner in which the Paris Peace Accord was 
concluded indicated the Kissinger style of foreign diplomacy, 
the accord was reached through consultation with the Soviet 
and China but with little regard to South Vietnam. While the 
United States attained the objective of disengaging itself from 
Southeast Asia, South Vietnam and Cambodia were left to 
defend for themselves. The final outcome of events in 
Cambodia and South Vietnam in April 1975 showed a total 
lack of action on the United States's part to reserve the 
declining trend of the American fortunes in Southeast Asia, 
156 
By 1975, the Unitd States strategic withdrawal from 
mainland Southeast Asia was well underway. The failure of 
the former policy to deter the communist attempt at 
predominance of power was manifested by the growing 
contradiction of the Vietnam problems. President Richard M. 
Nixon, therefore, took a bold step in reshaping the United 
States to reorder its relations with China which was the key 
to this planned military withdrawal while the new strategy 
was rationalized as an attempt to forge more sound and 
realistic relations with the Asian Countries.^ 
which was obvious reminder to Thailand of the ongoing 
American strategy. But what cause the Thai leaders to finally 
break from the traditionally reliance on United States was the 
disregard for small nations' rights and sovereignty, as 
demonstrated in the Mayaquez Affairs. The United States 
showed a high-handed approach in using Thai territory to 
launch relation against the Khmer Rouge. The incident not only 
unleashed a popular outburst (in the form of student 
demonstrations against the United States Embassy in 
Bangkok), but gave cause for the Kukrit Government to 
announce a revision of all existing treaties and agreement 
between the two countries. This move amounted to the first 
real decision to revamp Thailand's stand and reflected the 
many problems of the non-formal treaty agreements of the 
past. 
Sarasin Viraphol, n. 2, p. 30. 
8. American allies such as Japan and Thailand began charting new 
courses to face a changing regional environment. For one 
thing, both countries swiftly moved to accommodate their 
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Since that time, the Thai government introduced a new 
foreign policy line and stated that the Thai government 
would give priority to ordering relations with all friendly 
countries irrespective of ideological, social and political 
differences. Emphasis was given to improving relations with 
neighbouring countries. It also showed a significant decision 
to move away from previously singular dependence on the 
United States to a more balanced posture in relations with 
the power based explicitly on normalization of ties with 
China. Hence, Thailand by the beginning of 1975, was 
somewhat prepared to absorb the impact of the United States 
withdrawal.^ 
The heart of the new strategy called for Thailand to 
recognize People's Republic of China diplomatically and to 
seek an accommodation with Vietnam. This in actual fact 
former antagonist, the People's Republic of China. And the 
impending United States military withdrawal meant a 
fundamental change in the power equilibrium of Southeast 
Asia, especially when it became obvious, with the American 
troops pull out starting in 1973. 
Ibid. 
9. Ibid.. p.l20. 
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conformed with the expressed feature of the New American 
policy line emphasizing self-reliance and initiatives by Asian 
states to workout differences among themselves.'® 
As far as Thailand was concerned, 1976 saw the 
conscious attempt to seriously live with new and more 
flexible policy. The Bali Summit of the ASEAN heads of 
government in February gave new significant to the life and 
meaning of this regional organization which had existed 
since 1967.'^ The former strategy of dependence on the 
United States was gradually modified as emphasis shifted 
increasingly to ASEAN as a regional grouping given not 
merely to economic and regional cooperation, but more 
importantly to a collective security endeavour responding to 
'the new political arrangement.'^ This new direction, desires a 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 
announced in Kuala Lumpur in 1971. The foreign policy 
10. Ibid, p.121. 
11. Ibid.., p.128. 
12. Ibid., p. 129. 
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readjustment process culminated in Thai demand for a 
dismantling of all American military installation in the 
country, and a complete troop withdrawal during 1975 and 
1976. Having been frustrated all along by anti-war 
movements at home, the United States government seemed to 
understand, if not symphatize, with Thai sentiments at the 
time.'^ In short, the United States logically lessened its 
commitments to Thailand. By de-emphasizing the United 
States role in Southeast Asia, Thailand or its part committed 
itself to regionalism. The new policy of peaceful co-
existence with neighbouring countries automatically de-
emphasized ideological differences. To some, the Thai-
American relations during this period were defined as being 
downgraded. Yet it could preferably by argued that they 
were strengthened, they attained maturation through criticism 
and self criticism process.^"* 
13. Khien Theeravit, "The United States, Thailand and the 
Indochinese conflict", in Hans H. Indorf, (edited). Thai 
American Relations in contemporary affairs. (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University Press, 1984), p. 151. 
14. Ibid. 
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This action, however, opened the way for Thailand to 
establish some kind of balanced relations with mainland 
China and new communist regimes of Indo-China. In other 
words, this major shift of Thai foreign policy was to 
accommodate to the new situation of the post Vietnam War 
and was a result of the United States abandonment of its 
containment policy.'^ 
Thailand moreover, view the collapse of United States 
policy to prevent a communist take over of Indo-China as a 
major setback of the United State policy in this area, 
likewise the United States commitment to defend Thailand 
became in doubt.'^ However, as far as the containment policy 
of United States was concerned, both Thailand and the 
United States have admitted that they failed to achieve their 
common goal. They finally dropped this policy and 
15. Makata Ma, Consequences of the Vietnam War on Thai 
Foreign Policy, (Thesis), California State University, 1980), p. 
27. 
16. William, R. Kinter, "Thailand Faces the future", Orbis 
(Pheladelphia), Fall 1975, p. 11288. 
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conducted their new policy of rapprochement based upon the 
foundation of mutual interests. 
The collapse of United States policy in Indo-China had 
also brought about a new situation in Southeast Asia. For 
instance, every nation in the region must reevaluate its 
policies and alignments. It may be said that this was a period 
of confusion and frustration for Southeast Asian people 
especially those who trust for their security in the United 
States. Therefore, in conducting this policy Thailand had 
developed friendly ties as well as economic relations with 
all countries.^* 
This was review of Thailand's reassessment close 
alliance with the United State as a consequence of Vietnam 
17. Sudershan Chawla, "US Strategy in Southeast Asia in the Post-
Cease-Fire Period", in Sudershan Chawla, Melvincurtov and 
Alain Gerand Marrot, (edited). Southeast Asia under the New 
Balance of Power. (New York : Praeger Publisher Inc, 1974), 
p . l l . 
18. News Bulletin. No.14/1977, (Bangkok Information 
Department, Ministry of foreign Affairs 1977), November-
December 1977, p. 15 
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War. A statement made by the spokesman of the Thai foreign 
Ministry, Mr. Nissai Vejjajiva declared that : 
"All American military bases on Thai soil solely 
belonged to the Thai government and that all 
American forces should be withdrawn from Thai 
territory before March 20, 1976."'^ 
The United States troops withdrawal from Thai soil 
cleared the way for Thailand to make friends with its new 
communist neighbours. In addition, Thailand could avoid 
becoming a target of communist attack, or becoming an arena 
of fighting among major powers. This review of Thai foreign 
policy was based on a consideration of the shifts of United 
States policy, for example, the Nixon Doctrine, the Nixon 
visit to Peking in 1972, and United States Congress's 
limitation of American involvement abroad or Congressional 
limitation of the Presidential power in foreign policy.^° 
19. Foreign Affairs Bulletin . (Bangkok), October-December 1975, 
p.23. 
20. Makata Ma, n.l5, p.22. 
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Economic Co-operation 
In January 1974, the Thai Foreign Minister, 
Charoonphan Israngkul na Ayuthaya made it clear that the 
government was hoping for a change in emphasis by the 
United States from military to economic and technical 
cooperation. He said that: 
"Thailand's future relations with the United 
States will have to be modified and adopted to 
the changing of circumstances. During the past 
decade one characteristic of our relations with 
the United States has been an overemphasis on 
military cooperation. This needs to be adjusted in 
order to achieve a more truly balanced 
relationship."^' 
21. "Changing times made for changing ties," The Investor. 
(Bangkok), February 1975, p. 51. 
Since 1950, when Thailand and the United States signed their 
first Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, the 
United States had provided US $ 653.3 million of development 
aid to Thailand. A significant amount of the military aid 
funding was also provided for security purposes to accomplish 
projects which were also of direct economic value. 
The United States provided funds for international 
development through the United States Agency for 
International Development bureau of the government. The 
United States Operations Mission (USOM) was USAID's 
branch in Thailand. 
"The impact of United States aid," The Investor. (Bangkok), 
May 1977, p.19. 
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The United States had consistently been Thailand's 
second largest trading partner, generally since 1960. In 
1973, Thai-United States trade shared in the sharp expansion 
of Thailand's total foreign trade. Imports from the United 
States increased by 25 percent to a value total of US $ 292 
million, and exports from Thailand registered comparable 
figures of 25 percent and $ 170 million. Moreover, income 
from American tourists, the United States military presence 
and from United States economic assistance exceeded the 
trade deficit and gave Thailand a surplus in its total accounts 
vy'ith the United States.^^ 
However, the best proof of the success of Thailand-
American economic and trade relations during the past two 
decades was probably the signing in May 1966 of the Treaty 
of Amity and Economic relations between the two countries. 
Moreover, the United States in the following years decided 
to grant privileges to Thai products entering the United 
States market under Generalized System of the Preference 
22. Ibid., p. 45. 
165 
(GSP) starting with six GSP items in 1979, Later on, there 
were more than 200 Thai products enjoying GSP privileges 
from the United States.^^ 
23. Chuchart Kangwaan, "American-Thai Economic and trade 
ties", in Wiwat Mungkandi and William Warren (edited), A 
Century and A Half of Thai-American Relations. (Bangkok : 
Chulalongkorn University Press, 1982), p.191. 
The General System of Preferences (GSP) was a system by 
means of which developed countries extend advantages to 
developing countries by waiving or cutting customs duty on 
good imported therefrom. Such preferences were extended 
unilaterally, the motive being to promote world trade, to 
encourage poor countries to sell to their richer counterparts 
and to lessen trade imbalances. The United States joined GSP 
in 1979, granting duty free status to 3,062 items from 
developing countries. The first project came to an end in 1984, 
then extended until January 1993. The new system, in contrast, 
was intended to prompt developing countries to adopt policy 
that served United States economic interests. It was, therefore, 
determined that developing countries should. 
- extend protection to United States intellectual 
property. 
- open their markets to United States goods and 
investments. 
- reduce investment promotion that leads to trade 
imbalances, and 
- extend to their workers rights acceptable by the 
international community. 
The rules also became subject to general and annual review, 
thus, the General Review took place, during 1985-1986, 
granting privileges on the conditions that receive nations 
should 
- open their markets to United States goods and services. 
- give protection to intellectual property, for instance, 
copyrights, patents and trade marks. 
- reduce promotion of investments that create trade 
distortions 
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During 1975-1981, it was a trying period for Thailand 
and the United States which saw both sides undergoing a 
fundamental review of the structure of their relations shaped 
since the early 1950s. In 1975, it was discovered that 
political polarization in Southeast Asia had developed to 
such an extent that the simplistic dichotomy of the Free 
World versus Communism mentality was becoming 
increasingly anachronistic and as indigenous nationalistic 
forces and democratization process became increasingly 
marked, the old-style security arrangement as existing 
between the United States and Thailand was no longer 
adequate. On American side, the United States military 
- ensure that working conditions and workers' rights 
were of international standard. 
- be at a level of development measured by per capita 
income of not more than US $ 8,000. 
The results of the annual review were announced in early April 
and came into effect for one year from July each year. The 
review identities items that have become competitive on the 
United States market and rescinds the privileges given to them 
earlier using the following criteria. 
- if the value of an item imported into the USA from 
particular country exceeds 50 percent of total United 
States imports of that items or if it exceeds the 
minimum value. 
- if the value of the import exceeds the maximum value. 
The Nation. (Bangkok), No. 1, 1990, p. 132. 
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defeat in Vietnam sounded the death knell of its massive 
military involvement on mainland Southeast Asia. On the 
Thai side, the end of its erstwhile military oligarchic rule 
meant the reordering of more equitable and mutually 
productive relations between the two long time allies.^'* 
Cooperation also covers the field of tariff concessions. 
In 1979, as a result of the 1979 Tokyo-round meeting of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the United States and 
Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to 
grant tariff concessions to a package of products of both 
countries. Expected to come into force in 1982, the 
Memorandum would enable about 50 American and Thai 
products to enjoy the tariff concessions.^^ 
As a member of ASEAN, Thailand also receives the 
prospective ASEAN-US economic and technical cooperation. 
In August 1980 both sides signed a project agreement on the 
Agriculture Development Planning Centre whereby the 
24. Bangkok Post. (Bangkok), March 12, 1982, p. 12. 
25. Chuchart Mungkandi, n. 23, p. 191. 
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United States approved US $ 3 million in financial aid to the 
project covering a period of five years. 
The transition in the United States outlook had 
probably been influenced to a degree by Thai Prime Minister 
Kriangsak Chamanan, who visited the United States in 
February 1979. Kriangsak was able to impress upon 
President Jimmy Carter that apart from being a consistent 
friend and ally of the United States, Thailand was a key 
member of ASEAN, economically, socially and politically 
26. Thai students also benefit from the United States scholarship 
granted to the ASEAN-AIT scholarship and Research 
Programme. As of January 1980, eighteen Thai students among 
50 ASEAN graduates were recipients of the United States 
sponsored scholarship which enable them to further their 
studies and research at the Asian Institute of Technology 
(AIT) in Thailand. 
Ibid. 
Thailand and the other ASEAN member countries had always 
cherished the concept of a Zore of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) for Southeast Asia, which essentially 
means development of peace and progress in the region to the 
exclusion of adverse outside power interference. This notion 
had earned support from the United States. On the contrary, 
1975-1981 showed that there had been an intensification of the 
sort of power rivalry diametrically opposed to ASEAN's 
aspiration, particularly through the intensification of power 
rivalry brought on by Vietnam in Kamphudia. 
Ibid., p. 148. 
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resilient, and equally important, shared several common 
ideals and aspirations with the United States. Another 
functional usefulness of Thailand was the fact that Thailand 
could serve a strategic purpose for the United States in 
United States military deployments in the Pacific and the 
Indian Oceans, apart from being itself contributive to peace 
and stability in Southeast Asia.^^ 
In early October 1981, the then Thai Prime Minister 
Prem Tinsulanond visited the United States. It was in many 
ways a history-making event in the bilateral relations of the 
27. Ibid., p. 149. 
As a world power, the United States needs access and support 
for its naval and air forces in the Indian Ocean, where the 
Diego Garcia Island base had been developed. Its stop over 
landing rights at Takli base in Thailand and its great air and 
naval bases at Clark field and Subic Bay in the Philippines 
were currently important in the disposition of its power. The 
United States could retain its military capabilities in South and 
Southeast Asia without the use of these bases, but their re-
entry into the region, reduce some costs, and heightens the 
flexibility of United States military operations in the area. It, 
therefore, appears that "anti-imperialist" propaganda or 
activities emanating from Indochina and directed at Thailand 
or the Philippines, to encourage their witholding military base 
privileges, threaten a United States military advantage. 
Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, n. 5, p. 166. 
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two countries. Not only did the Thai premier had the chance 
to carry his message directly across the United States private 
sector, but he also met with the United States President, 
Ronald Reagan. The two leaders held talks with the clear 
objectives of setting any bilateral issues in an amicable 
manner and helping to ease Thailand's economic and security 
burdens.^^ 
During his official visit to the United States, apart from 
seeking security aid, the Thai Prime Minister also explained 
the country's immediate problems to President Reagan and 
senior members of the United States administrative on trade 
and agriculture. In addition, he had top level meetings with 
some of America's most influential business leaders in both 
New York and Dallas, including representatives of Import-
Export Bank and the Chamber of Commerce.^^ 
28. Ibid., P 192. 
29. Ibid., p. 193. 
Thailand's serious concern since the seventies had been the 
increasing imports of oil interm of value and amount. 
Fortunately with the help and support of American technology 
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In 1982, John Gunther Dean, the United States 
Ambassador to Thailand had addressed in Bangkok that: 
"On the policy level, many of the economic 
issues between the United States and Thailand 
are trade related. Unfortunately, sometimes those 
issues introduce misunderstandings or strains in 
our relationship. In pursuance of our own 
domestic priorities, we find ourselves forced to 
adopt trade measures which disadvantage our 
trading partners for third markets, and this 
competition is shaper edged during periods of 
economic slump. Here, the key to preventing 
misunderstanding and friction in our bilateral 
relations is a free and open exchange of 
information and options between the two 
governments."^^ 
Relations with the United States continued to show 
strains in 1988. Early in that year. Thai complaints about the 
and Finance, Thailand had, since September 1981, tapped its 
oil imports. 
Exploration and development of Thailand's offshore natural 
gas would have been impossible had American oil firms like 
Union Oil and Texas Pacific not been involved. Although both 
Union Oil and Texas Pacific found natural gas in the Gulf of 
Thailand some years ago. Union oil was the first firm to supply 
to fill Thailand immediate needs. Union oil had worked closely 
with the Thai government through the Industry Ministry and 
Thailand's Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) which led to 
prompt agreement on the price of natural gas. 
Ibid., pp. 195-196. 
30. The Nation Review. (Bangkok), December 16, 1982, p. 132. 
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declining level of aid from the United States were matched 
by United States protests over a tougher Thai policy toward 
Vietnamese refugees, in which the Thai military forcibly 
blocked Vietnamese from entering the country.^' 
The Foreign Ministry displayed nervousness and 
irritation over demands in the United States Congress and 
elsewhere that Thailand and China end aid to the Khmer 
Rouge. Thai officials and military leaders reacted strougly to 
an article in the Washington Post alleging that a group of 
Thai officers had siphoned off about $ 3.5 million in United 
States aid to the non-communist Khmer resistance forces. 
Thai newspaper often provided thoughtful analysis and new 
information on the allegation, but army leaders denounced 
the charges as untrue and baseless. 
More fundamentally. Thai officials foresaw a future 
loosening of the relationship because of trade disputes. The 
31. Larry A. Niksch, "Thailand in 1988: The Economic Surge", 
Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. XXIX, No. 2, February 1989, 
p. 172. 
32. Ibid. 
173 
issue of copyright protection for United States products 
came to a need at the end of the year when the Thai 
government rejected United States demand for special 
legislation to guarantee such protection. The Reagan 
Administration threatened to end the General System of 
Preferences (GSP) trade benefits to Thailand if it did not 
exact legislation by December 15. The Thai Prime Minister 
Chatichai asserted on December 13, during intense United 
States Thai negotiations, that a retention of GSP privileges 
was not worth the concessions demanded by Washington, 
although Thai negotiators reportedly promised interim 
measures to protect pharmaceuticals.^^ 
Following the unsuccessful conclusion of the talks, the 
Reagan administration began a process of determining the 
extent to which it would withdraw GSP benefits. The cloud 
on trade relations worsened, when the two governments 
failed to reach agreement on quotas for Thai exports of 
textiles, garments and steel products. Thai officials 
33. Bangkok Post. (Bangkok), December. 17, 1988, p. 15. 
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downplayed the impact of GSP cuts, but they expressed 
concern that Thailand in 1989 could be the target of United 
States retaliation under section 301 of the 1988 United 
States special trade act.^ "* 
Thai-United States Commercial Strains 
With the end of Cold War the security environment 
were likely to undergo changes. The future conflicts 
however, were concentrated relating to economic and trade 
relations. The 1990s were a fertile, formative periods for 
world politics and American foreign policy. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, 
bipolar global competition was over. 
In early of 1990's the United States demanded for 
copyright and intellectual property protection. In response to 
this demands the Thai Prime Minister Chatichai argued in 
January 1990, that: 
"Thailand was coming of age and would not 
bind despite Washington's reduction of Thai 
34. Larry A. Niksch, n. 31, p. 173. 
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benefits under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP)." 
While escaping the full fury of the United States Trade 
Bill's Section 301 for encroachments on United States 
patents, Thailand was high on Washington's watch list and 
could face further cuts in its GSP quotas.^^ 
However, the Thai-United States talks at Amsterdam in 
April 1991 had collapsed. The Thai delegation, led by 
Commerce Permanent Secretary Bajr Israsena, failed to 
35. Scott R. Christensen, "Thailand in 1989 : Consensus at Bay", 
Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol. XXX, No. 2, February 1990, p. 
183. 
In November 1990, the International Intellectual. Property 
Alliance, the Motion Picture Export Association of America 
and the Recording Industry Association of America filed a 
section 301 petition concerning Thailand's failure to enforce 
its copyright laws. 
Bankok Post. (Bangkok), April 6, 1994, p. 15. 
Under United States trade law, the listed countries would have 
six months to strengthen their intellectual property protection 
laws and their enforcement, or face punitive trade retaliation. 
Default could mean end to duty free treatment for some of 
their exports to the United States or tariff level of up to 100 
percent on some shipments. 
The Nation. (Bangkok), May 1, 1992, p. B.l. 
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Kristoff, who led the United States mission to the 
Amsterdam bilateral talks, to resolve the escalating trade 
disputes on intellectual property protection. The Thai 
Commerce Minister, Amaret Sila-on insisted that the 
delegations could not agree on several crucial points. He had 
pointed out that: 
"It was unacceptable for Thailand to extend 
patent protection to new drugs that were awaiting 
registration in the producing countries, or allow 
patenting of animal and plant varieties as 
demanded by Washington or limiting the state's 
—powei lo foice patentees to license their rights in 
case of non-use or national emergency, and there 
demands were beyond what Thailand can accept. 
Moreover, the international community which is 
negotiate for better protection of intellectual 
property rights in the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT negotiaions have not yet accepted these 
conditions, if Thailand was to accept the United 
States demands, its negotiating power in the 
Uruguay Round would be diminished.^^ 
Although Amaret could not predict how the United 
States might respond to the failure of the talks, he insisted 
that his ministry would consider the national interests as the 
most crucial point in negotiating with United States and 
36. The Nation. (Bangkok), April 25, 1991, p. BTIO. 
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lastly he said that no matter what would be happens, we will 
have to accept it.^ ^ 
In December 1991, the United States Trade 
Representatives (USTR) determined that Thailand's acts, 
policies and practices were unreasonable and burden or 
restrict United States Commerce.^* Thailands remained on 
the latest United States priority list of foreign countries 
charged with failure to enforce United States copyright and 
deficiencies in protection of pharmaceutical patents.^^ 
37. Ibid. 
38. Bangkok Post, (Bangkok), April 14, 1994, p. 14. 
39. Ibid. 
On pharmaceutical patents, the United States wanted Thailand 
to narrow the conditions under which the government can 
force patent holders to license their rights. It also demanded 
that patent protection be extended to drugs not yet marketed 
in Thailand. 
The Nation, n. 35, p. B.l 
As a result, the Student Federation of Thailand (SFT) on April 
24, 1991 asked the United States to drop its pressuring on the 
Thai government to protect pharmaceutical products and active 
ingredients under the patent law. In the letter submitted to the 
American Embassy in Thailand by the group of 12 students, the 
SFT pointed out that the existing legislation was in line with 
internationally agreed conventions on intellectual property 
protection." The SFT also called on Thai Deputy Public Health 
Minister, Athasit Vejajiva to oppose the government's decision 
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Thailand had been named along with Taiwan and India on the 
priority list announced in Washington on April 30, 1992 by 
the United State Trade Representative (USTR). The 
allegation was that the listed countries have done little to 
stop violation of United States intellectual property rights, 
making war, therefore, for retaliatory trade measures.'"' 
In March 1992, the United States Trade Representaives 
(USTR) again determined that Thailand acts, policies and 
practices related to patent protection were unreasonable even 
the Thai government had stated that it would continue to 
increase enforcement efforts.'*' 
to patent drugs. They also supported the Medical Council's 
decision to condemn the United States move. 
The Nation. (Bangkok), April 25, 1991, p. BTIO. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Bangkok Post, (Bangkok), n. 4, p. 14. 
In 1989, the United States trade deficit with Thailand 
amounted $ 2.1 billion, up $ 330 million compared with 1988. 
Thailand was the United States' 28"" largest market in 1989, 
and United States imports from Thailand totalled $ 4.4 billion 
in 1989, United States direct foreign investment in Thailand 
totalled $ 1.1 billion in 1988, ad decline of $ 148 million 
compared with 1987. United States direct investment in 
Thailand was heavily geared towards the petroleum and 
electronic equipment industries. 
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Reacting the USTR announcement, Surakiat 
Sathienthai, an economic advisor to the Prime Minister, said 
that the announcement only had psychological effect. There 
were two measures Thailand should undertake. Firstly, 
explain to exporters and importers that the issues in dispute 
were subject to negotiations and show that the country was 
sincere towards their resolution.Secondly, the government 
must detail the impact of possible United States retaliation 
and reassure the people that everything was being done to 
protect national interest. He affirmed that the Thai was doing 
everything according to the principles of the discussion 
under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade.'^ ^ 
The Nation. (Bangkok), April 5, 1990, p. 16. 
In 1991, the United States trade deficit with Thailand was $ 
2.4 billion or $ 65 million higher than 1990. United States 
exports to Thailand were $ 3.8 billion, up $ 767 million from 
1990. Thailand was the United States' 23rd largest export 
market in 1991. United States imports from Thailand totalled $ 
6.1 billion in 1991 higher than 1990. The Stock of United 
States direct investment in Thailand was largely concentrated 
in manufacturing and petroleum. 
The Nation. (Bangkok), April 2, 1992, p.48. 
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The United States also in that year, asked Thailand to 
relax regulations in 11 areas namely, professional, business 
communication, construction, distribution, environmental, 
financial health and social, tourism and travel, recreational, 
sporting and others, and transportation. The main features of 
the United States demands were the financial, banking and 
insurance sectors areas which employ accountants, lawyers 
and architics/^ The United States requirement involve the 
proportion of shareholdings, rules and origin and foreign ownership."*^  
42. The Nation, n. 35. p. B. l . 
The United States was threatening to make it harder for Thai 
companies to get into the United States financial market if 
Thailands fails to further open its own financial market, said 
Mr. Therachai the Director of the Bank of Thailand's financial 
institutions supervision and development department. The 
United States demanded that the maximum amount of shares 
Thai legislation allows aliens to hold in Thai banks and 
financial institutions should be raised from the current 25%. 
The United States threatened to put Thailand in the second tier 
of countries that readily open their door to United States 
companies. 
Mr. Thiraechai feels disappointed by the United States attitude 
that time considering the long-cherished bilateral relationship. 
He said that United States business had always been privileged 
in Thailand under special agreement. 
Bangkok Post. (Bangkok), December 25, 1994, p. 17. 
43. The Nation. (Bangkok), August 8, 1992, p. B.l. 
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In response, Thailand rejected a United States demands. Suchai 
Jaovisidha, Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Commerce Ministry 
said that: 
"Thailand is just a small country and it is not 
ready to comply with all the United States 
demands. And Thailand would consider 
suspending the bilateral Thai-United States 
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations of 1968 
which give special for Americans working in 
Thailand privileges. Instead, Thailand would 
bring the bilateral agreement under GATT 
jurisdiction.'"*^ 
Efforts by Thailand to reduce copyright increased 
substantially in 1993, with the Thai police conducting more 
raids in Bangkok and expanding enforcement activities 
44. Ibid. 
45. Ibid. 
The Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations of 1968 obligates 
both countries to accord national treatment to each other's 
national and companies with respect of establishment and 
operation. Under the treaty, the United States companies may 
hold 100% equity in Thailand subsidiaries in many sectors of 
the economy where other foreign owner would generally be 
limited to 40%. The Treaty does, however, allow each country 
to prohibit, or limit the extent of, establishment or acquisition 
of interests in enterprises engaging in fiduciary functions of 
banking involving depository functions. 
Bangkok Post, n. 38, p. 14. 
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outside Bangkok. United States Industry Associations had 
been instrumental in securing more energetic enforcement/^ 
While considerable improvements had been made, 
copyright piracy of audio and videotapes, computer software 
and printed material remains extensive. The Thai government 
had publicly stated its commitment to continuing and 
vigorous enforcement.""^ 
Following the consultations with the United States in 
mid 1993, the Thai government pledged to address those 
concerns in new copyright legislation which was being 
considered by the Thai Parliament. The Thai Government had 
pointed out that: 
"It aims to bring its copyright into confirmity 
with international standards, including the 
intellectual right provisions of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements and the Berne Convention 
(Paris Act, 1971)."^^ 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
183 
American was satisfied in 1993 with Thai moves to 
protect intellectual property rights, starting with the 
suppression of piracy, a continuing with a number of other 
administrative and legislative moves on copyrights and 
patents, including the decision to set up an intellectual 
property court to improve judicial handling of prosecutions. 
As a result Thailand was placed on lower priority watch list 
of the American call for reduction in barriers which was 
clearly showed in the letters of the United States Trade 
Representative,Mickey Kantor, on September 7, 1993 to the 
Thai Deputy Prime Minister Supachai Panitchpakdi and 
Uthai Pimchaichon, Minister of Commerce, announcing his 
decision to drop Thailand from the Priority Foreign country 
list and put it on a Priority Watch list instead."*^  
49. Excerpt from the letter to the Deputy Prime Minister. 
As a result of steps that Thai Government had taken and the 
commitment for continued enforcement and to bring Thai 
intellectual property legislation upto world standards that your 
government has made, I am revoking Thailand's identification 
as a Priority Foreign Country. Thailand will be placed on the 
special, 301 "Priority Watch List" and monitoring of 
Thailand's progress will continue under section 306. As I 
explained to you in July. I will review the enforcement efforts 
and status of intellectual property legislation again in January. 
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During the beginning of October 1994, the Thai Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai visited United States and met the 
United States President, Bill Clinton, The both agreed that 
trade liberalization in the Pacific Rim should be a priority at 
an upcoming summit of Asian-Pacific Leaders. Clinton also 
reaffirmed the importance the United States attaches to its 
long standing relationship with Thailand, one of five treaty 
allies in the Asia Pacific region.^° 
Following meeting, the two leaders greated a group of 
Thai and American business leaders and expressed strong 
This review will include on examination of whether Thailand 
should remain on the "Priority Watch List." 
Excerpt from the letter to the Commerce Minister. 
I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of my 
decision to revoke Thailand's identification as a Priority 
Foreign Country. The steps that Thailand has taken, beginning 
with the enforcement measures that you instituted, and the 
commitments to continued enforcement and to bring Thai 
intellectual property legislation up to world standards, has 
allowed me to make this decision. 
You have played an important role in resolving these standing 
issues and I wanted to convey to you my appreciation. I took 
forward to working with you and your colleagues on many 
trade issues of mutual interest. 
Bangkok Post. (Bangkok), Vol. XLVII, No. 252, section two, 
September 9, 1993, p. 12. 
50. Bangkok Post. (Bangkok), October 8, 1994, p. 3. 
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support for strengthening private sector ties between the two 
countries.^' 
On November, 26, 1996, the United States President, 
Bill Clinton visited Thailand, he called on King Bhumibl 
Adulyadej, the World longest reigning monarch at the King 
Palace. 
Under a blazing sun, Clinton witnessed the signing of 
minor taxation treaty in a palace garden. His voice was 
hoarsed at the end of a 12 day trip. He said that the treaty 
closes 15 years of negotiations and opens a new era of trade 
and investment.^^ 
Thailand Economic Crisis and American Assistance 
After a decade of spectacular performance, with per 
capita income (GNP) growth averaging more than 8%. 
51. Ibid. 
52. The Times of India. (New Delhi), November 27, 1996. p. 12, 
And see King Danial "Thailand in 1996 : Economic slowdown 
clounds years", Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. 37, No.2, 
February 1997, p. 165. And also see, Asian Recorder. (New 
Delhi), December 23-31, 1996 p.26139. 
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Thailand's economy began to slowdown in 1996. The stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET), mirroring the condition of the 
economy, fell steadily from 816.79 points on December 20, 
1996, to 385.25 points on December 19, 1997.^^ 
On July 2, 1997, the Bank of Thailand (the Central 
Bank) announced that it had abandoned the fixed exchange 
rate system and had allowed the baht (Thai currency) to 
float. This allowed the international currency markets to 
establish the value of the baht, thereby precipitating a 
significant devaluaiton. The Thai Finance Minister, Thanong 
Bidaya, on July 9, 1997 had sought a package of loans from 
International Monetary Funds (IMF) value at between $ 10-
20 billion to help ailing companies write off bad debts and 
improve the core strength of the economy.^ 
53. Suchitra Punyaratabandhu, "Thailand in 1997 : Financial Crisis 
and Constitutional Reform", Asian Survey. (Berkeley), Vol. 
XXXVIII, No.2, February 1998, pp. 161-162. And also see 
Scott B. Mac Donald, "Tranparancy in Thailand's 1997", Asian 
Survey. (Berkeley), Vol XXXVIII, No.7, July 1998, p.701. 
54. Kessing's Record of World Events. (London), Vol. 44, No. 5, 
May 1998, p. 42273. 
187 
Following the Thai devaluation of its currency, rescue 
operation was undertaken by the IMF and several other 
countries, including Japan.^^ However, the United States did 
not join the efforts. By August 1997, rescue fund for 
Thailand was finalized at $ 17.2 billion. Since the middle of 
1997 and the beginning of the year 1998, the phenomenon of 
falling economic dominoes was witnessed in Southeast 
Asia.^^ 
55. The IMF was created by Bretton Woods Agreements and came 
into existence on December 27, 1945. The Chief objectives 
were. 
(1) To promote International Monetary Cooperation through 
a permanent institution which provides the machinery for 
consultation and collaboration on international monetary. 
(2) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of 
international trade and to contribute thereby to the promotion 
and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income 
and to the development of the productive resources of all 
member as primary objectives of economic policy. 
(3) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly 
exchange arrangements among members and to avoid 
competitive exchange depreciation. 
(4) To assist in the establishment of multilateral system of 
payment in respect of current transactions between members 
and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which 
hamper the growth of world trade. 
(5) To give confidence to members by making the funds 
resources available to them under adequate safeguards, thus 
providing them with opportunity to control maladjustments in 
there balance of payments without resorting to measures 
destructive of national on international prosperity. 
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However, the rescue package were different for 
different countries - Thailand $ 17.2 billion, Korea $ 57 
billion and Indonesia $ 54 billion." The conditions of the 
loan were stringent and, if implemented, would certainly lead 
to recession in the short term. The following conditions were 
stipulated a value-added-tax (VAT) increase from 7% to 
10%, a reduction of the current account deficit from 7.9% of 
GDP in 1996 to 5% in 1997 and 3% in 1998 and a fiscal goal 
of keeping the consolidated public sector in a surplus of one 
percent of GDP in 1997 and 1998.^^ 
In July 1997, Thailand supported Myanmar entry into 
the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). As a 
result, the United States had appealed to the ASEAN member 
The money for the Fund comes through contributions made by 
the members. Each member contributes 25% of its share in 
gold and the remainder in the currency of its country. 
L.N. Srivastava, International Organization. (New Delhi : SDN 
Publishers Distributors, 1997), p. 155. 
56. Parimal Kumar Das, "Economic Turmoil in Southeast Asia" 
Strategic Digest. (New Delhi), Vol. XXVIII, No. 12, 
December 1998, p. 2019. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid. 
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State to turndown Myanmar's entry into the grouping on 
grounds of its human rights performance.^^ Some observers 
of Thai-United States relations attribute United States 
aphathy during Thailand's financial crisis to the Thai 
government's adament stance in regard to Myanmar. 
Certainly, Thailand was given far less assistance than South 
Korea. By the year's end, Thailand's foreign relations had 
become in extricably linked with solving the financial 
crisis.^° 
59. Myanmar's long absence from ASEAN reflected a strict non-
alignment policy, rejecting membership in a group with so 
many ties to the West. Before 1989, the West probably had 
welcomed Myanmar's decision to apply to ASEAN as perhaps 
portending some softening of the authoritarians military 
regime. In 1989, however, the human rights violations of the 
governing State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
came into question when it brutally suppressed political 
opposition and place Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. In 
1990, the dies was cast when the SLORC nullified an election 
which Suu Kyi's party won 80 percent of the vote. Henceforth, 
Myanmar faced increasingly strong protests from West and 
demands that SLORC either restore legitimate government or 
face international isolation and sanction. 
David B.H. Denoon and Evelyu Colbert, "Challenges for the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)", Pacific 
Affairs. (Vancouver), Vol. 71, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, p. 517. 
60. Ibid. 
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The Southeast Asians led by Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad were quickly declared that 
Washington was trying to impose its human right standards 
on others and that it failed to appreciate the importance of 
Asian Values. During the World Bank - IMF seminar in Hong 
Kong in 1997, Mahathir Mohamad again strongly denounced 
that : 
"American financier, George Soros, and Western 
leaders in general, wanted to prevent the 
Southeast Asian countries from becoming 
prosperous, developed societies because of envy 
over their economic success."^' 
On March 11-17, 1998, the Thai Prime Minister Chuan 
Leekpai headed a delegation on an official visit to the United 
States. Among those accompanying were Finance Minister, 
Tharrin Nimmanheaminda and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Surin Pitsuwan. Following a meeting with United States 
President, Bill Clinton, on March 14, it was announced that 
61. Lucian W. Pye, "The United States and Asia in 1997 : Nothing 
Dramatic just Incremental Pogress" , Asian Survey. (Berkeley), 
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, January 1998, p. 105. 
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the United States had agreed to provide aid worth $ 1.7 
billion to Thailand, including $ 1 billion in export credits. 
The remainder of the package was directed to providing 
assistance for two electricity production investment projects 
and scholarship for Thai students studying in the United 
States and agreed to release Thailand from the purchase of F 
18 fighter aircraft worth $ 392 million which the Thai 
government claimed it could no longer afford. The United 
States also promised to try to seek reimbursement for the $ 
75 million Thailand had already paid for the jets, agreed to 
finance $ 1 billion of raw materials imports, offered to help 
clean up landmines along the border with Cambodia, vowed 
to keep United States Peace Corps strength in Thailand at 
current levels rather cut the programme as earlier planned, 
and would move ahead with talks to create an international 
law enforcement training institute in Bangkok. The United 
States Oversea Private Investment Corp (OPIC) also 
62 The Kessing's Record of World Events. (London), Vol. 44, 
No. 3, March 1998, p. 41236. 
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approved $ 400 million in Loan guarantees to construct two 
power projects expected to employ more than 2000 Thais. A 
group of private American investors told Thai Prime 
Minister, Chuan Leekpai, that it would put more than $ 600 
million into a steel mill.^^ 
Clinton and Congressional leaders had been impressed 
by Chuan's moves to slash spending and hike taxes, push 
privatization, drop foreign exchange control that limit 
investor confidence, install capable technocrafts instead of 
cronies, float the bath (Thai currency) and put into place the 
reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).^ 
It was the World Bank on July 4, 1998, approved two 
loans total $ 700 million in order to aid financial reform and 
to help mitigate the adverse social impact of the economic 
crisis on the poor and unemployed. A $ 400 million 
63. Time. "American for Thailand", (New York), March 30, 1998, 
p. 19. 
64. Ibid. 
193 
economic and financial adjustment loan was to help with 
restructuring of the country's financial and corporate sector 
while a $ 300 million social investment project was to be 
used to create employment generation schemes and provide 
essential social services, such as basic health and AIDS 
care. Both loans were repayable over 15 years, including 
three year grace period.^^ 
The extra funding was in addition to $ 1.5 billion which 
the World Bank had already pledged to lend as part of wider 
IMF economic rescue package agreed in August 1997.^ 
In early 1999, the Thai, Deputy Prime Minister, 
Supachai Panitcphakdi was proposed as a candidate for the 
Director General of World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
replace Renato Ruggiero, whose term ended in early May 
1999. He was strongly supported by Japan, the countries of 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and most 
65. Kessing's Record of World Events. (London), Vol. 44, No. 2, 
p. 42072. 
66. Ibid. 
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of the Europe Countries.^^ On the other hand, the United 
States as well as some European countries supported the 
former Prime Minister New Zealand, Mike Moore, which 
perceived him as the more likely of the contenders to back 
free trade or, atleast the American agenda.*^^ Then, an 
67 Thomas Abraham, "A trade-off over an appointment". 
Frontline. (Chennai), August 13, 1999, pp 63-64 
The World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) came into 
existence on January 1, 1995 with 81 member countries 
Membership of the organization with its headquarter in 
Geneva, would eventually be open to all 125 member countries 
of the GATT upon their ratification of the Final Act of 
Uruguay Round Agreements Its aims differed from the GATT 
in several respects, for instance 
(1) the WTO aspired to wider global remit, obliging 
members to subscribe to its more extensive range of 
agreement, unlike the GATT which permitted countries 
not observe some GATT rules 
(2) the WTO would have a wider sphere of investment, 
regulating for the first time commercial activities which 
had been beyond the justification of the GATT, including 
trade in services, intellectual property rights and 
investment 
(3) as an international organization in its own right, the 
WTO aimed at a more coherent framework than the 
GATT, which had emerged from a provisional treaty 
serviced by and adhoc secretariat 
Kessing's Record of World Events. (London), January 1995, p 
40387 
68 Bangkok Post Mid-Year Economic Review 1999. (Bangkok), 
December 1999, p 3 
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extraordinary decision taken after month of Wragling, the 
World Trade Organization would appoint two Director-
General to replace Renato. Both Supachi and Moore would 
share a six-year term and Moore would be in office for the 
first three years.^^ 
However, Thailand economic crisis started to be 
recovered before the end of 1999, as the value of export had 
been increased. The Permanent Secretary of Commerce 
Sompol Kiatpaibool, once stated that: 
"Thailand could see export growth of 8.6% in the 
year 2000 if the Commerce Ministry was correct 
in its forecast of a $ 5 billion rise on an estimated 
$ 5.8 billion for 1999".^^ 
69. Thomas Abraham, n. 32, p. 64. 
70. Bangkok Post, n. 33, p. 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
After 1954, the United States decided to support the 
South Vietnamese government led by Ngo Dinh Dien.The 
United States also helped to block the electioins, which 
were to be held in 1956, believing jthat such elections 
would be rigged in the North to achieve the communist 
success under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Again the 
United States decision was based on the nature of World 
Communism and on a desire to contain the expansionist 
tendencies of China in Southeast Asia. In 1957, North 
Vietnamese were furious over their failure to unite North 
and South Vietnam and to overthrow the Dien government. 
The Eisenhower Administration asserted that the 
United States objectives in Vietnam would be helpful and 
capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression 
through military means or an independent North Vietnam 
endowed with a strong government, which would be so 
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responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so 
enlightened in purpose and effective in performance.' 
President John F. Kennedy in his short term of 
presidency greatly broadened the commitment of President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in South Vietnam. His policy 
towards the crisis in Laos affected his attitude towards 
commitments in both Thailand and South Vietnam as well 
as his relationship with Cambodia. It became much more 
clear under John F. Kennedy than Eisenhower that 
American involvement in mainland Southeast Asia - the 
two Vietnams, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand - was 
pronounced and heading towards a major crisis. 
President John F. Kennedy's policy in Laos led to 
deeper United States involvement in Thailand . Actually, 
Thailand had long been greatly concerned over 
developments in its Mekhong Neighbours. The steps 
towards a neutralization of Laos against a background of 
1. Russell H. Fifield, American in Southeast Asia. The roots of 
Commitment. (New York : Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1973) pp. 256-259 
198 
the weakness of South East Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) caused Thailand to seek stronger assurances 
from the United States. At the end of February 1962, the 
Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, was invited to 
Washington to discuss the ways to assure the security of 
Thailand under the framework of SEATO. President John 
F. Kennedy then, assured Thaiuland of full United States 
support for its independent and territorial integrity. 
However, the crisis in Indo-China provided the 
occasion for the United States to take additional 
precautionary measures in Southeast Asia, particularly 
measured of pre-position which strengthened American 
capacity in the event of any eventuality. 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson believed 
that the world would be less dangerous if communism did 
not succeed in Indo-China. The basic American objective 
under President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, 
therefore, remained constant in South Vietnam denying 
communism to control the area. Although South Vietnam 
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remained in existence due to American policy after the 
Geneva settlement of 1954, the United States often-found 
itself at the mercy of weak and inefficient Saigon regimes. 
Both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson 
Administrations constantly pre-occupied with the domino 
theory or a variation of it. The theory persisted despite the 
emergence of the rift between Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China and despite the subsequent 
failure of the communist coup in the Southeast Asian 
country like Indonesia. Indeed, when Vietnam was viewed 
from United States in term of global strategic 
considerations, there was a certain aspect in outlook, a 
carry-over from an earlier period. After China fell to Mao 
Tse Tung, and the United States policy towards communism 
became hardened and the importance of Indo-China in the 
United States security perception viewed seriously by the 
United States authorities to combat any eventuallities of 
communists, particularly in Southeast Asian region. 
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During 1964 United States policy towards Southeast 
Asia entered a new phase. In summer, the North 
Vietnamese attacked American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, 
then a Congressional resolution permitted the President to 
respond strongly to incident. In additional, when the North 
Vietnamese imposed additional pressure on South 
Vietnamese government, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
approved American bombing in the North in an attempt to 
force the Vietnamese to the bargaining table. After 1965 
the war became increasingly Americanized, with the 
introduction of hundreds of thousands of American troops. 
Such action certainly prevented North Vietnam's 
unification of the country. But, however, led to a crucial, 
bloody, prolonged and indecisive conflict. 
When President Richard M. Nixon came to power, he 
continued to bring the parties of the Indo-China war to 
the Paris talks and when the prospect of getting settlement 
did not materialize, he offered a new plan that the United 
States was going to begin a process of Vietnamization of 
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war that was the withdrawal of American forces and 
military preparation of the South Vietnamese themselves to 
take over the fighting. Still hoping for a negotiated 
settlement but without other significant bargaining power, 
the President then suggested that would use the 
Vietnamization process as his holecard, if the North 
Vietnamese would negotiate the war would come to an end 
promptly and he would speed up the process of American 
withdrawal, otherwise he would simply proceed on his own 
schedule. 
What became known as Vietnamization under Nixon 
Administration was really a reaffirmation of what 
President John F. Kennedy had come to recognize just 
before his death. While Vietnmization was fine as far as 
the remaining North Vietnam forces was concerned, it did 
not provide the framework within which American or 
South Vietnamese attacks on an extended time basis. 
To fight a war with no hope of decisive victory 
reinforced the frustration of the American soldiers and 
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citizen alike. Then Americans were instructed to fight a 
holding action and to minimize casualties. Beginning in 
early 1970s no major offensive operaitons were to be 
initiated. While conserving American lives, the effect of 
this policy was percieved as abondoning any hope of 
victory. The war was made even more difficult because, 
unlike battle lines of previous wars, there was no simple 
way to measure progress. 
The Paris Agreements of 1973 between the United 
States and North Vietnam formally ended American 
participation in the war. It committed the United States to 
stop all military involvement in South Vietnam, and to 
withdraw all its remaining troops, technicians and 
advisors. The United States, in contrast, withdrew 
completely and unequivocally in 1973 and thereupon 
reduced its aid levels to South Vietnam.^ 
2. Henry J. Kenny, The American Role in Vietnam, and East 
Asia. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp.32-36. 
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Early 1970s, the only Thailand had remained in 
geopolitical terms, potentially to focal point of United 
States involvement on continental Asia. The United States, 
therefore, attempted to redefine the role of America 
forward line of defence in the region. The security 
planners thought that there could be an arbitrary limit to 
set off the rimland of continental Asia which would 
represent the extent of new American defence and 
security. But in time, such a concept gave way under the 
weight of reality and practicality, and the United States 
was to compelled once again to regard the entire 
Asia/Pacific expanse as an integral part of its global 
strategy-the strategy of meeting the growing of Soviet 
Union Challenges.^ 
The Thai government still permits United States 
planes to fly over Indo-China, although in July 1974, it 
Sarasin Viraphol, "Thai- American Relations in the Post 1975 Period,' in 
Wiwat Mungkandi and William Warren (edited), A Century and a Half of 
Thai-American Relations. (Bangkok : Chulalongkom University Press, 
(1982). 
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asked the United States to stop flying over the Indian 
Ocean from Thai bases The Thai Foreign Minister, 
Charoonpan Israngkul na Ayuthya told the United States 
Ambassador to Thailand, William Kinter, that such flights 
contravened Thailand's support for the United Nations 
resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a Peace Zone and 
ASEAN agreement on the neutrality of the region. Since 
then, the trend in Thailand was definitely towards 
regional. The Thai authorities also sought co-operation 
from China regardless of differences in political, ideology, 
economic and social system. Dr. Thanat Khoman, the then 
Thai Foreign Minister once pointed out the wisdom behind 
regional cooperation that even if China were interfering in 
Thailand, Thailand should take the initiative to try and 
normalize relations with China. A nation of 35 million was 
no match for 300 million. So Thai's have no choice but to 
circumvent by diplomatic means the hostility China shows 
to government which choose to rely for security on 
American planes and guns. Thailand can not even make a 
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plane of its own, so, how ridiculous it was for Thailand to 
refuse to talk with China. 
The withdrawal of United States troops from 
Thailand in 1975 provided a useful bargaining tool for 
diplomatic negotiations with its neighbours. Many Thai's 
feared repercussions from North Vietnam for the Thai role 
in allowing United States forces within Thailand to bomb 
Indo-China. As Hanoi had long maintained that it would 
not open negotiations with Thailand as long as American 
troops were present. Hence, Thai insistence on United 
States withdrawal would be a useful gesture of good will. 
As the competitive demands of the global economy 
propel the states of mainland Southeast Asia towards 
greater economic interconnection, therefore, pressures 
upon Thailand to form a new and constructive relationship 
with government of neighbouring countries have multiplied 
and intensified. Thailand's border area can no longer serve 
merely as buffer zones, instead, in the new politic and 
economic context of regional relations, they serve as 
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gateways for trade and investment. Peaceful and open 
borders were one major precondition for sustained 
economic development. 
Thai-American relations, however, have their own 
features, sometime if there were conflicts they mostly 
derived from problems of co-operation. During the Second 
Indo-China war the United States asserted itself too 
strongly, antagonizing its allies especially Thailand. Indo-
China war ended with an American withdrawal. Allies 
which were parties to the war readjusted themselves 
accordingly. By comparison, the Thai-American adaptation 
process had been remarkably satisfied.^ The clearest 
example in the new era of Thai-United States relation was 
the intellectual property rights (IPR) controversy. For the 
Thai, the issue weas defined in terms of long-term ally, 
nationalism and economic development. While in United 
4. Khien Theeravit, "The United States, Thailand and the Indochinese 
Conflict," in Hans Indort, (edited), Thai-American Relations in 
Contemporary Affairs. (Bangkok : Chulalongkom University Press, 1984), 
pp. 155-158. 
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States consideration, the issue concerned the lack of Thai 
protection of the United States products as well as fairness 
in trade relations. The intellectual property rights has, 
therefore, symbolized the new importance of economic 
concerns and the decline of security considerations in 
relations between the two countries. 
Economic relations since then, have replaced security 
ties as the Kingdom's major foreign policy concern. 
Thailand economy is now integrated into the world 
capitalist system. The new tone of Thai-United States 
relation reflected Thailand's growing importance in the 
world economy. Major aspects include financial aid, co-
operation to wage war on nacrotics and support for Peace 
Crops. In the relationship of the two countries, therefore, 
some essential points should be taken into considerations. 
(i) Thailand as well as the other member states of 
Southeast Asian nations must live alongside its 
neighbours, therefore, the United States should not be in a 
position to dictate the relationship of their own. 
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(ii) Infact, the United States have an important interests in 
Thailand with regard to external security. Thailand holds a strategic 
position in regard to the security of ASEAN, where the United States 
has vital interests. Hence, Thailand should be given a high priority in 
the United States foreign policy considerations. 
(iii) The United States should consider Thailand's security 
from a wider perspective, not purely from military aspect. Political and 
economic development are also closely associated with national 
security. Therefore, both political and economic should be emphasized. 
(iv) As Thailand's foreign policy became more collective 
reflection of ASEAN, the United States finds it at time difficult to assist 
Thailand in some specific and concrete instances. The reason was 
possibly that because a policy line requires a joint effort by several 
partners it may not always be clear to the United States. Thailand has 
to listen to the views of the other ASEAN members, to China as well as 
to United States, and various factors of its domestic needs. 
209 
Appendix-I 
Peace Proposals 
The "Four Points'*; Pham Van Dong Speech 
DRV National Assembly, April 8, 1965 
It is the unswerving policy of the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam to strictly respect the 1954 
Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, and to correctly implement 
their basic provisions as embodied in the following points: 
1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the 
Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity 
and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva 
Agreements, the U.S. government must withdraw from South 
Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of 
all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its 
"military alliance" with South Vietnam. It must end its 
policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. 
According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government 
must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely 
cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, 
while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the 
military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on 
Vietnam must be strictly respected: the two zones must 
refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign 
countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and 
military personnel in their respective territory. 
3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be 
settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in 
accordance with the program of the South Vietnam National 
Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference. 
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4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be 
settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any 
foreign interference. 
This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and 
support of all peace- and justice-loving Governments and 
peoples in the world. 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam Vietnam is of the view that the above-expounded 
stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the 
Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable 
conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the 
Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the 
reconvening of an international conference along the pattern 
of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam. 
The U.S. Version of the "Four Points" 
Presented to Mai Van Bo by Edmund Gullion, 
August 6, 1965 
Point I — The basic rights of the Vietnamese people to 
peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial 
integrity are recognized as setforth in the Geneva Accords of 
1954. Obtaining compliance with the essential principles in 
the Accords is an appropriate subject for immediate, 
international discussions without preconditions and 
subsequent negotiations. Such discussions and negotiations 
should consider, among other things, appropriate means, 
including agreed stages, for the withdrawal of foreign 
military and quasi-military personnel and weapons from 
South and North Vietnam; the dismantling of foreign military 
bases in both areas; the cancellation of military alliances in 
contravention of the Accords; and the regrouping and 
redeployment of indigenous forces. 
Point II — Strict compliance with the military 
provisions of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in 
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accordance with schedules and appropriate safeguards to be 
agreed upon in the said discussions and subsequent 
negotiations. 
Point III — The internal affairs of South and North 
Vietnam must be settled by the South and North Vietnamese 
peoples themselves in conformity with the principles of self-
determination without any foreign interference. 
Point IV — The issue of reunification of Vietnam must 
be decided peacefully, on the basis of free determination by 
the peoples of South and North Vietnam without foreign 
interference. 
^'Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia'' 
(White House press release, January 7, 1966) 
1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an 
adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia; 
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast 
Asia or on any part thereof; 
3. We would welcome "negotiations without 
preconditions" as the 17 nations put it; 
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as 
President Johnson put it; 
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order 
of business at a conference or could be the subject of 
preliminary discussions; 
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with 
other points which others might wish to propose; 
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia; 
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8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South 
Vietnam after peace is assured; 
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to 
give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice; 
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should 
be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free 
decision; 
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-
aligned or neutral if that be their option; 
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for 
the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If 
there is peace. North Vietnam could participate in a regional 
effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least 
one billion dollars; 
13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not 
have difficulty being represented and having their views 
represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to 
cease aggressiop. I don't think that would be a problem." 
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could 
stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace 
although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion 
from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing 
stopped. 
The Lewandowski 10 Points 
1. The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solution 
through negotiations. 
2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way 
to negotiated surrender by those opposing the U.S. in 
Vietnam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding 
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an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind 
that the present status quo in South Vietnam must be 
changed in order to take into account the interests of the 
parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in South 
Vietnam. 
3. The U.S. does not desire a permanent or a long-
term military presence in South Vietnam. 
4. The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems with 
respect to the settlement. 
5. The U.S. is willing to accept the participation of 
"all" in elections and the supervision of these elections by an 
appropriate international body. 
6. The U.S. believes that reunification should be 
settled by the Vietnamese themselves after peace and proper 
representative organs are established in South Vietnam. 
7. The U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral South 
Vietnam. 
8. The U.S. is prepared to stop bombing "if this will 
facilitate such a peaceful solution." In this regard the U.S. is 
prepared to accept DRV modalities on the cessation and not 
require the DRV to admit infiltration into South Vietnam. 
9. The U.S. will not agree to "reunification under 
military pressure." 
10. The U.S. will not declare now or in the future its 
acceptance of North Vietnam's 4 or 5 points." 
Source: Wallage J. Thies, When Governments Colloide: Coercion 
and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964-1968 
(California : University of California Press, 1980), pp. 
421-429. 
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Appendix-II 
The Vietnam Agreement and Protocols 
January 27, 1973 
The parties participating in the Paris conference on 
Vietnam, 
With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in 
Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese peoples' 
fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese 
people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to 
the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world. 
Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake 
to respect and to implement them: 
CHAPTER I 
Article 1 
THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL 
NATIONAL RIGHTS 
The United States and all other countries respect the 
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of 
Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on 
Vietnam. 
CHAPTER II 
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WITHDRAWAL OF 
TROOPS 
215 
Article 2 
A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South 
Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on Jan. 27, 1973. 
At the same hour, the United States will stop all its 
military activities against the territory of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam by ground air and naval forces, 
wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the 
territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will 
remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in 
the territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of North 
Vietnam as soon as this agreement goes into effect. 
The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this 
article shall be durable and without limit of time. 
Articles 3 
The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to 
insure a lasting and stable peace. 
As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect : 
(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign 
countries allied with the United States and the Republic 
of Vietnam shall remain in place pending the 
implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The 
Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in 
Article 16 shall determine the modalities. 
(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties 
shall remain in place. The Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the 
areas controlled by each party and the modalities of 
stationing. 
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(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the 
irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall 
stop all offensive activities against each other and shall 
strictly abide by the following stipulations : 
* All acts of force on the ground, in the air and on the 
sea shall be prohibited. 
* All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both 
sides will be banned. 
Articles 4 
The United States will not continue its military 
involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South 
Vietnam. 
Article 5 
Within 60 days of the signing of this agreement, there 
will be a ^ total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, 
military personnel, including technical military personnel and 
military personnel associated with the pacification program, 
armaments, munitions and war material of the United States 
and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 
3(a). Advisers from the above mentioned countries to all 
para-military organizations and the police force will also be 
withdrawn within the same period of time. 
Article 6 
The dismantlement of all military bases in South 
Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign 
countries mentioned in Article 3(a) shall be completed within 
60 days of the signing of this agreement. 
217 
Article 7 
From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation 
of the government provided for in Articles 9 (b) and 14 of 
this agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not 
accept the introduction of troops, military advisers and 
military personnel, including technical military personnel, 
armaments, munitions and war material into South Vietnam. 
The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to 
make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war 
material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or 
used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, 
of the same characteristics and properties, under the 
supervision of the Joint Military Commission of Control and 
Supervision. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL 
AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND 
DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
Article 8 
(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign 
civilians of the parties shall be carried out 
simultaneously with and completed not later than the 
same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 
5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the 
above-mentioned captured military personnel and 
foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this 
agreement. 
(b) The parties shall help each other to get information 
about those military personnel and foreign civilians of 
the parties missing in action, to determine the location 
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and take care of the graves of the dead so as to 
facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the 
remains, and to take any such other measures as may be 
required to get information about those still considered 
missing in action. 
(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian 
personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will 
be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the 
basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the 
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam 
of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties 
will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and 
concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in 
order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two 
South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to 
resolve this question within 90 days after the cease-
fire comes into effect. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE 
PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION 
Article 9 
The Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise 
of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination 
(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self determi-
nation is sacred, inalienable and shall be respected by 
all countries. 
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(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves 
the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely 
free and democratic general elections under 
international supervision. 
(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political 
tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese 
people. 
Article 10 
The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect 
the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all 
matters of contention through negotiations and avoid all 
armed conflict. 
Article 11 
Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South 
Vietnamese parties will: 
* Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end 
hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and 
discrimination against individuals or organizations that have 
collaborated with one side or the other. 
* Insure the democratic liberties of the people: 
personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of 
political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, 
freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property 
ownership and right to free enterprise. 
Article 12 
(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South 
Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit 
of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect 
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and mutual none Hmination to set up a National Council 
of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal 
segments. The council shall operate on the principle of 
unanimity. After the National Council of National 
Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, 
the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the 
formation of councils at lower levels. The two South 
Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the 
internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible 
and do their utmost to accomplish this within 90 days 
after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with 
the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, 
independence and democracy. 
(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and 
Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South 
Vietnamese parties' implementation of this agreement, 
achievement of national reconciliation and concord and 
insurance of democratic liberties. The National Council 
of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize 
the free and democratic general elections provided for 
in Article 9(b) and decide the procedures and 
modalities of these general elections. The institutions 
for which the general elections are to be held will be 
agreed upon through consultations between the two 
South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of 
National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide 
the procedures and modalities of such local elections as 
the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon. 
Article 13 
The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South 
Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties 
in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality 
and mutual respect, without interference, in accordance with 
the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed 
by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce 
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their military effective and to demobilize the troops being 
reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish 
this as soon as possible. 
Article 14 
South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace 
and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations 
with all countries irrespective of their political and social 
systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and 
sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any 
country with no political conditions attached. The 
acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future 
shall come under the authority of the government set up after 
the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in 
Article 9(b). 
CHAPTER V 
THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AND THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH 
VIETNAM 
Article 15 
The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step 
by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions 
and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without 
coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign 
interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon 
by North and South Vietnam. 
Pending reunification: 
(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at 
the 17^ ^ Parallel is only provisional and not a political 
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or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 
of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva 
Conference. 
(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the 
demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional 
military demarcation line. 
(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start 
negotiations with a view to re-establishing normal 
relations in various fields. Among the questions to be 
negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement 
across the provisional military demarcation line. 
(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military 
alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign 
powers to maintain military bases, troops, military 
advisers and military personnel on their respective 
territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements on Vietnam. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND 
SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
Article 16 
(a) The parties participating in the Paris conference on 
Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to 
form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the 
task of insuring joint action by the parties in 
implementing the following provisions of this 
agreement: 
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* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam. 
* Article 3(a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces 
and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that 
article. 
* Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South 
Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign 
countries mentioned in Article 3(a). 
* Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military 
bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the 
other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). 
* Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military 
personnel and foreign civilians of the parties. 
* Article 8(b), regarding the mutual assistance of the 
parties in getting information about those military personnel 
and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action. 
(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate 
in accordance with the principle of consultations and 
unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the 
International Commission of Control and Supervision. 
(c) The Four-Party Military Commission shall begin 
operating immediately after the signing of this 
agreement and end its activities in 60 days, after the 
completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those 
of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) 
and the completion of the return of captured military 
personnel and foreign civilians of the parties. 
(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the 
organization, the working procedure, means of activity 
224 
and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission. 
Article 17 
(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately 
designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission with the task of insuring joint 
action by the two South Vietnamese parties in 
implementing the following provisions of this 
agreement: 
* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, 
when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its 
activities. 
* Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two 
South Vietnamese parties. 
* Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all 
parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission has ended its activities. 
* Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the 
introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other 
provisions of this article. 
* Article 8, regarding the question of the return of 
Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in 
South Vietnam; 
* Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military 
effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the 
demobilization of the troops being reduced. 
(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision. 
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(c) After the signing of this agreement, the Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on 
the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the 
cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam. 
Article 18 
(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International 
Commission of Control and Supervision shall be 
established immediately. 
(b) Until the International conference provided in Article 
19 makes definitive arrangements, the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision will report to 
the four parties on matters concerning the control and 
supervision of the implementation of the following 
provisions of this agreement : 
* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam. 
* Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by United 
States forces and those of the other foreign countries 
referred to in that article. 
* Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all the 
parties in South Vietnam. 
* Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South 
Vietnam of United States troops and those of the other 
foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). 
* Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military 
bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the 
other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). 
* Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured 
military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties. 
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The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its 
tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the 
location and operation of these teams. The parties will 
facilitate their operation. 
(c) Until the international conference makes definitive 
arrangements, the International Commission of Control 
and Supervision will report to the two South 
Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control 
and supervision of the implementation of the following 
provisions of this agreement: 
* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire through South Vietnam, when 
the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its 
activities. 
* Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the 
two South Vietnamese parties. 
* Articles 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all 
parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission has ended its activities. 
* Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the 
introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other 
provisions of this article. 
* Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of 
Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in 
South Vietnam. 
* Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic 
general elections in South Vietnam. 
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* Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military 
effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the 
demobilization of the troops being reduced. 
The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its 
tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree 
immediately on the location and operation of these teams. 
The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their 
operations. 
(c) Unit the international conference makes definitive 
arrangements, the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties 
on matters concerning the control and supervision of the 
implementation of the following provisions of this 
agreement: 
* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the 
enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, 
when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its 
activities. 
* Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the 
two South Vietnamese parties. 
* Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all 
parties in South Vietnam, when the four-Party Joint Military 
Commission has ended its activities. 
* Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the 
introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other 
provisions of this article. 
* Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return 
of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in 
South Vietnam. 
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* Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic 
general elections in South Vietnam. 
* Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military 
effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the 
demobilization of the troops being reduced. 
The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its 
tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree 
immediately on the location and operation of these teams. 
The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their 
operation. 
(d) The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four 
countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The 
chairmanship of this commission will rotate among the 
members for specific periods to be determined by the 
commission. 
(e) The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the 
principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam. 
(f) The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of 
consultations and unanimity. 
(g) The International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes 
into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 
18(b) concerning the four parties, the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its 
activities when the commission's tasks of control and 
supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. 
As regards the provisions in Article 18(c) concerning the two 
South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of 
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Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the 
request of the government formed after the general elections 
in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b). 
(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the 
organization, means of activity and expenditures of the 
International Commission of Control and Supervision. The 
relationship between the international commission and the 
international conference will be agreed upon by the 
International Commission and the International Conference. 
Article 19 
The parties agree on the convening of an international 
conference within 30 days of the signing of this agreement to 
acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending 
of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect 
of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and 
the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; 
and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina. , 
The United States and the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris 
conference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties 
that they participate in this international conference: the 
People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, 
the four countries of the International of Control and 
Supervision and the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
together with the parties participating I the Paris conference 
on Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER VII 
REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS 
Article 20 
(a) The parties participating in the Paris conference 
on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements 
on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao 
peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, 
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of these countries. 
The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and 
Laos. 
The parties participating in the Paris conference on 
Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of 
Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the 
sovereignty and security of one another and of other 
countries. 
(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military 
activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and 
refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, 
military advisers and military personnel, armaments, 
munitions and war material. 
(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall 
be settled by the people of each of these countries without 
foreign interference. 
(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese 
countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the 
basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's 
internal affairs. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
Article 21 
The United States anticipates that this agreement will 
usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In 
pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will 
contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar 
reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and 
throughout Indochina. 
Article 22 
The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in 
Vietnam and the strict implementation of this agreement will 
create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually 
beneficial relationship between the United States and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for 
each other's independence and sovereignty and 
noninterference in each other's internal affairs. At the same 
time this will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute 
to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and 
Southeast Asia. 
CHAPTER IX 
OTHER PROVISIONS 
Article 23 
This agreement shall enter into force upon signature by 
plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in 
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the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned 
shall strictly implement this agreement and its protocols. 
Done in Paris this 21^^ day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the 
United States of America 
William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam 
Tran Van Lam 
Minister for foreign Affairs 
For the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
Nguyen Buy Trinh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
For the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of 
South Vietnam 
Nguyen Thi Binh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2-PARTY VERSION AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR 
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM 
The Government of the United State of America, with 
the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam, 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam, 
With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in 
Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's 
fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese 
peoples' right to self-determination, and to contributing to 
the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world. 
Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake 
to respect and to implement them: 
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[Text of agreement Chapters I-VIII same as above] 
CHAPTER IX 
OTHER PROVISIONS 
The Paris agreement on Ending the War and Restoring 
Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature of this 
document by the Secretary of State of the government of the 
United States of America and the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same 
terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the 
United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
South Vietnam. The agreement and the protocols to it shall 
be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned. 
Done in Paris this 27^ ** day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the 
United States of America 
William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 
For the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
Nguyen Duy Trinh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
PROTOCOL ON CLEARING SEA MINES, PROTOCOL TO 
THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND 
RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE 
REMOVAL. PERMANENT DEACTIVATION OR 
DESTRUCTION OF MINES IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, 
PORTS, HARBORS AND WATERWAYS OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
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The Government of the United States of America, 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, 
In the implementation of the second paragraph of 
Article 2 of the Agreement on Ending the war and Restoring 
Peace in Vietnam signed on this date, have agreed as 
follows: 
Article 1 
The United States shall clear all mines it has placed in 
the territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This mine-clearing 
operation shall be accomplished by rendering the mines 
harmless through removal, permanent deactivation or 
destruction. 
Article 2 
With a view to insuring lasting safety for the movement 
of people and watercraft and the protection of important 
installations, mines shall, on the reiquest of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, be removed or destroyed in the 
indicated area; and whenever their removal or destruction is 
impossible, mines shall be permanently deactivated and their 
emplacement clearly marked. 
Article 3 
The mine-clearing operation shall begin at twenty-four 
hundred (2400) hours G.M.T. on Jan. 27, 1973. The 
representatives of the two parties shall consult immediately 
on relevant factors and agree upon the earliest possible 
target date for the completion of the work. 
Article 4 
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The mine-clearing operation shall be conducted in 
accordance with priorities and timing agreed upon by the 
two parties. For this purpose representatives of the two 
parties shall meet at an early date to reach agreement on a 
program and a plan of implementation. To this end : 
(a) The United States shall provide its plan for mine-
clearing operations, including maps of the minefields and 
information concerning the types, numbers and properties of 
the mines. 
(b) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall 
provide all available maps and hydrographic charts and 
indicate the mined places and all other potential hazards to 
the mine-clearing operations that the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam is aware of. 
(c) The Two parties shall agree on the timing of 
implementation of each segment of the plan and provide 
timely notice to the public at least 48 hours in advance of the 
beginning of mine-clearing operations for that segment. 
Article 5 
The United States shall be responsible for the mine 
clearance on island waterways of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall, to the 
full extent of its capabilities, actively participate in the mine 
clearance with the means of surveying, removal and 
destruction, and technical advice supplied by the United 
States. 
Article 6 
With a view to insuring the safe movement of people 
and watercraft on waterways and at sea, the United States 
shall in the mine-clearing process supply timely information 
about the progress of mine clearing in each area, and about 
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the remaining mines to be destroyed. The United States shall 
issue a communique when the operations have been 
concluded. 
Article 7 
In conducting mine-clearing operations, the United 
States personnel engaged n these operations shall respect the 
sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and shall 
engage in no activities inconsistent with the Agreement on 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and this 
protocol. The United States personnel engaged in the mine-
clearing operations shall be immune from the jurisdiction of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the duration of the 
mine-clearing operations. 
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall insure the 
safety of the United State personnel for the duration of their 
mine-clearing activities on the territory of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam and shall provide this personnel with all 
possible assistance and the means needed in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam that have been agreed upon by the two 
parties. 
Article 8 
This protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the 
War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force 
upon signature by the Secretary of State of the Government 
of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by the two parties. 
Done in Paris this 2T^ day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the For the Government of the 
United States of America Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
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William P. Rogers Nguyen Day Trinh 
Secretary of State Minister for Foreign A/fairs 
PROTOCOL ON THE CEASE-FIRE 
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR 
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE 
CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
The parties participating in the Paris conference on 
Vietnam. 
In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, 
Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of 
the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam signed on this date which provides for the cease-
fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission, 
Have agreed as follows : 
CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
Article 1 
The high commands of the parties in South Vietnam 
shall issue prompt and timely orders to all regular and 
irregular armed forces and the armed police under their 
command to completely end hostilities throughout South 
Vietnam, at the exact time stipulated in Article 2 of the 
Agreement and insure that these armed forces and armed 
police comply with these orders and respect the cease-fire. 
Article 2 
(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and 
until regulations are issued by the Joint Military 
Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of 
the parties in South Vietnam shall remain in place; that is, in 
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order to insure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major 
redeployments or movements that would extend each party's 
area of control or would result in contact between opposing 
armed forces and clashes which might take place, 
(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the 
armed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe 
the prohibition of the following acts: 
(1) Armed patrol into areas controlled by opposing 
armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all 
types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and 
maintenance; 
(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military 
or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of 
small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by 
airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device; 
(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, 
on the sea and in the air; 
(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and 
(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private 
property. 
(c) The above mentioned prohibitions shall not 
hamper or restrict; 
(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to 
work and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and 
civilian communication and transportation between and 
among all areas in South Vietnam. 
(2) The use by each party in areas under its control 
of military support elements, such as engineer and 
transportation units, in repair and construction of public 
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facilities and the transportation and supplying of the 
population. 
(3) Normal military proficiency conducted by the 
parties in the areas under their respective control with due 
regard for public safety. 
(d) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately 
agree on corridors, routes and other regulations governing 
the movement of military transport aircraft, military 
transport vehicles and military transport vessels of all types 
of one party going through areas under the control of other 
parties. 
Article 4 
In order to avert conflict and insure normal conditions 
for those armed forces which are in direct contact, and 
pending regulation by the Joint Military Commissions, the 
commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of 
direct contact shall meet as soon as the cease-fire comes into 
force with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary 
measures to avert conflict and to insure supply and medical 
care for these armed forces. 
Article 5 
(a) Within 15 days after the cease-fire comes into 
effect, each party shall do its utmost to complete the removal 
or deactivation of all demolition objects, minefields, traps, 
obstacles or other dangerous objects placed previously, so as 
not to hamper the population's movement and work, in the 
first place on waterways, roads and railroads in South 
Vietnam. Those mines which cannot be removed or 
deactivated within that time shall be clearly marked and must 
be removed or deactivated as soon as possible. 
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(b) Emplacement of mines is prohibited, except as a 
defensive measure around the edges of military installations 
in places where they do not hamper the population's 
movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and 
railroads. Mines and other obstacles already in place at the 
edges of military installations may remain in place if they are 
in place where they do not hamper the population's 
movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and 
railroads. 
Article 6 
Civilian police and civilian security personnel of the 
parties in South Vietnam, who are responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order, shall strictly respect the 
prohibitions set forth in Article 2 of this protocol. As 
required by their responsibilities, normally they shall be 
authorized to carry pistols, but when required by unusual 
circumstances, they shall be allowed to carry other small 
individual arms. 
(a) The entry into South Vietnam of replacement 
armaments, munitions and war material permitted under 
Article 7 of the agreement shall take place under the 
supervision and control of the Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission and of the International Commission of Control 
and Supervision and through such points of entry only as are 
designated by the two South Vietnamese parties. The two 
South Vietnamese parties shall agree on these points of entry 
within 15 days after the entry into force of the cease-fire. 
The two South Vietnamese parties may select as many as six 
points of entry which are not included in the list of places 
where teams of the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision are to be based contained in Article 4(d) of the 
protocol concerning the international commission. At the 
same time, the two South Vietnamese parties may also select 
points of entry from the list of places set forth in Article 4(d) 
of that protocol. 
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(b) Each of the designated points of entry shall be 
available only for that South Vietnamese party which is in 
control of that point. The two South Vietnamese parties shall 
have an equal number of points of entry. 
Article 8 
(a) In implementation of Article 5 of the agreement, 
the United States and the other foreign countries referred to 
in Article 5 of the agreement shall take with them all their 
armaments, munitions and war material. Transfers of such 
items which would leave them in South Vietnam shall not be 
made subsequent to the entry into force of the agreement 
except for transfers of communications, transport and other 
noncombat material to the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission or the International Commission or Control and 
Supervision. 
(b) Within five days after the entry into force of the 
cease-fire, the United States shall inform the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission and the International Commission 
of Control and Supervision of the general plans for timing of 
complete troop withdrawals which shall take place in four 
phases of 15 days each. It is anticipated that the number of 
troops withdrawn in each phase are not likely to be widely 
different, although it is not feasible to insure equal numbers. 
The approximate numbers to be withdrawn in each phase 
shall be given to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
and the International Commission of Control and Supervision 
sufficiently in advance of actual withdrawals so that they can 
properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto. 
Article 9 
(a) In implementation of Article 6 of the agreement, 
the United States and the other foreign countries referred to 
in that article shall dismantle and remove from South 
Vietnam or destroy all military bases in South Vietnam of 
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the United States and of the other foreign countries referred 
to in that article, including weapons, mines and other 
military equipment at these bases, for the purpose of making 
them unusable for military purposes. 
(b) The United States shall supply the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission and the International Commission 
of Control and Supervision with necessary information on 
plans for base dismantlement so that those commissions can 
properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto. 
The Joint Military Commissions 
Article 10 
(a) The implementation of the agreement is the 
responsibility of the parties signatory to the agreement. 
The Four-Party Joint Military Commission has the task 
of insuring joint action by the parties implementing the 
agreement by serving as a channel of communication among 
the parties, by drawing up plans and fixing the modalities to 
carry out, coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation 
of the provisions mentioned in Article 16 of the agreement, 
and by negotiating and settling all matters concerning the 
implementation of those provisions. 
(b) The concrete tasks of the Four-Party Joint 
Military Commission are : 
(1) The coordinate, follow and inspect the 
implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the 
agreement by the four parties. 
(2) To deter and detect violations, to deal with cases 
of violation, and to settle conflicts and matters of contention 
between the parties relating to the above-mentioned 
provisions. 
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(3) To dispatch without delay one or more joint teams 
as required by specific cases, to any part of south Vietnam, 
to investigate alleged violations of the agreement and to 
assist the parties in finding measures to prevent recurrence 
of similar cases. 
(4) To engage in observation at the places where this 
is necessary in the exercise of its functions. 
(5) To perform such additional tasks as it may, by 
unanimous decisions, determine. 
Article 11 
(a) There shall be a Central Joint Military 
Commission located in Saigon. Each party shall designate 
immediately a military delegation of 59 persons to represent 
it on the central commission. The senior officer designated 
by each party shall be a general officer, or equivalent. 
(b) There shall be seven Regional Joint Military 
Commissions located in the regions shown on the annexed 
map and based at the following places: 
Regions 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
Places 
Hue 
Da Nang 
Pleiku 
Phan Thiet 
Bien Hoa 
My Tho 
Can Tho 
Each party shall designate a military delegation of 16 
persons to represent it on each regional commission. The 
senior officer designated by each party shall be an officer 
from the rank of lieutenant colonel to colonel, or equivalent. 
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(c) There shall be a joint military team operating in 
each of the areas shown on the annexed map and based at 
each of the following places in South Vietnam: 
Region I 
Quang Tri 
Phu Bai 
Region II 
Hoi An 
Tam Ky 
Chu Lai 
Region III 
Kotnum 
Hau Bon 
Phu Cat 
Tuy An 
Ninh Hoa 
Ban Me Thuot 
Region IV 
DaLat 
Bao Loc 
Phan Rang 
Region V 
An Loc 
Xuan Loc 
Ben Cat 
Cu Chi 
Tan An 
Region VI 
Moc Hoa 
Diong Trom 
Region VII 
Tri Ton 
Vinh Long 
Vi Thanh 
Khanh Hung 
Quan Long 
Each party shall provide four qualified persons for each 
joint military team. The senior person designated by each 
party shall be an officer from the rank of major to lieutenant 
colonel, or equivalent. 
(d) The Regional Joint Military Commission shall 
assist the Central Joint Military Commission in performing 
its tasks and shall supervise the operations of the military 
teams. The region of Saigon-Gia Dinh is placed under the 
responsibility of the central commission, which shall 
designate joint military teams to operate in this region. 
(e) Each party shall be authorized to provide support 
and guard personnel for its delegations to the Central Joint 
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Military Commission and Regional Joint Military 
Commissions, and for its members of the joint military 
teams. The total number of support and guard personnel for 
each party shall not exceed 550. 
(f) The Central Joint Military Commission may 
establish such joint sub commissions, joint staffs and joint 
military teams as circumstances may require. The central 
commission shall determine the numbers of personnel 
required for any additional subcommissions, staff or teams it 
establishes, provided that each party shall personnel for the 
Four-Party Joint Military Commission, to include its staffs, 
teams and support personnel, shall not exceed 3,300. 
(g)The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties 
may, by agreement, establish provisional subcommissions 
and joint military teams to carry out the tasks specifically 
assigned to them by Article 17 in the agreement. With 
respect to Article 7 of the agreement, the two South 
Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint 
Military Commission shall establish joint military teams at 
the points of entry into South Vietnam used for replacement 
of armaments, munitions and war material which are 
designated in accordance with Article 7 of this protocol. 
From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time 
when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes 
operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations 
to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a 
provisional subcommission and provisional Joint military 
terms to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained 
Vietnamese civilian personnel. Where necessary for the 
above purposes, the two parties may agree to assign 
personnel additional to those assigned to the two South 
Vietnamese delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission. 
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Article 12 
(a) In accordance with Article 17 of the agreement, 
which stipulates that the two South Vietnamese parties shall 
immediately designate their respective representatives to 
form the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, 24 hours 
after the cease-fire comes into force, the two designated 
South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission shall meet in Saigon so as to reach an 
agreement as soon as possible on organization and operation 
of the Two-Party Joint Commission, as well as the measures 
and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and 
preserving peace in South Vietnam. 
(b) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to 
the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission 
becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' 
delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at 
all levels shall simultaneously assume the tasks of the Two-
Party Joint Military Commission at all levels, in addition to 
their functions as delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission. 
(c) If, at the time the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission cease its operation in accordance with Article 
16 of the agreement, agreement has not been reached on 
organization of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission the 
delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties serving with 
the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall 
continue temporarily to work together as a provisional two-
party joint military commission and to assume the tasks of 
the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels until 
the Two-Party Military Commission becomes operational. 
Article 13 
In application of the principle of unanimity, the Joint 
Military Commissions shall have no chairmen, and meetings 
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shall be convened at the request of any representative. The 
Joint Military Commissions shall adopt working procedures 
appropriate for the effective discharge of their functions and 
responsibilities. 
Article 14 
The Joint Military Commissions and the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely 
cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their 
respective functions. Each Joint Military Commission shall 
inform the international commission about the 
implementation of those provisions of the agreement for 
which that Joint Military Commission has responsibility and 
which are within the competence of the international 
commission. Each Joint Military Commission may request 
the international commission to carry out specific 
observation activities. 
Article 15 
The Central Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall 
begin operation 24 hours after the cease-fire comes into 
force. The Regional Four-Party Joint Military Commissions 
shall begin operating 48 hours after the cease-fire comes into 
force. The joint military teams based at the places listed in 
Article 11(c) of this protocol shall begin operating no later 
than 15 days after the cease-fire comes into force. The 
delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties shall 
simultaneously begin to assume the tasks of the Two-Party 
Joint Military Commission as provided in Article 12 of this 
protocol. 
Article 16 
(a) The parties shall provide full protection and all 
necessary assistance and cooperation to the Joint Military 
Commissions at all levels, in the discharge of their tasks. 
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(b) The Join Military Commissions and their 
personnel, while carrying out their tasks shall enjoy 
privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded 
diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents. 
(c) The personnel of the Joint Military Commissions 
may carry pistols and wear special insignia decided upon 
by each Central Joint Military Commission. The personnel of 
each party while guarding commission installations or 
equipment may be authorized to carry individual small arms, 
as determined by each Central Joint Military Commission. 
Article 17 
(a) The delegation of each party to the Four-Party 
Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Mililaiy 
Commission shall have its own offices, communication, 
logistics and transportation means, including aircraft when 
necessary. 
(b) Each party, in its areas of control, shall provide 
appropriate office and accommodation facilities to the Four-
Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission at all levels. 
(c) The parties shall endeavor to provide to the Four-
Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint 
Military Commission by means of loan, lease or gift, the 
common means of operation, including equipment for 
communication, supply and transport, including aircraft when 
necessary. The Joint Military Commissions may purchase 
from any source necessary facilities, equipment and services 
which are not supplied by the parties. The Joint Military 
Commissions shall possess and use these facilities and this 
equipment. 
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(d) The facilities and the equipment for common use 
mentioned above shall be returned to the parties when the 
Joint Military Commissions have ended their activities. 
Article 18 
The common expenses of the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission shall be borne equally by the four parties, and 
the common expenses of the Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission in South Vietnam shall be borne equally by 
these two parties. 
Article 19 
This protocol shall enter into force upon signature by 
plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating 
in the Paris conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly 
implemented by all the parties concerned. 
Done in Paris this 27^ ^ day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the 
United States of America 
William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam 
Tran Van Lam 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
For the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam 
Nguyen Duy Trinh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
For the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of 
the Republic of South Vietnam 
Nguyen Thi Binh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2-PARTY VERSION 
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR 
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE 
250 
CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
The Government of the United States of America, with 
the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam, 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam, 
In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, 
Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of 
the Agreement on Ending the war and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam signed on this date which provide for the cease-fire 
in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint 
IvliTTtary Comnrreston—a»d—a—Two^£aily__J[oini^_Nlilitary 
Commission, 
Have agreed as follows: 
[Text of protocol Articles 1-18 same as above] 
Article 19 
The protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Concerning the Cease-fire in 
south Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions shall 
enter into force upon signature of this document by the 
Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and 
upon signature of a document in the same terms by the 
Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of 
America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government 
of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the protocol shall be strictly implemented 
by all the parties concerned. 
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Done in Paris this 2T^ day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the For the Government of the 
United States of America Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
William P. Rogers Nguyen Duy Trinh 
Secretary of State Minister for Foreign Affairs 
PROTOCOL ON CONTROL COMMISSION 
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR 
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND 
SUPERVISION 
— Xhe-4iaili^s_^articipatingin the Paris conference on 
Vietnam, 
In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on 
this data providing for the formation of the International 
Commission oi coliliOi and Supervision, Have agreed as 
follows: 
Article 1 
The implementation of the agreement is the 
responsibility of the parties signatory to the agreement. 
The functions of the international commission are to 
control and supervise the implementation of the provisions 
mentioned in Article 18 of the agreement. In carrying out 
these functions, the international commission shall: 
(a) Follow the implementation of the above-
mentioned provisions of the agreement through 
communication with the parties and on-the-spot observation 
at the places where this is required. 
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(b) Investigate violations of the provisions which fall 
under the control and supervision of the commission. 
(c) When necessary, cooperate with the Joint 
Military Commissions in deterring and detecting violations 
of the above-mentioned provisions. 
The international commission shall investigate 
violations of the provisions described in Article 18 of the 
agreement on the request of the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission, or of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission 
or of any party, or, with respect to Article 9(b) of the 
agreement on general elections, of the National Council of 
National Reconciliation and Concord, or in any case where 
the international commission has other adequate grounds for 
TonsiHering flial there—has—b^#n—a—vioJatiQiL_jof_Jhosie 
provisions. It is understood that, in carrying out this task, 
the international commission shall function with the 
concerned parties' assistance and cooperation as required. 
Article 3 
(a) When the international commission finds that 
there is a serious violation in the implementation of the 
agreement or a threat to peace against which the commission 
can find no appropriate measure, the commission shall report 
this to the four parties to the agreement so that they can hold 
consultations to find a solution. 
(b) In accordance with Article 18(f) of the agreement, 
the international commission's reports shall be made with the 
unanimous agreement of the representatives of all the four 
members. In case no unanimity is reached, the commission 
shall forward the different views to the four parties in 
accordance with Article 18(c) of the agreement, but these 
shall not be considered as reports of the commission. 
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Article 4 
(a) The headquarters of the international commission 
shall be at Saigon. 
(b) There shall be seven regional teams located in the 
regions on the annexed map and based at the following 
places: 
Regions 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
Places 
Hue 
Danang 
Pleiku 
Phan Thiet 
Bien Hoa 
My Tho 
Can Tho 
The international commission shall redesignate three 
teams for the region of Saigon-Gia Dinh. 
(c) There shall be 26 teams operating in the areas 
shown on the annexed map and based at the following places 
in South Vietnam: 
Region I 
Quang Tri 
Phu Bai 
Region III 
Region 
Kontum 
Hau Bon 
Phu Cat 
Tinh Hoa 
Ninh Hoa 
Ban Me Thuot 
Region II 
Hoi An 
Tam Ky 
Chu Lai 
Ben Cat 
CuChi 
Tan An 
Region VI 
Moc Hoa 
Giong Trom 
Region VI 
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Region IV Tri Ton 
Da Lat Vinh Long 
Bao Loc Vi Thanh 
Phan Rang Khanh Hung 
Quan Long 
Region V 
An Loc 
Xuan Loc 
(d) There shall be 12 teams located as shown on the 
annexed map and based at the followiiig places: 
Lao Bao Vung Tau 
Ben Het Xa Mat 
Due Co Bien Hoa Airfield 
Chu Lai Hong Ngu 
Qui Nhon Can Tho 
Nha Trang 
(e) There shall be seven teams, six of which shall be 
available for assignment to the points of entry which are not 
listed in paragraph (d) above and which the two South 
Vietnamese parties choose as points for legitimate entry to 
South Vietnam for replacement of armaments, munitions and 
war material permitted by Article 7 of the agreement. Any 
team or teams not needed for the above-mentioned 
assignment shall be available for other tasks, in keeping with 
the commission's responsibility for control and supervision. 
(f) There shall be seven teams to control and 
supervise the return of captured and detained personnel of 
the parties. 
Article 5 
(a) To carry out its task concerning the return of the 
captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the 
parties as stipulated by Article 8 (a) of the agreement, the 
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international commission shall, during the time of such return 
send one control and supervision team to each place in 
Vietnam where the captured persons are being returned, and 
to the last detention places from which these persons will be 
taken to the places of return. 
(b) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the 
Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in south 
Vietnam mentioned in Article 8 (c) of the agreement, the 
international commission shall, during the time of such 
return, send one control and supervision team to each place 
in south Vietnam where the above-mentioned captured and 
detained persons are being returned, and to the last detention 
places from which these persons shall be taken to the places 
of return. 
Article 6 
To,carry out its tasks regarding Article 9 (b) of the 
agreement on the free and democratic general elections in 
South Vietnam, the international commission shall organize 
additional teams, when necessary. The international 
commission shall discuss this question in advance with the 
National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. If 
additional teams are necessary for this purpose; they shall be 
formed 30 days before the general elections. 
Article 7 
The international commission shall continually keep 
under review its size, and shall reduce the number of its 
teams, its representatives or other personnel, or both, when 
those teams, representatives or personnel have accomplished 
the tasks assigned to them and are not required for other 
tasks. At the same time, the expenditures of the international 
commission shall be reduced correspondingly. 
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Article 8 
The international commission shall continually keep 
under review its size, and shall reduce the number of its 
teams, its representatives or other personnel, or both , when 
those teams, representatives or personnel have accomplished 
the tasks assigned to them and are not required for other 
tasks. At the same time, the expenditures of the international 
commission shall be reduced correspondingly. 
Article 8 
Each member of the international commission shall 
make available at all times the following numbers of 
qualified personnel: 
(a) One senior representative and 26 others for the 
headquarters staff. 
(b) Five for each of the seven regional teams. 
(c) Two for each of the other international control 
teams, except for the teams at Gio Linh and Vung Tau, each 
of which shall have three. 
(d) One hundred sixteen for the purpose of providing 
support to the commission headquarters and its teams. 
Article 9 
(a) The international commission, and each of its 
team, shall act as a single body comprising representatives 
of all four members. 
(b) Each member has the responsibility to insure the 
presence of its representatives at all levels of the 
international commission. In case a representative is absent. 
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the member concerned shall immediately designate a 
replacement. 
Article 10 
(a) The parties shall afford full cooperation, 
assistance and protection to the international commission. 
(b) The parties shall at all times maintain regular and 
continuous liaison with the international commission. During 
the existence of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, 
the delegations of the parties to that commission shall also 
perform liaison functions with the international commission. 
After the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its 
activities, such liaison shall be maintained through the Two-
Party Joint Military Commission, liaison missions or other 
adequate means. 
(c) The international commission and the Joint 
Military Commissions shall closely cooperate with and assist 
each other in carrying out their respective functions. 
(d) Wherever a team is stationed or operating, the 
concerned party shall designate a liaison officer to the team 
to cooperate with and assist it in carrying out without 
hindrance its task of control and supervision. When a team is 
carrying out an investigation, a liaison officer from each 
concerned, party shall have the opportunity to accompany it^  
provided the investigation is not thereby delayed. 
(e) Each party shall give the international 
commission reasonable advance notice of all proposed 
actions concerning those provisions of the agreement that are 
to be controlled and supervised by the international 
commission. 
(f) The international commission, including its teams, 
is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably 
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required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated 
in the agreement. In carrying out these functions, the 
international commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all 
necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties 
concerned. 
Article 11 
In supervising the holding of the free and democratic 
general elections described in Articles 9(b) and 12(b) of the 
agreement in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon 
between the National Council of National Reconciliation and 
Concord and the international commission, the latter shall 
receive full cooperation and assistance from the national 
council. 
Article 12 
The international commission and its personnel who 
have the nationality of a member state shall, while carrying 
out their tasks, enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to 
those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents. 
Article 13 
The international commission may use the means of 
communication and transport necessary to perform its 
functions. Each South Vietnamese party shall make available 
for rent to the international commission appropriate office 
and accommodation facilities and shall assist it in obtaining 
such facilities. The international commission may receive 
from the parties, on mutually agreeable terms, the necessary 
means of communication and transport and may purchase 
from any source necessary equipment and service not 
obtained from the parties. The international commission shall 
possess these means. 
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Article 14 
The expenses for the activities of the international 
commission shall be borne by the parties and the members of 
the international commission in accordance with the 
provisions of this article: 
(a) Each member country of the international 
commission shall pay the salaries and allowances of its 
personnel. 
(b) All other expenses incurred by the international 
commission shall be met from a fund to which each of the 
four parties shall contribute twenty-three per cent (23%) and 
to which each member of the international commission shall 
contribute two per cent (2%). 
(c) Within 30 days of the date of entry into force of 
this protocol, each of the four parties shall provide the 
international commission with an initial sum equivalent to 
four million five hundred thousand (4,500,000) French francs 
in convertible currency, which sum shall be credited against 
the amounts due from that party under the first budget. 
(d) The international commission shall prepare its 
own budgets. After the international commission approves a 
budget, it shall transmit it to all parties signatory to the 
agreement for their approval. Only after the budgets have 
been approved by the four parties to the agreement shall they 
be obliged to make their contributions. However, in case the 
parties to the agreement do not agree on a new budget, the 
international commission shall temporarily base its 
expenditures on the previous budget, except for the 
extraordinary, one-time expenditures for installation or for 
the acquisition of equipment, and the parties shall continue 
to make their contributions on that basis until a new budget 
is approved. 
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Article 15 
(a) The headquarters shall be operational and in 
place within 24 hours after the cease-fire. 
(b) The regional teams shall be operational and in 
place, and three teams for supervision and control of the 
return of the captured and detained personnel shall be 
operational and ready for dispatch within 48 hours after the 
cease-fire. 
(c) Other teams shall be operational and in place 
within 15 to 30 days after the cease-fire. 
Article 16 
Meetings shall be convened at of call of the chairman. 
The international commission shall adopt other working 
procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of its 
functions and consistent with respect for the sovereignty of 
South Vietnam. 
Article 17 
The members of the international commission may 
accept the obligations of this protocol by sending notes of 
acceptance to the four parties signatory to the agreement. 
Should a member of the international commission decide to 
withdraw from the international commission, it may do so by 
giving three months' notice by means of notes to the four 
parties to the agreement, in which case those four parties 
shall consult among themselves for the purpose of agreeing 
upon a replacement member. 
This protocol shall enter into force upon signature by 
plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating 
in the Paris conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly 
implemented by all the parties concerned. 
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rth Done in Paris this 27"" day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are officially and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the 
United States of America 
William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam 
Iran Van Lam 
Minister for Foreign 
For the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
Nguyen Duy Trinh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
For the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of 
theRepublic of South Vietnam 
AffairsNguyen Thu Binh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2-PARTY VERSION PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING 
THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM CONCERNING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION 
The Government of the United States of America, with 
the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam. 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam. 
In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on 
this date providing for the formation of the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision. 
Have agreed as follows: 
[Text of protocol Articles 1-17 same as above] 
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Article 18 
The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the International 
Commission of Control and Supervision shall enter into force 
upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of 
the Government of the United States of America and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a 
document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the 
Government of the United States of America, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government 
of the Republic of South Vietnam. The protocol shall be 
strictly implemented by all the parties concerned. 
Done in Paris this 27^ ^ day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the 
United States of America 
William P. Rogers 
Secretary of State 
For the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
Nguyen Duy Trinh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
PROTOCOL ON THE PRISONERS PROTOCOL TO THE 
AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR CONCERNING THE 
RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND 
FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED 
VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
The parties participating in the Paris conference on 
Vietnam, 
In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on 
this data providing for the return of captured military 
263 
personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained 
Vietnamese civilian personnel, 
Have agreed as follows: 
THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY 
PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS 
Article 1 
The parties signatory to the agreement shall return the 
captured military personnel of the parties mentioned in 
Article 8 (a) of the agreement as follows: 
* All captured military personnel of the United 
States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in 
Article 3 (a) of the agreement shall be returned to United 
States authorities. 
* All captured Vietnamese military personnel, 
whether belonging to regular or irregular armed forces, shall 
be returned to the two South Vietnamese parties; they shall 
be returned to that South Vietnamese party under whose 
command they served. 
Article 2 
All captured civilians who are nationals of the United 
States of any other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 
(a) of the agreement shall be returned to United States 
authorities. All other captured foreign civilians shall be 
retained to the authorities of their country of nationality by 
any one of the parties willing and able to do so. 
Article 3 
The parties shall today exchange complete lists of 
captured persons mentioned in Article 1 and 2 of this 
protocol. 
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Article 4 
(a) The return of all captured persons mentioned in 
Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol shall be completed within 
60 days of the signing of the agreement at a rte no slower 
than the rate of withdrawal from South Vietnam of United 
States forces and those of the other foreign countries 
mentioned in Article 5 of the agreement. 
(b) Persons who are seriously ill, wounded or 
maimed, old persons and women shall be returned first. The 
remainder shall be returned either by returning all from one 
detention place after another or in order of their dates of 
capture beginning with those who have been held the 
longest. 
Article 5 
carried out at places convenient to the concerned 
parties. Places of return shall be agreed upon by the Four-
Party Joint Military Commission. The parties shall insure the 
safety of personnel engaged in the return and reception of 
those persons. 
Article 5 
The return and reception of the persons mentioned in 
Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol shall be carried out at 
places convenient to the concerned parties. Places of return 
shall be agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission. The parties shall insure the safety of personnel 
engaged in the return and reception of those persons. 
Article 6 
Each party shall return all captured persons mentioned 
in Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol without delay and shall 
facilitate their return and reception. The detaining parties 
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shall not deny or delay their return for any reason, including 
the fact that captured persons may, on any ground, have been 
prosecuted or sentenced. 
THE RETURN OF CAPTURED AND 
DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
Article 7 
(a) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian 
personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be 
resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of 
the principles of Article 21 (b) of the agreement on the 
Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954, which 
reads as follows: 
"The term 'civilian internees' is understood to mean all 
persons who, having in any way contributed to the political 
and armed struggle between the two parties, have been 
arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by 
either party during the period of hostilities." 
(b) The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a 
spirit of national reconciliation and concord with a view to 
ending hatred and enmity in order to ease suffering and to 
reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do 
their utmost to resolve this question within 90 days after the 
cease-fire comes into effect. 
(c) Within 15 days after the cease-fire comes into 
effect, the two South Vietnamese parties shall exchange lists 
of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained 
by each party and lists of the places at which they are held. 
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TREATMENT OF CAPTURED PERSONS 
DURING DETENTION 
Article 8 
(a) All captured military personnel of the parties and 
captured foreign civilians of the parties shall be treated 
humanely at all times, and in accordance with international 
practice. 
They shall be protected against all violence to life and 
person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, 
torture and cruel treatment, and outrages, upon personal 
dignity. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed 
forces of the detaining party. 
They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter 
and the medical attention required for their state of health. 
They shall be allowed to exchange postcards and letters with 
their families and receive parcels. 
(b) All Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and 
detained in South Vietnam shall be treated humanely at all 
times, and in accordance with international practice. 
They shall be protected against all violence to life and 
person, in particular against murder in any form, multilation, 
torture and cruel treatment, and outrages against personal 
dignity. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their 
return for any reason including the fact that captured persons 
may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced. 
These personnel shall not be forced to join the armed forces 
of the detaining party. 
They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter 
and the medical attention required for their state of health. 
They shall be allowed to exchange postcards and letters with 
their families and receive parcels. 
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Article 9 
(a) To contribute to improving the living conditions 
of the captured military personnel of the parties and foreign 
civilians of the parties, the parties shall, within 15 days after 
the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation 
of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all 
places where captured military personnel and foreign 
civilians are held. 
(b) To contribute to improving the living conditions 
of the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel, 
the two South Vietnamese parties shall, within 15 days after 
the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation 
of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all 
places where the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian 
personnel are held. 
WITH REGARD TO DEAD AND MISSING PERSONS 
Article 10 
(a) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall 
insure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 
8(b) of the agreement. When the Four-Party Joint Military 
Commission has ended its activities, a Four-Party Joint 
Military Team shall be maintained to carry on this task. 
(b) With regard to Vietnamese civilian personnel 
dead or missing in South Vietnam, the two South Vietnamese 
parties shall help each other to obtain information about 
missing persons, determine the location and take care of the 
graves of the dead, in a spirit of national reconciliation and 
concord, in keeping with the people's aspirations. 
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OTHER PROVISIONS 
Article 11 
(a) The Four-Party and Two-Party Joint Military 
Commissions will have the responsibility of determining 
immediately the modalities of implementing the provisions of 
this protocol consistent with their respective responsibilities 
under Articles 16(a) and 17(a) of the agreement. In case the 
Joint Military Commission, when carrying out their tasks, 
cannot reach agreement on a matter pertaining to the return 
of captured personnel they shall refer to the international 
commission for its assistance. 
(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall 
form, in addition to the teams established by the protocol 
concerning the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint 
Military Commissions, a subcommission on captured persons 
and, as required, joint military teams on captured persons to 
assist the commission in its tasks. 
(c) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to 
the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission 
becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' 
delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission 
shall form a provisional subcommission and provisional joint 
military teams to carry out its tasks concerning captured and 
detained Vietnamese civilian personnel. 
(d) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall 
send joint military teams to observe the return of the persons 
mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol at each place 
in Vietnam where such persons are being returned and at the 
last detention places from which these persons will be taken 
to the places of return. The Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the 
return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and 
detained at each place in South Vietnam where such persons 
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are being captured, and at the last detention places from 
which these persons will be taken to the places of return. 
In implementation of Articles 18(b) and 18(c) of the 
agreement, the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision shall have the responsibility to control and 
supervise the observance of Articles 1 through 7 of this 
protocol through observation of the return of captured 
military personnel, foreign civilians and captured and 
detained Vietnamese civilian personnel at each place in 
Vietnam where these persons are being returned, and at the 
last detention places from which these persons will be taken 
to the places of return, the examination of lists and the 
investigation of violations of the provisions of the above-
mentioned articles. 
Article 13 
Within five days after signature of this protocol, each 
party shall publish the text of the protocol and communicate 
it to all the captured persons covered by the protocol and 
being detained by that party. 
Article 14 
This protocol shall come into force upon signature by 
plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating 
in the Paris conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly 
implemented by all the parties concerned. 
Done in Paris this 27^^ day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the For the Government of the 
United States of America Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
William P. Rogers Nguyen Duy Trinh 
Secretary of State Minister for Foreign Affairs 
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For the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam 
Iran Van Lam 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
For the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of 
the Republic of South Vietnam 
Nguyen Thi Binh 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
2-PARTY VERSION PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON 
ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM 
CONCERNING THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY 
PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS 
AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN 
PERSONNEL 
The Government of the United States of America, with 
the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam. 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam. 
In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on 
this date providing for the return of captured military 
personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained 
Vietnamese civilian personnel. 
Have agreed as follows: 
[Text of protocol Articles 1-13 same as above] 
Article 14 
The protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Return of 
Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians and 
Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel shall 
enter into force upon signature of this document by the 
Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Minster for Foreign Affairs of the 
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Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and 
upon signature of a document in the same terms by the 
Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of 
America the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government 
of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South 
Vietnam. The protocol shall be strictly implemented by all 
the parties concerned. 
Done in Paris this 27*^  day of January, 1973, in 
Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts 
are official and equally authentic. 
For the Government of the For the Government of the 
United States of America Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
William P. Rogers Nguyen Duy Trinh 
Secretary of State Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Source : Arthur M.Schksinger and J.R. Albert Schweitzer, 
(edited), World Power : A Documentary History of 
United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973. (New York : 
Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), pp. 808-841. 
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